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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The HF (3 to 30 MHz) spectrum is utilized for long distance 
communications by the military, amateur radio, shipping and diplomatic services. 
Communications is no longer limited to voice and telegraphy, but now include 
applications such as email, text messaging, image, and telemetry. This project looks 
into the design and development of an image transmission system that for use in the 
HF radio frequency spectrum. Additional features of the system include short 
messaging, text file transfer, and electronic security such as authentication and 
confidentiality. An AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) block is cipher is used for 
both authentication and key distribution with key length 256 bits and 128 bits 
respectively. For confidentiality, stream cipher algorithm used is based on the linear 
feedback register (LFSR) and a nonlinear combining function. To meet the 
requirements of the maritime industry, further research were done to include light 
house telemetry and automatic vessel tracking system. The system is built around an 
HF data communication system: HF transceiver, modem, controller and computer. 
Experiments were performed for data transmission over the HF spectrum at lower 
power of 5 to 25 watts on the 40 meter band (7.0 to 7.1 MHz) and marine band (8.0 
to 8.8 MHz) for selected links within the Peninsular Malaysia. At low power, the 
advantage is in increasing equipment life, minimize power supply requirements, and 
minimize interference to other users. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Frekuensi Tinggi (3 hingga 30 MHz) digunakan oleh tentera, radio amatur, 
industri perkapalan dan dalam perkhidmatan diplomatik untuk berkomunikasi jarak 
jauh. Kini, komunikasi jenis ini bukan sahaja terhad menggunakan suara dan 
telegrafi tetapi boleh juga digunakan untuk menghantar data seperti aplikasi e-mail, 
mesej bergambar dan juga telemetri. Projek ini bertujuan untuk merekacipta dan 
membangunkan sistem komunikasi yang mampu manghantar imej atau gambar 
menggunakan frekuensi tinggi. Selain itu, ia juga boleh digunakan untuk menghantar 
mesej pendek dan fail teks di samping mempunyai ciri-ciri keselamatan untuk 
memastikan komunikasi adalah selamat. Untuk pengesahan dan penghantaran identiti 
pengguna, penyahkod jenis AES digunakan manakala untuk komunikasi secara 
selamat, sistem menggunakan algorithma penyahkod jenis bit. Sistem ini diharap 
memenuhi kehendak semasa terutamanya dalam industri maritim. Untuk itu, projek 
ini juga memberi tumpuan untuk membangunkan sistem telemetri rumah api dan 
sistem pengesanan kapal secara automatik. Kesemua sistem menggunakan frekuensi 
tinggi sebagai medium perhubungan, maka ia memerlukan perkakasan seperti radio, 
modem dan komputer untuk berfungsi. Beberapa sesi ujian komunikasi telah 
dijalankan di beberapa bahagian di semenanjung Malaysia dengan hanya 
menggunakan kuasa penghantaran dalam lingkungan 5 ke 25 watt. Pada kadar ini, ia 
mampu menambah jangka hayat perkakasan, meminimum penggunaan kuasa dan 
gangguan kepada pengguna lain.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
High frequency (HF) radio has been used as wireless communication method 
for decades especially for beyond line of sight communications. The high frequency 
spectrum refers to the band of radio frequency spectrum from 3 to 30 MHz. By using 
the refractive properties of the ionosphere, it is possible to use these frequencies for 
long distance communications by sky-wave propagation. Despite the introduction of 
satellite services, the use of this medium has been undergoing resurgence over the 
last few years (NTIA-ITS, 1998). The most important benefit is providing 
communication over thousands of miles, as far away as the other side of the world. 
The second advantage is, HF free to use because the ionosphere is not own by 
anyone and equipment required is with minimal infrastructure. Therefore, the cost to 
setup a HF communication system is much cheaper as compared to other means of 
communication such as satellite (Abdullah et al., 2003). And the third advantage is, 
the HF communication is completely our national control and not compromise with 
other organization from other country. This will ensure the integrity and security of 
the communication. 
 
 
The HF radio’s usage has been expanded and propagation problems were 
overcame by new technologies in digital communication and digital signal 
processing (NTIA-ITS, 1998; MIL-STD-188-141B, 1999). This enhances the 
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reliability of communication in the HF spectrum. Besides voice and telegraphy, text, 
fax and images can be transmitted by using HF modem (SailMail, 2004; Cruiseemail, 
2004; Harris Corporation, 2002). These new technologies permit computer-to-
computer communication. In communication either connection-oriented or wireless, 
security such as authentication and confidentiality is important due to the broadcast 
nature of HF communication. But unfortunately, most of the existing HF commercial 
systems such as Sail Mail, Cruise Mail and Winlink 2000 do not provide any features 
for authentication and confidentiality. Only products from Mils and Crypto AG 
(Mils, 2004; Crypto AG, 2004) promised that kind of security components. Others 
are only available as part of military communication equipment and is too costly for 
commercial user. Thus, there is a need for the development of a Secured HF 
Transmission System for commercial use which not only capable to send an image, 
but also text files and short message as well.  
 
 
 
 
1.1 Objective 
 
 
The objectives of the project are 
 
(i) To develop a prototype of HF transmission system which capable to 
transmit image, text file and short message via HF frequency 
spectrum with security features. 
 
(ii) Analyze a chosen set of stream cipher algorithm to access its strength 
and weakness. 
  
(iii) To implement real-time HF modem by using DSP board with for low 
power consumption. 
 
(iv) To develop a prototype of telemetry system using HF frequency 
spectrum. 
 3
 
1.2 Scope Of Work 
 
 
(i) The prototype of system is developed by using Microsoft Visual C++ 
software and Windows platform as Operating System. 
 
(ii) Block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is included for 
authentication and key distribution while the stream cipher used is 
based on the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) for confidentiality. 
  
(iii) The analyses on stream cipher conducted based on common key 
length of 64 bit keys. Due to the system developed, the security is not 
limited to 64 bit key but can be enhanced by increasing the key length 
to 128 bits or more. This is because the key length can be extended by 
increasing the size of the LFSR. 
  
(iv) For development of HF modem, DQPSK is chosen as the modulation 
technique because of its relative simplicity of implementation and its 
robustness to error in phase synchronization. 
 
(v) Sampling frequency that is used is 8000Hz and the channel bandwidth  
is 3 kHz. This corresponds to the typical voice bandwidth used in HF 
communication systems.  
 
(vi) Even thought the project not focus on JPEG image compression, but 
the system prototypes is capable to use any JPEG image for 
transmission over HF frequency spectrum. 
 
(vii) For telemetry, the SCADA system is developed for lighthouse 
telemetry and vessel tracking system. 
  
(viii) At master station, a computer is being used in displaying information 
and data storage for future analysis.  A Microsoft Visual C++ based 
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Graphical User Interface (GUI) is implemented as a computer 
software to display the information of the lighthouse condition and 
vessel position. All the information is stored in database for offline 
analysis. 
 
(ix) At remote station, printed circuit board (PCB) based on PIC 
microcontroller is designed for remote terminal unit (RTU). 
  
(x) The project is not includes design the HF transceiver and antenna. 
Therefore, both equipments are purchase directly from the open 
market. For the HF modems, they are purchased in order to 
understand the existing system works and to reverse engineering the 
technology involved. 
 
(xi) The frequencies that is used during transmission is determined using 
third party software called ASAPS (Advanced Stand Alone Prediction 
System) and also based on license given by MCMC (Malaysian 
Communications and Multimedia Commission). 
 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
 
 
Computer networks normally transfer data via ground-based communication 
infrastructure such as telephone lines and fiber optic cables. However, this is 
impossible to communicate with places where terrestrial-based links are not possible 
and unreachable places by land such as on a ship, or on an aircraft. Satellite can be 
used but studies (Abdullah et al., 2003) have shown that it is too costly. Thus, HF 
radio becomes the alternative communication medium for data transmission. In 
December 2004, when the tragic tsunami disaster happened in Aceh, all the 
communication systems were shut down. Therefore, the help from neighboring 
countries is found difficult. At that time, the only communication between them and 
the outside world is HF communication and this unexpected situation shows the 
significant of HF communication. 
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  In general, the broadcast nature of any radio communication system such as 
HF communication makes it vulnerable interception by an unauthorized third party. 
Thus, there is a need for authentication, confidentiality and integrity services. This is 
to ensure only the authorized users use the system and the information is not access 
by unauthorized third party. Due to noisy channel conditions, stream ciphers are 
ideal choices over block ciphers for bulk data transmission based on faster 
implementation speed and do not introduce error of propagation. By employing the 
block and stream ciphers for authentication and encryption, the system will provide a 
secured data transmission over the HF spectrum.  
 
 
 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
 
The ensure the success of the project, the following steps are taken 
 
(i) Literature and technology review of work done at the academic 
institutions and relevant industries. 
 
(ii) Evaluation and development of stream cipher and block cipher 
algorithms for confidentiality and integrity. 
 
(iii) Implementation of DQPSK on the targeted hardware 
TMS320VC5416. 
 
(iv) Develop HF transmission system using Visual C++. The program 
shall be capable to control basic function for transmitting and 
receiving purposes. 
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(v) Integration of the software application, cipher system and modem as a 
demonstrable prototype. 
 
(vi) Field-testing of the system is conducted to verify the performance 
based on the Kuala Lumpur-Skudai HF link and other designated 
sites.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Organization of Report 
 
 
The report begins with the introduction that describes the objectives, scope 
and research methodology. This is followed by the literature review in Chapter 2 that 
gives an overview of the work done and the technology available in the open market. 
Chapter 3 describes the stream cipher analysis. The implementation of DQPSK HF 
modem and implementation of HF messenger software are described in Chapter 4 
and 5. New features on lighthouse telemetry and vessel tracking system are discussed 
in Chapter 6. The final chapter is the conclusion and recommendation for future 
work. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
HF communications is alternative way for long distance communication both 
for commercial or military use. With the Secured HF Transmission System, data can 
be transmitted with authentication and confidentiality. This application consist two 
separate parts: HF communication and the cryptography. 
 
In order to use this application efficiently, a basic knowledge of HF 
propagation is required. Thus, this chapter will describe about the science behind HF 
communication and its properties, followed by introduction to HF modem, 
cryptography and crypto analysis. By combining both technologies, many 
applications were developed that inspired the development of secured HF 
transmission system that will be also discussed in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
2.1 HF Propagation Characteristics 
 
 
Wireless communication is separated into several modes, which are LF, MF, 
HF, VHF, UHF and microwave. In the microwave region, the wave is more 
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directional compared to other propagation modes, which travel in a wave-like 
manner. In the HF region, solar ionization of the upper reaches of atmosphere causes 
an effect known as skywave propagation that leads to long-distance communications 
and intercontinental broadcasting.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Atmosphere Layer (Australian Space Weather Agency) 
 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the space that covers up to 400 kilometers high from ground 
level. A blanket of air, which is called atmosphere, surrounds the Earth. It reaches 
over 560 kilometers from the surface of the Earth (Harris Corp., 1996). The 
troposphere starts at the Earth’s surface and extends 8 to 14.5 kilometers high. This 
region, which is also known as lower atmosphere, is the densest. The stratosphere 
starts just above the troposphere and extends to 50 kilometers high. Stratosphere is 
dry and less dense compared to the troposphere. The ozone layer, which absorbs and 
scatters the solar ultraviolet radiation, is in this layer. Ninety-nine percent of “air” is 
located in the troposphere and stratosphere. The mesosphere starts just above the 
stratosphere and extends up to 85 kilometers high. The chemicals are in an excited 
state, as they absorb energy from the sun. The thermosphere starts just above the 
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mesosphere and extends up to 600 kilometers high. Chemical reactions occur much 
faster here than on the surface of the Earth. 
 
 
For HF communication, the ionosphere is the most important region that 
begins at an altitude of about 50 kilometers and extends up to approximately 300 
kilometers. The ionosphere is a region of very thin atmosphere. Ionosphere is clearly 
a very unpredictable region. HF communication utilizes the ionosphere to enable 
long distance communication.  During the day, there may be four regions present 
called D, E, F1 and F2 regions. Among these regions, only E, F1, sporadic E, and F2 
refract HF waves. The conditions of the regions differ from night and day according 
to the solar cycle (Carr, 2001). HF propagation, as shown in Figure 2.2, is divided 
into three, which are 
 
(i) ground wave propagation. 
(ii) line of sight propagation or space wave. 
(iii) sky wave propagation. 
 
 
Ground wave propagation is the dominant mode of propagation for 
frequencies below 2 MHz (Couch, 1997). Here the electromagnetic tends to follow 
the contour of the Earth. This is the propagation mode used in amplitude modulation 
(AM) broadcasting. The ground wave travels in direct contact with the Earth’s 
surface, and it suffers a severe frequency-dependent attenuation because of 
absorption by the ground. The losses are caused by ohmic resistive losses in 
conductive Earth as well as to the dielectric properties of the Earth. 
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Figure 2.2: Propagation Paths 
 
 
Line of sight propagation or also known as space wave is the dominant mode 
for frequencies above 30MHz (Couch, 1997). Here the electromagnetic wave 
propagates in a straight line. The disadvantage of the space wave propagation mode 
is for communication between terrestrial stations, the signal path has to be above the 
horizon, or else the Earth will block the line-of-sight path. 
 
 
Skywave propagation is the dominant mode of propagation in the 3~30MHz 
frequency range. Here, long distance coverage is obtained by reflecting the wave at 
the ionosphere. Skywave propagation is caused primarily by reflection from F layer 
(Couch, 1997). Because of this layer, international broadcast stations in HF band can 
be heard from the other side of the world at almost any time during day and night. 
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2.2 Effects of Multipath 
 
 
The advantages of HF communication arise from its relative simplicity, its 
ability to provide near global connectivity at low power without relay and its 
moderate cost. The apparent disadvantages are directly related to ionospheric 
variability. Fading caused by solar disturbances (Goodman, 1992) and multipath 
interferences leads to a reduction in reliability in HF communication. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Multipath Reception 
 
 
Multipath fading results from dispersion of the signal by the transmitting 
antenna (Goodman, 1992). A number of modes propagate have variations in phase 
and amplitude. These occur because of the signal which maybe be refracted by 
different layers of ionosphere and also because of signal hopping as shown in Figure 
2.3. These waves may interfere with each other, resulting in the signal fading each 
other if they arrived at the receiver in different phase. This kind of fading is known 
as multipath fading and it leads to time selective fading and frequency selective 
fading, which is the main cause for baud rate limitation. If the signal is transmitted 
over 100 baud through skywave, a phenomena which is known as inter symbol 
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interference (ISI) will occur. This is where adjacent symbols interfere with each 
other. This is caused by time delay spread, which is the main factor in symbol rate 
limitation of 100 baud per second (Willink et al, 1996). 
 
 
 Time selective fading is caused by delay due to multipath effect within one 
phase. This delay in phase will result in cancellation of waves or attenuation in wave 
amplitude. The worst case happens if the same signal from different paths arrives at 
the receiver at 0180  phase different, resulting in the wave practically canceling each 
other. A delay in milisecond unit due to multipath, introduces a frequency selective 
fading to the system. Frequency selective fading will cause certain frequencies to be 
attenuated. This in turn will introduce time delay spread problem to the system. So in 
order to avoid this problem, symbol transmission rate is limited to 100 baud per 
second (Willink et al, 1996). 
 
 
Doppler shift is caused by the vibration of electrons in the ionosphere layer 
(Goodman, 1992). Doppler shift will introduce a change in radio frequency. These 
phenomena will cause a problem if the shift in frequency is too great in which the 
receiver would not recognize the signal. If the receiver uses a band-pass filter to 
capture the signal, the frequency shift will cause the rejection of some of the received 
signal. In the case of coherent detection, the received frequency carrier and the 
reference frequency at the receiver will be totally different and this will result in the 
loss of a whole packet of data. 
 
 
 
 
2.3 HF Modems 
 
 
Commercially made HF modems are now available in the market that offers a 
variety of service such as HF packet radio, slow scan TV, fax service, IP over HF 
and robust image transmission (Harris Corp.,1996). Below are two examples of 
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commercially made HF modem from Kantronics and Timewave Technology Inc, 
USA. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Kantronics HF Modem 
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Figure 2.5: Timewave HF Modem 
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2.4 HF Communication Systems 
 
 
Several types of data format exist in HF communication. They are classed in 
the standard format and non-standard format groups. Some of the most frequently 
used data formats for standard format group are listed as follows. 
 
(i) RTTY (Baudot code) 
(ii) AMTOR (ASCII) 
(iii) PACTOR 
(iv) PACTOR II 
(v) PACTOR III 
(vi) GLOVER 
(vii) PSK31 
(viii) GTOR 
 
 
 Radio Teletypewriter (RTTY) equipment using 5 digits BAUDOT code 
became available in the market in the years following World War II (Kasser, 1991). 
Radio amateurs experimented using that equipment for communications. RTTY 
communication faces a serious problem of fading and noise since error detection is 
not used. It is is a half duplex communication mode where a each character is 
transmitted as soon as it is typed. 
 
 
AMTOR is a specialized form of RTTY (Kasser, 1991). The term is an 
acronym for Amateur Teleprinting Over Radio and is derived from the commercial 
SITOR system (Simplex Telex Over radio) developed primarily for Maritime use in 
the 1970s. In the early 1980's, Peter Martinez, G3PLX, made several minor changes 
to the SITOR protocol and called it AMTOR. AMTOR improves on RTTY by 
incorporating a simple error detection technique. AMTOR employs two forms of 
time diversity in ARQ (auto-repeat request) mode and FEC (forward error 
correction) mode. A repeat is only sent when requested in ARQ mode whereas in 
FEC mode each character is sent twice. In both modes, the redundancy of the code 
  
16
itself which sent at different times, supplies the time diversity in AMTOR (Reed, 
2001). AMTOR utilizes ASCII code for transmission. ASCII (American National 
Standard Code II) is a coded character set used for information processing systems. 
ASCII uses 7 bits to represent letters, figures, symbols and control characters. ASCII 
has both upper and lower case letters.  The system remains relatively uncomplicated 
but AMTOR performs well even in poor HF conditions. While there can still be 
many errors in AMTOR data, the error detection helps a lot and the result is quite 
tolerable for normal text mode conversations because of the high redundancy in plain 
language text. AMTOR is a half duplex communications mode with some of the 
attributes of a full duplex mode. 
 
 
PACTOR was designed in 1991 in Germany to overcome the disadvantages 
of AMTOR and Packet Radio (Reed, 2001). It improves on the error detection 
technique, by employing the CRC-16 or cyclic redundancy check. PACTOR is a 
cheap and reliable means of fast, robust and error-free data transfer over HF. 
PACTOR format uses not only the complete ASCII character set, but any given 
binary information which could be transferred over HF, even in very poor 
propagation conditions. Initially Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) was chosen as a 
modulation method. PACTOR employs packet structure, which contains 20 
characters of data for 200-baud transmission or 8 characters of data for 100 baud. 
 
 
PACTOR II uses m-ary PSK as it modulation method and employes 2 sub-
carriers, transmitting about 800 bits per second at 100 baud (Reed, 2001). It utilizes 
Huffman and Markov compression method and viterbi decoding to further increase 
the data transfer rate. Error control used for PACTOR II is a soft decision ½ code 
rate convolutional code with the constraint length of 9. 
 
 
The only significant difference between PACTOR III and PACTOR II is 
PACTOR III is an m-ary modulation method where it uses up 18 sub-carriers while 
PACTOR-II uses only two sub-carriers (Reed, 2001). Carrier separations are 120 Hz 
and the modulation methods are DBPSK or DQPSK at 100 baud. 
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CLOVER uses a four-tone multi-level modulation system that includes a 
combination of frequency, phase and amplitude-shift modulation (Reed, 2001). 
CLOVER uses a very low base data rate 31.25 symbols per second to counter the 
multipath propagation distortion that commonly occurs on HF radio signals. 
Modulation technique, which is used, is BPSK or QPSK. 4 carriers are used in 
CLOVER with 125Hz carrier spacing within 500Hz bandwidth. Clover uses Reed-
Solomon error correction codes to correct a moderate number of errors but it can also 
switch to ARQ whenever the conditions are very bad and number of error exceeds 
the capacity of Reed-Solomon error corrector. 
 
 
PSK31 stands for phase shift keying, which is the method used for 
modulation (Reed, 2001). The precise bit rate for PSK31 is 31.25. PSK31 is designed 
based on RTTY mode of operation. The RTTY code shuffles various combinations 
of five bits to represent each character. For example, the letter A is expressed as 
00011. For a new code called Varicode that combines the best of RTTY and Morse 
was designed. In Varicode, shorter codes are allocated to the letters that appeared 
most often in standard English text. The idea was to send the least number of bits 
possible during a given transmission. For example E is a very popular letter on the 
English alphabet hit parade, so it gets a Varicode of 11. Z sees relatively little use, so 
its Varicode becomes 111010101. 
 
 
G-TOR is a completely new hybrid – ARQ HF digital communications 
system for commercial and amateur services. Golay error correction coding forms 
the basis for G-TOR (short for Golay - TOR), G-TOR is the innovation of 
KANTRONICS (Reed, 2001), introduced in 1994. Key features of G-TOR are 
extended Golay forward error correction coding, full-frame interleaving, link-
quality-based baud rate (300, 200, and 100), 2.4 second hybrid-ARQ cycle and use of 
standard FSK tone pairs (mark and space). Format of G-TOR operation is 
proprietary.  
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Several of the non-standard formats are listed as follows (Scalsky, Chace, 
1997): 
 
(i) ARQ6-90/98 - 6-character-block simplex ARQ used by French and 
Italian Diplomatic services, typically 200 bd. ARQ-6/90 and ARQ-
6/98 differ in their inter data block timing. 
(ii) IRA-ARQ - Duplex ARQ with IRA (ITA-5), used by Czech/Slovak 
Diplomatic stations, typically 171.42, 200.2, or 300.3 bd. 
(iii) PICCOLO - Originally developed in 1957 in Great Britain at the 
Diplomatic Wireless Service or as it is known today the 
Communication Engineering Department of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
(iv) COQUELET - COQUELET Mk I is an asynchronous 13 tone ITA2 
system used by French (possibly abandoned) and Belgian military 
police. COQUELET Mk II is a synchronous 8 tone ITA2 system used 
by Algerian Diplomatic and Customs. 
 
 
 Other than the standard format and non-standard formats listed above, there 
are two governing bodies that sets the standard for HF communication. STANAG 
5066 is a standard protocol that covers the NATO countries while FED-STD-1052 is 
a standard by U.S. Government to ensure the minimum level of interoperability 
among HF modems. 
 
 
The STANAG 5066 is a NATO Standardization agreement: Profile for HF 
Radio Data Communications (Trinder, Gillespie, 2001). It is an open standard 
defining the requirements for building interoperable HF data communication system. 
STANAG 5066 was completed prior to the standardization of high data rate 
waveform capable of data rates of 9.6kbps and higher. In addition for ARQ protocol, 
the standard includes a mechanism for adapting the data rate in accordance with the 
prevailing channel conditions. STANAG 5066 NATO Standardization agreement 
targets a very high data transfer rate for military use HF communication system.  
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FED-STD-1052 is a standard by U.S. Government which contains technical 
standard for minimum interface and performance standards pertinent to modems 
which operate in HF radio equipment (FED-STD-1052; 1994). The general standard 
is the HF modems shall be capable of modulating and demodulating serial data 
into/from an FSK waveform. The minimum acceptable performance is 75 bps using 
the FSK and PSK single-tone waveforms. Modems with 150, 300, 600, 1200, 2400, 
all coded and 4800 bps uncoded, should have the capability to adapt to channel 
condition. This standard states that FEC encoder shall be used for data rates up to an 
including 2400 bps. It proposes the use of ½ code rate for the FEC coding scheme.  
 
 
 
 
2.5 Recent Development in HF Digital Modulation Techniques 
 
 
Continuous research is conducted in finding the best modulation method to be 
used in HF. Among the types that are frequently investigated is the m-ary modulation 
method which is capable in transferring high data rate. The best method to 
implement error control is also explored where a faster decoding method could 
reduce the overall time needed for processing. The effect of different computational 
platform is compared to find the trade-off between the speed and power consumption 
(Jorgenson et al, 2001). 
 
 
(Cook, 1993) employs a 16-DQPSK signaling tones at a 75 baud QPSK 
modems placed in adjacent channels. The low symbol rates of the tones were chosen 
to combat the time delay spread introduced by HF channels, typically in the range of 
a few milliseconds. (Nilsson, Timothy, 1997) explored the potential of m-ary or 
OFDM for military HF communication. The proposed system uses a differential 
binary PSK (DBPSK) modulation method on each carrier. The number of carriers 
used in this system is 1024 over a bandwidth of 125 kHz and the symbol duration is 
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8.2ms. The modem proposed by Nilsson is capable of operating until 1.22Mbps. 
(Cook et al, 1994) conducted a work on designing a high speed m-ary HF modem. 
The modem used 16 tone formats and the modulation method is 8PSK. This modem 
could operate for 3.6kbps. (Clark et al, 1993) implemented multi frequency shift 
keying (MFSK) in his paper. Maximum number of tones transmitted in his modem 
over 2 kHz of bandwidth is 32 tones. Data format used in his approach is the 
PICCOLO format. Reed Solomon (RS) code is used as an error correction coding. 
 
 
(Brakemier, 1988) proposed a system using 4 PSK as modulation method and 
RS code for forward error correction (FEC). Bandwidth used for his modem is about 
2-3 kHz and the transmission rate is 2.4kbps. Brakemier concluded in his work that 
one of the requirements for HF modem is having a nearly constant envelope of 
transmitted signal helps to overcome the disturbing effect introduced by HF radio 
channels. This conclusion led to the development of single tone HF modem.  
 
 
The m-ary HF modem was developed by Racal Research (Hoult, 2000). This 
modem used a 56 tones orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), and 
each modulated with 256-QAM constellation. This modem was designed to operate 
at 16kbps in a 3 kHz bandwidth channel. The studies on multi channel modulation on 
HF communication were done by (Jorgenson et al, 2000). In his approach 8 separate 
channels (8 modems on adjacent bandwidth) were used to achieve 64kbps. Each 
channel transmits 8kbps over bandwidth of 3 kHz. 32 QAM was used in his approach 
as his modulation method. The total of bandwidth used for 8 channels is 24 kHz. In 
(Kotlowski et al, 2000) paper to answer NATO’s demand for higher data transfer 
rate, he proposed a 128 QAM in a 3 kHz bandwidth that can transfer up to 14.4kbps.  
 
 
(Boyarinov, 2000) investigated the speed of extended Golay Code soft 
decoding in his paper. Several methods exist for Golay code decoding which are; 
algebraic decoding algorithm, bounded-distance decoding algorithm and trellis 
decoding algorithm. However, these algorithms are not suitable for applications in 
software as they are complex for implementation and introduce a large decoding 
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delay. Boyarinov introduced decoding algorithm, based on Turyn construction, 
which is capable in correcting all triple and fewer errors. This decoder still requires 
an extensive computation since it requires at least 80 operations to calculate the 
initial syndromes to determine there are no errors present. (Cook, 1993) did a study 
to find the best error-control options for HF modems. He investigated six error 
control coding schemes and he concluded that Trellis coded modulation (TCM) is the 
most suitable for an m-ary (16 sub-carrier) 2.4kbps HF modem. 
 
 
Considerable work is done to investigate the appropriate platform of HF 
modem. Converting the computer to be the HF software modem may not be the 
correct solution in some cases. (Jorgenson, 2001) proved that a PC that runs on 
processors before Pentium III  processor may not be capable in handling the real-
time calculation for the signal processing. Jorgenson compared the interrupt latencies 
and thread latencies between a PC running on NT OS  and Linux OS and 
Jorgenson concluded that PC running on Linux OS performs better. A comparison 
between PC software modem and modem implemented on DSP board are also 
compared. DSP processors are at an advantage where its power consumption is low 
compared to multi purpose processor such as Pentium. Power consumption for DSP 
processor such as Texas Instrument TMS320VC5416 DSP boards at full operation is 
only 100 mWatt (TMS320VC5416 Technical Reference), whereas Pentium drained 
about 10 to 100 Watt for it to be fully operational (Blonstein, Katorgi, 2003). 
Relative to advance DSPs, general purpose processors like Pentium are high in 
power consumption. However, DSPs have an obvious disadvantage compared to PC 
software modem. The programmers are faced with a very limited internal memory 
during modem implementation on DSP boards. 
 
 
 
2.6   Cryptography 
 
 
Cryptography is the science of information security (Nichols and Lekkas, 
2002). It is the technology that encodes information so that only accessible by 
  
22
authorized parties. In the modern computer world, cryptography is commonly 
associated with encryption and decryption where encryption refers to scramble 
ordinary data called plaintext into cipher text and decryption means the vice versa. 
According to the Federal Standard 1037C: Glossary of Telecommunications Terms, 
cryptography is defined as “The principles, means and methods for rendering plain 
information unintelligible and for restoring encrypted information to intelligible 
form” (Federal Standard 1037C, 2002). It is closely related to the disciplines of 
cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
 
  
There are 4 major objectives of modern cryptography: 
  
(i) Confidentiality: ensures only authorized parties can access the 
information. The standard mechanism for enabling confidentiality is 
encryption. 
(ii) Authentication: ensures both sender and recipient can confirm each 
other’s identity. There are many authentication mechanism exist, for 
example presenting user ID and password, using smart card, digital 
signatures, biometric authentication and challenges and response 
authentication. 
(iii) Integrity: ensures no altering can be made to information without 
being detected. The alterations include but not limit to change, delete 
and create. Message digests are the primary mechanism for ensuring 
data integrity. 
(iv) Non-repudiation: ensures neither the sender nor the recipient can 
deny his intentions in the transmission of the information. Digital 
signatures are the basic non-repudiation enabling mechanism. 
 
Procedures and protocols that meet some or all of the above criteria are 
known as cryptosystems or cipher system. These systems are not only refer to 
mathematical procedures and computer programs, in fact, it includes the regulation 
of human behavior such as choosing hard-to-guess password, frequently change of 
passwords, logging off unused systems and not discuss sensitive procedures with 
outsiders. 
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Now, cryptography is a very important field especially in communication and 
banking system. It is also a crucial factor to success in war or business as well.  Due 
to this significant, there are many parties who attempt to design new cipher system in 
order to improve an existing system. They are not only creating better cipher systems 
that tends to be more difficult to be hacked but they are also trying to hack the 
existing cipher systems in order to discover the weaknesses and further strengthen it.  
 
 
Referring to Federal Standard 1037C, the cryptology is “the science that deals 
with hidden, disguised or encrypted communications. It embraces communications 
security and communication intelligence” (Federal Standard 1037C, 2002). It is the 
science of mathematics, such as number of theory and the application of formulas 
and algorithms that underpin cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
 
 
Cryptanalysis refers to the study of cipher systems, either the algorithms and 
procedures or the cipher-text, with the sole objective to find weaknesses in them that 
will permit retrieval of the plaintext from the cipher-text, without necessarily 
knowing the key or the algorithms. This is known as breaking the cipher systems. It 
includes the weakening strategy that find a property or fault in the design or 
implementation of the cipher that reduces the number of keys required to facilitate 
others attack such as a brute force attack. 
 
 
There are numerous techniques for performing cryptanalysis, depending on 
the access to the plaintext, cipher text, or other aspects of the cipher systems 
(Stallings, 2003). These include:  
 
(i) Cipher-text-only analysis 
(ii) Adaptive chosen-plaintext analysis 
(iii) hosen-cipher text analysis 
(iv) Meet-in-the-middle attack 
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(v) Timing or differential power analysis 
(vi) Slide attack cryptanalysis 
(vii) Differential cryptanalysis 
(viii) Linear cryptanalysis 
 
 
Besides these electronics programmable methods, there are some other 
unorthodox techniques such as convincing individuals to reveal password or keys, 
developing Trojan horse programs to steal secret key or tricking a victim into using a 
weakened cipher systems. 
 
 
 
 
2.7 Cipher Systems 
 
 
Cipher system is the system that encrypts and decrypts data. Generally, there 
are two kinds of cipher systems, which are symmetric and asymmetric. The 
symmetric or the secret key cipher system uses the same key in encryption and 
decryption. Asymmetric or the public key cipher systems uses one key to encrypt and 
the other corresponding key to decrypt. Usually, a cipher system comprises 5 
elements: the plaintext, cipher text, key, encryption and decryption functions 
(Nichols and Lekkas, 2002). 
 
 
2.7.1 Symmetric Cipher Systems 
 
 
Symmetric Cipher systems use the same key for encryption and decryption. It 
is often referred to as secret-key cipher systems or conventional cipher systems (Lail, 
2002). Generally, the symmetric cipher systems are algorithms that use the 
underlying transposition and substitution operation, to ensure that cipher-text can 
only be decrypted by the corresponding secret key. 
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The core security factor for symmetric cipher systems is the encryption 
algorithm. It must be powerful enough so that it is impossible to decrypt a message 
based on the cipher-text alone. Secondly, the security depends on the secrecy of the 
key, and not the algorithm. Thus we are not required to keep algorithm secret. 
 
 
Symmetric cipher systems have a few common disadvantages (Kotsakis, 
2004). First, it is impossible for the sender of the message to prove to his partner that 
he has sent a particular message. Secondly, the keys have to be communicated on a 
channel whose cryptanalytic security is much higher than the security of the channel 
used for normal transmission. With a large number of partners wanting secure 
communication, the number of two-way channels and thus the number of keys 
becomes quite large. This is because for a network with N parties, when each 
wanting to exchange messages safely with everyone, total of N*(N-1)/2 keys are 
required (Stallings, 2003). For example, in the network of 10 persons, total of 45 
keys are required and kept on each party. However, these disadvantages can be 
overcome by using suitable authentication and key distribution technique. 
 
 
On the other side, as comparatively to asymmetric cipher systems, symmetric 
cipher systems can process data faster. Thus a lot of applications in the market today 
use an asymmetric system to exchange secret keys at initial stage, and then use a 
symmetric system to transport data (Kotsakis, 2004).  
 
There are two types of symmetric algorithms, which are stream ciphers and 
block ciphers. Examples of symmetric cipher systems are Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) (Stallings, 2003), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (NIST, 2001), 
Blowfish, Twofish, IDEA, CAST, SEAL and RC4. Among these, RC4 (Schneier, 
1996) and SEAL (Menezes et al., 1996) are the stream ciphers and the rest are block 
ciphers. 
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2.7.1.1 Block Cipher 
 
 
A block cipher is a method of encrypting text in which a cryptographic key 
and algorithm are applied to a fixed length block of data at once rather than to one bit 
at a time (Pawliw, 2001). The fixed length is called the block size. A block cipher 
effectively provides a permutation of the set of all possible messages as different 
plaintext blocks are mapped uniquely to different cipher-text blocks. The 
permutation effected during any particular encryption is the function of the secret 
key. Block cipher utilize both diffusion and confusion criteria. Diffusion means 
every block or character of the cryptogram is dependent on each other. Every single 
bit is dependency, which causes an error in block size. The cryptogram generated by 
block cipher also random and unpredictable which is called confusion. By make use 
these criteria, the block cipher has high resistant in security.  
 
 
There are three basic important behaviors of block ciphers (Pawliw, 2001): 
 
(i) Knowing both the plaintext block and the key, it must be easy to 
calculate the cipher-text block 
(ii) Knowing both the cipher-text block and the key, it must be easy to 
calculate the plaintext block 
(iii) Knowing both plaintext block and the cipher-text block, it must be as 
difficult as possible to find the key 
 
There are a lot of cryptanalysis theories and practices relevant to block 
ciphers that have been published such as differential cryptanalysis, linear 
cryptanalysis (Schneier, 1996), slide attack cryptanalysis and algebraic cryptanalysis 
(Menezes et al., 1996). For a modern proposal for a block cipher to be taken 
seriously, there must be a good reason to believe it is strongly resistant to all these. 
 
 
Examples of popular block ciphers include AES and DES. AES is the 
replacement of the DES certificate by National Institute of Standards and 
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Technology (NIST). Another block ciphers that have been published are Twofish, 
Serpent, RC6, RC5, Safer, IDEA, Blowfish (Stallings, 2003), and GOST (Schneier, 
1996). 
 
 
2.7.1.2 Stream Cipher 
 
 
Stream ciphers encrypt input data one bit (sometimes one byte) at a time 
(Beker and Piper, 1982). They are also called state ciphers, as the encryption of a bit 
is dependent on the current state. The encryption and decryption process of stream 
ciphers normally involves the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation of the plaintext with 
the keystream to produce the ciphertext. Keystream generally consist of a 
pseudorandom bit pattern, such as the output of a pseudorandom number generator 
(PRNG). Key or password is then used to generate a seed for the PRNG in order to 
generate same keystream in encryption and decryption. 
 
  
Generally, stream ciphers can be designed to be exceptionally faster to 
execute in hardware than block ciphers. Another important feature is a single bit of 
cipher text error results in a single bit of plaintext error, which is very useful when 
the transmission error rate is high. In order to provide high security, a stream cipher 
needs all these characteristics (Beker and Piper, 1982) 
 
 
(i) A cryptogram must have random characteristics 
(ii) A keystream must have high linear complexity 
 
 
Examples of stream ciphers are RC4, Shrinking, Improve Geffe, SEAL 
(Menezes et al., 1996), SNOW (Ekdahl and Johansson, 2001) and SOBER (Rose, 
2000). 
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2.7.2 Comparison between block and stream cipher system 
 
 
Even though both block and stream ciphers need same secret key to encrypt 
and decrypt, but obviously the processing is different. Block cipher encrypts the 
plaintext by blocking, usually 64 bits or 128 bits respectively depends on algorithms 
but stream cipher encrypts the plaintext bit by bit. Block cipher utilizes both 
diffusion and confusion and is not for stream cipher, which only had confusion 
criteria. Because of that, block cipher suitable to be used in key management, 
authentication and encryption while stream cipher only for encryption (Schneier, 
1996).  
 
 
Actually, the choice between using block cipher or stream cipher is greatly 
affected by its application. The usage of block cipher implies error propagation. 
Thus, block ciphers can only be used when error propagation is either an advantage 
or, at least, not a handicap (Tuan Sabri, 1995). The example where the block cipher 
often used for encryption is in banking system and Internet service (Lail, 2002).  
 
 
However, in any communication over a noisy channel such as high frequency 
medium, an introduction of extra errors because of encryption is unacceptable. For 
block cipher, an introduction of error in transmission causes propagation error. Even 
though there is an error correction to handle error in transmission, but it is still not 
guarantee. Due to no propagation error produce, a stream cipher is better choice 
rather than a block cipher. 
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2.7.3 Asymmetric Cipher systems 
 
 
The asymmetric or the public key cipher system uses one key to encrypt and 
other corresponding key to decrypt. It was found and published by Whitfield Diffie 
and Martin Hellman (Diffie and Hellman, 1976), although the National Security 
Agency (NSA) claims to have discovered it some years earlier. This system makes 
use of various intractable mathematics problems, that are normally easy to calculate 
from one way, but theoretically almost impossible to compute the original value from 
the results, which is the other way. These problems include discrete logarithm 
problem, the integer factorization problem and elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem. Asymmetric cipher systems allow public keys to be simply distributed to 
the public. Data that is encrypted using the published public key can only be 
decrypted using the secure private key kept secretly by individuals. The computation 
of one key from the other key is infeasible. Some examples of asymmetric cipher 
systems are Digital Signature Standard (DSS), RSA, El-Gamal and Diffie-Hellman 
(DH) (Stallings, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
2.8 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
 
 
On December 6th 2001, the Secretary of Commerce, United State (US) 
officially approved FIPS 197, which specifies that all sensitive, unclassified 
documents will use Rijndael as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES in 
fact is the result of the NIST effort to find a more robust replacement for DES and to 
a lesser degree Triple DES (Stallings, 2003). In January 1997, NIST has initiated a 
call for symmetric cipher algorithm that uses 128-bit block size, supporting key sizes 
of 128, 192 and 256 bits as a minimum. The algorithm was required to be royalty-
free for use worldwide and offered security of a sufficient level to protect data for the 
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next 20 to 30 years. It was to be easy to implement in various types of hardware and 
software, offer good defenses against various attack techniques. 
 
 
The entire selection process was fully open to public scrutiny and comment; 
it had being decided that full visibility would ensure the best possible analysis of the 
designs. In August 1999, NIST selected five algorithms for more extensive analysis, 
which were: MARS from IBM research, RC6 by RSA Security, Rijndael by two 
Belgian Cryptographers, Joan Deamen and Vincent Rijment, Serpent by Ross 
Andersen, Eli Biham and Lars Knudsen, and Twofish submitted by researchers 
including Counterpane’s respected cryptographer, Bruce Schneier. The end result 
was that on October 2, 2000, NIST announced that Rijnadael had been selected as 
the proposed standard. 
 
 
Rijndael was initially developed to support variable block length and key 
length, and they can be extended very easily to multiples of 32 bits. The design of 
Rijndael was strongly influenced by the design of the block cipher square. 
 
 
The new AES cipher (NIST, 2001) is fast in both software and hardware, 
relatively easy to implement and requires little memory. As the new block cipher 
standard it is currently being deployed on a large scale. AES has 10 rounds for 128-
bit keys, 12 rounds 192-bit keys and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys. It is very fast, 
almost approaching the speed of existing hashing algorithm, nonetheless faster than 
DES and Triple DES.  
 
 
 
2.9 Authentication, Key Distribution and Confidentiality 
 
 
 Authentication is a basic security services, without it most other 
communication security services become meaningless. This mechanism will enable 
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both parties to verify the authenticity of message or user as well. The authentication 
can be grouped into three classes, as follows: 
 
(i) Message encryption: The cipher text of the entire message serves as 
its authenticator 
(ii) Message authentication code (MAC): A public function of the 
message and a secret key that produces a fixed-length value that 
serves as the authenticator. 
(iii) Hash function: A public function that maps the message of any 
length into fixed-length hash value, which serves as the authenticator 
 
 
 One of the popular methodologies for authentication, which is used in many 
applications, is challenge and response authentication (Menezes et al., 1996). In 
general, this method can be implemented either using symmetric or public key cipher 
system as long they provide an authenticity as well. Symmetric is best for encrypting 
data, while public key is best for key management (Schneier, 1996). Secured HF 
Transmission System is an example of communication system where the users 
coming from specific parties. Therefore, the user network is not complex as ordinary 
network-based station. So, the block cipher is chosen due to fewer burdens of key 
management, faster encryption time and less complex of implementation. Figure 2.6 
shows the diagram of challenge and response authentication using block cipher 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 256 bits.  
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  Figure 2.6: Challenge and Response Authentication 
 
 
From the diagram, firstly Station 1 requests Station 2 to start communication. 
After receiving the request, Station 2 will generate random message, m and by using 
authentication key, Kaut that message will encrypt to cryptogram, c. That is 
cryptogram, will be sent to Station 1. At the other side, Station 1 receives the 
cryptogram and decrypts that message by using same authentication key, Kaut. The 
decipher message, m_bar will be returned to Station 2. Station 2 will compare 
whether m_bar is equal or not with random message, m. If the message is equal, 
authentication is successful and both stations can start to communicate 
confidentially. Otherwise the communication will be discarded.  
 
 
Usually, an authentication works together with key distribution in order to 
provide authenticity and confidentiality. Key distribution required to protect the 
session key from access by third party.  Therefore, the strength of any cryptographic 
system rests with the key distribution technique, a term that refers to the means of 
delivering key to two parties who wish to exchange data, without allowing others to 
see the key (Stallings, 2003). For two parties A and B, key distribution can be 
achieved in number of ways, as follows: 
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(i) A can select a session key and physically deliver it to B. 
(ii) A third party can select the session key and physically deliver it to A 
and B. 
(iii) If A and B have master key, one party can transmit a session key to 
the other, encrypted using master key. This also called decentralized 
key distribution. 
(iv) If A and B each has an encrypted connection to a third party C, C can 
deliver a session key on the encrypted links to A and B. This method 
is called centralized key distribution. 
 
 
Due to Secured HF Transmission System where both stations are far away 
and using end-to-end encryption, manual delivery of session key is awkward. Here 
session key will change rapidly depending on the number of stations involve and 
communication had occurred. Therefore, session key supplied should be 
dynamically, and the solution of this is using decentralized key distribution 
technique.  
 
 
Because the trusted third party is not involve directly in communication, both 
parties need master key which is consist authentication key and session key 
distribution key. The master key management is handled or programmed by trusted 
third party (Mils, 2004).  By using master key, session key is distributes using block 
cipher AES 128 bits. The rest of the communication than occurs confidentially using 
a proprietary stream cipher. The security of Secured HF Transmission System was 
provided based on symmetric cipher system which need both parties have same 
secret key.  In practice, GSM communication also uses symmetric cipher system 
where A3 block cipher used for authentication and A5 stream cipher for 
confidentiality (Quirke, 2004).   
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2.10 Examples of application for HF transmission system 
 
 
HF e-mail systems such as Sail Mail (SailMail, 2004), and Cruise email 
(Cruiseemail, 2004) are capable for data transmission via HF medium and now 
available in the market. Both commercial systems also support the messaging system 
but unfortunately they do not have features for authenticity and confidentiality. They 
are needed because the HF medium is free and low cost of infrastructure setup 
compare with satellite system. By using the advances in High Frequency radio, these 
systems can be sent and received in the most remote areas. Besides, the 
communications is easy and transparent to the user because the users have complete 
controls of the radio and modem. 
 
 
 EasyTransfer is another system developed by SCS PC Software that allowed 
the communication via HF medium (Pactor, 2004). EasyTransfer (for Win98 and 
above) is a program developed for binary file transfers between two computers and it 
is using PACTOR coding for data transmission. The graphical user interface is 
similar to some well-known FTP clients, which are used for file transfers via the 
Internet. In addition to the file transfer, EasyTransfer has a chat mode to exchange 
hand typed messages. With that, EasyTransfer is the ideal tool to exchange digital 
information over unlimited distances through HF medium.  
 
 
The Winlink 2000 (WL2K) radio-email digital network system is the 
software that is capable to extend with the amateur radio to provide data transmission 
over HF medium (Winlink, 2000). It was developed by Winlink Development Team 
to assist the mobile or remotely located user, and to provide emergency email 
capabilities to community agencies. Because of this, WL2K supports a clean simple 
interface to the Internet SMTP e-mail system. Using own B2F format, any message 
sent or received may include multiple recipients and multiple binary attachments. 
The radio user's email address, however, must be known to the system as a radio user 
or the message will be rejected. This simple Internet interface protocol has an added 
benefit in case of an emergency where local services are interrupted and the system 
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can use by non-Amateur groups as an alternative to normal SMTP email. Connecting 
to any one of the WL2K publicly used PMBOs (Participating Network Stations) via 
HF (radio) or the specialized non-public PMBOs, can immediately and automatically 
connect a local amateur station to the Internet for emergency traffic. Using MS 
Outlook or MS Outlook Express, the Paclink mini-email server can replace a 
network of computers (behind a router) as a transparent substitute for normal SMTP 
mail (Winlink, 2000). WL2K uses no external source for sending or receiving 
Internet email. It is a stand-alone function, which interacts directly with the internet 
rather than through any external Internet service provider. 
 
 
Communication through HF medium whether using email or messaging 
system is still not perfect without having security features. It is important to make the 
communication with authentication, confidential and integrity. Primarily, security to 
the military is to avoid their enemy from getting the secret information. Second 
entities that need this feature in their system are anyone that involved in business. 
This is because they need to protect their asset or secret information from their 
business competitor. Some of the messaging systems that had security features are 
System 700 that is produced by Mils Electronic (Mils, 2004), HC-6830 by Crypto 
AG (Crypto AG, 2004) and HF Email from Reids Radiodata (Reidsradiodata, 2004). 
 
 
The Mils Electronic System 700 is not the only one to support messaging 
system but also others in communication like GSM, E-mail, HF radio and Telex. The 
M730 Cipher Machine handles the cipher function of this system. This is a Windows 
application for processing messages at a station of the System 700 network. 
Everything about encrypting and decrypting of messages, sending and receiving of 
ciphered messages and the administration of these messages happened here. A 
proprietary stream cipher algorithm encrypts and decrypts the messages. M730 also 
provides an authentication algorithm to provide authentication functions. 
 
 
The Crypto AG HC-6830 is a secure, state-of-the- art, fully ruggedized field 
communication station. It combines local security with secure communication via 
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telephone or radio modem at the tactical and strategic levels. Special attention has 
also been paid to HF communication by integrating a very compact HF radio modem 
into the HC-6830. Due to its versatile design, it may be used for stationary, portable, 
vehicular, air-borne, ship borne and man packs applications. The unit provides secure 
message handling primarily for army, air force, navy, and military intelligence 
organizations and also non-military users such as police forces, international field 
organizations and diplomatic. As the HC-6830 is fully modular, the system may be 
upgraded at any time to accommodate future applications. 
 
 
The HF Email produced by Reids Radiodata is distinguishing from the other 
commercial product. Unlike Sail Mail and Cruise email, this HF Email supported 
with the compression and security service to make the data transmission faster and 
secure (Reidsradiodata, 2004). This Reids Radio Data HF Email service gives us our 
own email address such as rahim@reidsradiodata.com.au so anyone anywhere in the 
world can send an email to us, all we need to do is connect to the email server and 
our email will automatically be downloaded to computer.  
 
 
Finally, the HF Messenger™ (Soyer, 2001) created by Rockwell-Collins, 
France is advanced HF data communication software. It implements the NATO 
STANAG 5066 standard and uses Q9600 modem device implementing the MIL-
STD-188-110B waveform and equipped with ALE capability. Besides, this system 
also provides stream cipher algorithm to ensure the transmission occurred secure. 
The main objective of this system is to permit personal computers to exchange text, 
files, facsimiles, images and pictures at data rates equivalent to current satellite 
radios over a HF medium. This system also provides wireless transmission between 
several HF users for broadcasting, multicasting or point-to-point with services in 
LAN operating environment. The main application offered by this system is HF e-
mail for ground, tactical airborne and maritime.  
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2.11 Telemetry 
 
 
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.  As the 
name indicates, it is not a full control system but more focuses on the supervisory 
level or in other words telemetry or remote monitoring.  One of the advantages of 
implementing the SCADA system is it has databases system that allows information 
collection, sharing and offline analysis.  SCADA system is used in industrial and 
engineering applications to monitor and control distributed station remotely from a 
master location.  Therefore, SCADA system usually covers a large geographical 
area. 
 
 
A SCADA system consists of three main components, which are the field 
data interface devices or a Remote Telemetry/Terminal Unit (RTU), the 
communication medium, and human-machine interface or Graphical User Interface 
(GUI).  A SCADA system gathers information at remote stations, transmit back the 
information to master station through a communication medium and display the 
information in organized fashion and store information in database to allow future 
analysis.  
 
 
 
 
2.11.1 Tanjung Tuan Lighthouse VHF Telemetry 
 
 
Lighthouse telemetry is an example of SCADA system. A visit to Tanjung 
Tuan Lighthouse, Port Dickson was conducted to understand a SCADA system in 
practical application.  Tanjung Tuan Lighhouse has been equipped with electric 
distribution line.  A generator set is used as back up power source.  Main light is the 
ac lamp that will only transmit white light when supplied with rated current. Motor is 
used to rotate pedestal in a fixed velocity to provide a flashing fog signal.  Photo 
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sensor is used to turn on the light system when low visibility.  Figure 2.7 shows the 
lighthouse system block diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Lighthouse system block diagram 
 
 
The lighthouse VHF telemetry is carried out by RF Comm. Sdn. Bhd. using a 
VHF transceiver, model Motorola GM300 and a Kantronics Modem.  The purpose of 
this lighthouse telemetry is to obtain a remote picture of the condition at the 
lighthouse. The VHF telemetry system transmits the following information from 
lighthouse to headquarter: 
 
(i) Power supply 
(ii) Generator 
(iii) Motor 
(iv) Main light 
(v) Standby light 
(vi) Emergency light 
(vii) Back up batteries 
 
Motor M M
GTNB
Emergency 
Light 
Main Light
Lens
Pedestal
Back up motor
Photo sensor 
Generator as back up 
power supply 
Power supply 
from TNB 
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From SCADA system, any problem at the lighthouse can be trace and further 
action can be made immediately.  
 
 
 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
 
 
HF communication is important as an alternative for long distance 
communication due to low cost equipment setup and being completely under national 
control. With the present technology in digital signal processing, advance 
communication and adaptive radio technology, digital information is not only 
possible to be transmitted over HF radio but also more reliable and error free 
transmission. Security features such as authentication and confidentiality will ensure 
that only the authorized parties communicate with confidence not to unauthorized 
third parties. By understanding the existing system in market and technology behind 
it, the proposed system will develop to achieve the objective to exchange an image 
over HF radio.  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
STREAM CIPHER ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
The broadcast nature radio of communications such as in the HF (High 
Frequency) spectrum exposes the transmitted information to unauthorized third 
parties. Employing cipher system ensures confidentiality. For bulk transmission of 
data, stream ciphers are ideal choices over block ciphers due to the faster 
implementation speed and do not introduce error propagation. Thus, this chapter will 
describe the theory of stream cipher algorithm, which contains linear feedback shift 
register (LFSR) and nonlinear combining function. By using a common key length 
and worst-case conditions, the strength of several stream cipher algorithms are 
evaluated based on statistical tests, correlation attack, linear complexity profile and 
nonstandard test. The best algorithm is the one that exceeds all of the tests.  
 
 
 
 
3.1 Stream Cipher 
 
 
The stream cipher (Beker and Piper, 1982) is a symmetric cipher that is 
described in Figure 3.1. Unlike the block cipher, the stream cipher enciphers the 
plaintext one bit at a time and only utilizes the confusion characteristics not diffusion 
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of the cipher system. This is because each character of the cryptogram is independent 
of each other. The main component of the stream cipher is the keystream generator 
that is shown in Figure 3.2. Various types of stream ciphers can be generated based 
on the choice of the combining function and the linear feedback shift registers 
(LFSR).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Block Diagram of stream cipher. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Block diagram of keystream generator 
 
 
Each of the linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) that form the keystream 
generators are shown in Figure 3.3. The combining function can be any logic 
functions either linear or nonlinear combination depending on algorithm.  
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Figure 3.3: A general case N-length linear feedback shift register 
(LFSR). 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 
 
 
The LFSR is a finite state machine that is described by a sequence of states 
and it output is the pseudorandom sequence. An example of a 3-stage LFSR and its 
state diagram are shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
    (a)          (b) 
Figure 3.4: (a) 3-Stage LFSR. (b) State Diagram of 3-stage LFSR. 
 
 
If the initial condition is chosen as (111)2 , the resulting sequence is 
 
  s(n)=[111001011100101110010…….]           (3.1) 
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In this example, the number of states is 7 or equal to 23-1. Except for the initial 
condition (000)2 , any state can be chosen as the initial condition, and the resulting 
sequence has a period of 7. 
 
 
The output of a Nc stage LFSR is defined by a recursion relationship 
 
)().(......)2().2()1().1()().()(
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where c(i) represents the feedback coefficients, the operation ⊕  represents a modulo 
2 addition or exclusive-or operation, and the operation ‘.’ represents an AND 
function. 
 
 
The coefficients of the LFSR can be defined by f(x) polynomial over GF(2). 
For the Nc LFSR defined in Equation (3.2), the f(x) polynomial over GF(2) that 
described the coefficients is 
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The polynomial is irreducible if it is divisible by 1 and by itself. If f(x) and g(x) are 
two polynomials over GF(2), they are irreducible if GCD(f(x),g(x))=1. Examples of 
reducible and irreducible polynomials are 
 
)1)(1(1)( 2321 xxxxxxf ++=+++=   (reducible)           (3.4) 
 
321)( xxxf ++=     (irreducible)           (3.5) 
 
An irreducible polynomial of order Nc over GF(2) such that f(0)≠ 0, it has an 
exponent e if f(x)/(1+xe). The polynomial is primitive if its exponent is 2Nc-1. A 
primitive polynomial of order Nc ensures that the resulting sequence repeats itself at 
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every 2Nc-1 regardless of the choice of the initial condition except for zero value. 
Table 3.1 shows example of primitive polynomial from order 2 to 8. Further 
examples are found in (Press and Teukolsky, 1992; Menezes et al., 1996). 
 
 
Table 3.1: Examples of primitive polynomial from order 2 to 8. 
Degree Polynomial 
2 1+x+x2 
3 1+x+x3 
4 1+x+x4 
5 1+x2+x5 
6 1+x5+x6 
7 1+x3+x7 
8 1+x2+x3+x4+x8 
 
 
If f(x) is a primitive polynomial over GF(2), then the generation function is 
 
.......)1)()(......)2()1()0((
)1)((
)()( 212 +++++++=+=
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xxg φ      (3.6) 
 
where s(n) represents the generated sequence, )(xφ is the polynomial that defines the 
initial conditions, and p is the period of the resulting random sequence.  
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Worst Case Condition 
 
 
A cipher system is secured as long as the attacker does not know the 
algorithm, the keys and equivalent plaintext and cryptogram. The algorithm is 
compromised if any one of these factors is known. This leads to the worst-case 
cryptographic conditions (Beker and Piper, 1982) that are  
 
(i) The algorithm can completely be described. 
(ii) A considerable amount of cryptogram is known 
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(iii) There is certain amount of cryptogram and its equivalent plaintext 
available. 
 
 
For the first condition, the only security that can be provided by algorithm is 
in the key length. Attack based on an exhaustive keysearch of all the possible keys 
should not be possible within a reasonable time. Given the present computing 
technology, a 64-bit key is no longer considered safe compared to a 128-bit key. That 
is why a double or triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) block cipher is considered 
more secured compared to the basic DES algorithm. If a cryptogram is random, 
condition two is not valid since it is not possible to derive the plaintext from the 
cryptogram based on the statistics. Condition three is as the result of the known 
plaintext attack where it is possible to derive the keystream from the cryptogram and 
its equivalent plaintext. The strength of the keystream can be tested based on the 
correlation attack and the linear complexity profile. An algorithm that can be proven 
of its strength under the worst-case cryptographic condition is considered ideal. A 
good stream cipher system must have all these criteria (Beker and Piper, 1985): 
 
(i) The mathematical equations describing the algorithms operation are 
so complex that, for all practical purposes, it is not possible to solve 
those using analytical methods and cost or time required to recover 
the message or key is too great. 
(ii) Keystream should have a long period. If registers used have size N1, 
N2,…..Nr, the period is usually bounded by (2N1 -1)(2N2-1)…..(2Nr-1). 
(iii) The keystream should have good statistical properties that passed all 
the statistical test 
(iv) The keystream should have a large LCP that any attempt to find an 
equivalent LFSR to reconstruct the entire keystream is infeasible.   
(v) The keystream should be correlation immune 
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3.2 Keystream Generators 
 
 
There are many different pseudorandom sequence generators applied to 
stream ciphering. The analysis focuses to stream ciphers based on structure of LFSR 
as discuss in previous section, which is a bit oriented keystream. The LFSR permits 
in simple way to obtain sequences of very high periods and furthermore with 
excellent statistics properties. This section describes stream cipher based on LFSR 
and nonlinear combining function. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Linear Generator 
 
 
A set of M LFSR’s are combined such that the output sequence is 
 
  )(........)()()()( 1210 nsnsnsnsnz M −⊕⊕⊕⊕=                 (3.7) 
 
where s0(n), s1(n) ……..SM-1(n) represents the outputs of LFSR 0 to M-1 (Beker and 
Piper, 1982). If M is chosen 3, then Equation (3.7) becomes 
 
                         )()()()( 210 nsnsnsnz ⊕⊕=             (3.8) 
 
The LFSR used are defined by polynomials over GF(2) as shown 
 
                       19521)( xxxxxf ++++=             (3.9) 
           
                            2351)( xxxf ++=            (3.10) 
 
                            2921)( xxxf ++=                (3.11) 
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3.2.2 Improved Geffe Generator 
 
 
This keystream generator is based on a nonlinear combining function with 
three LFSRs (Menezes et al., 1996). The output of the generator is 
 
           )().()().()().()( 212010 nsnsnsnsnsnsnz ⊕⊕=          (3.12) 
 
where s0(n), s1(n) and s2(n) are the output of the LFSR 0 to 2. The LFSR’s used that 
is defined by polynomials as in Equation (3.9)-(3.11) in GF(2). 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Summation Registers Generator 
 
 
Unlike the Improved Geffe generator, this keystream has an internal memory 
in the combining function (Menezes et al., 1996). The summation register is  
 
          ∑>=< ))(),(),(()(),( 10 ncnsnsncnz inout            (3.13) 
 
where s0(n) and s1(n) are the output of LFSR 0 and 1, cin(n) is the carry-in, cout(n) is 
the carryout and z(n) is the arithmetic sum of the input. Its equivalent Boolean 
equations are 
 
               )()()()( 100 ncnsnsnz in⊕⊕=             (3.14) 
 
                        )().()().()().()( 1010 ncnsncnsnsnsnc ininout ⊕⊕=                        (3.15) 
 
 
Possible output for the generator can be chosen as 
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                        z(n)=z0(n) if cin(n)=cout(n-1)           (3.16) 
 
                        z(n)=cout(n) if cin(n)=z0(n-1)           (3.17) 
 
The configurations based on Equation (3.16) and (3.17) are known as summation 
register (z0 output) and summation register (cout output) respectively. The 
polynomials used in GF(2) are 
 
                           2921)( xxxf ++=             (3.19) 
 
                                                    4131)( xxxf ++=             (3.20) 
 
 
Like linear generator, summation register can also be expandable depending 
on numbers of LFSR used. Previous description is based 2 LFSR s0(n) and s1(n) 
respectively. For 3 LFSR nonlinear combinations, Boolean equations are 
 
                                )()()()()( 210 ncnsnsnsnz ino ⊕⊕⊕=               (3.21) 
 
)().()().()().()().()().()().()( 212102010 ncnsncnsnsnsncnsnsnsnsnsnc inininout ⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕=   (3.22) 
 
where s0(n), s1(n) and s2(n) are the output of the LFSR 0 to 2. The LFSR’s used that 
is defined by polynomials as in Equation (3.9)-(3.11) in GF(2). 
 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Multiplexing Generator 
 
 
This cipher uses a standard digital electronic component called multiplexer 
(Beker and Piper, 1982). A multiplexer has many inputs but only one output. The set 
of inputs (often termed select lines) uses the state of LFSR 0, R0 to provide an 
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address for the multiplexer. The output of multiplexer is then merely the member of 
LFSR 1, R1 specified by the address. Figure 3.5 shows the example of nonlinear 
combination for multiplexing generator. Polynomial used to provide R0 and R1 
respectively defined in Equation (3.19) and (3.20) in GF(2). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: A 4 to 1 Multiplexing Generator 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5 Shrinking Generator 
 
 
Shrinking generator is a relatively new keystream generator that promises 
candidate for high-speed encryption applications (Schneier, 1996). This cipher uses 2 
LFSR’s for nonlinear combination that LFSR 0, R0 is used to select a portion of the 
output sequence of a second LFSR 1, R1. The keystream produced from the output 
sequence of R1 as shown in Figure 3.6 
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Figure 3.6: The Shrinking generator 
 
 
Instead of using LFSR R0 to select sequences of LFSR R1, modifying the 
condition of selector is another method to implement this cipher. This modify cipher 
is called XOR-shrinking register as shown in Figure 3.7. The generator was modified 
by the researcher to increase the complexity of producing the keystream. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: The XOR-Shrinking generator 
 
 
Both shrinking and XOR-shrinking uses polynomials in Equation (3.19) and 
(3.20) in GF(2) for LFSR R0 and R1. 
 
 
There is another type of shrinking cipher called self-shrinking generator 
(Schneier, 1996). This cipher only uses single LFSR. A pair of bits from LFSR was 
taken and if the first bit in the pair is 1, the output of the generator is the second bit. 
But if not, the pair will discard and same process occurs for next clock. The 
polynomials used in GF(2) is 
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                                    64321)( xxxxf +++=             (3.23) 
 
 
 
 
3.2.6 Variable-Memory Binary Generator (Memory Generator) 
 
 
Variable-Memory Binary Generator also called memory generator needs 
three LFSRs, R0, R1, R2 respectively and a memory to implement. (Golic and 
Mihaljevic, 1990). First, the output of R1 is read out of the memory location 
addressed by the read address becomes a keystream sequences. Second, the output 
bit of R0 is written into the memory location addressed by the write address R2. Non-
linear combinations for this cipher more like substitutions as shown in Figure 3.8.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: The Variable-Memory Binary generator 
 
 
For analysis purpose, two types of memory are used, that are 16 and 64 
addresses. Polynomials involved for all LFSRs are defined in Equation (3.9)-(3.11) 
in GF(2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 52
3.2.7 W7 Generator 
 
 
The last generator that will be used in the research is the W7 generator. 
Actually, this generator designed to produce a keystream in byte oriented for more 
suitable in software implementation. However, the generator still uses LFSR as a 
basic structure, which combines 3 LFSR as shown in Figure 3.9. Therefore 8 basic 
structures in parallel are needed to supply each byte of keystream.  Due to its 
fundamental, the research will analyze the basic structure that produces keystream in 
bit oriented. Either the strength or weakness of this structure will influence the whole 
of W7 generator.  
 
 
The W7 cipher does not use the output bit directly from LFSR. Instead, it 
uses a nonlinear filtering function that is a combination of several bits in the LFSR 
(Thomas and Anthony, 2002). The Figure 3.9 below shows the combination of each 
state of LFSR in W7 generator.  
 
 
Figure 3.9: The W7 Generator 
 
 53
The output of each correspond LFSR is the exclusive-OR of two quantities 
which are the LFSR output and the output of logical-AND. For example, in Figure 
3.7, the output of LFSR 0 is the result of exclusive-OR between bit 4 and logical 
AND of bits 3 and 1. Finally, the random keystream produced from the exclusive OR 
of the output of 3 LFSRs 
 
                  )()()()( 210 nsnsnsnz ⊕⊕=           (3.24) 
 
where s0(n), s1(n) and s2(n) are the output of the LFSR 0 to 2. In addition, the 3 
LFSRs together also determine when each shift register is clocked. One bit in each 
register is designated as the clock tap for that register which represented by “[]” in 
Figure 3.9. At each clock cycle, the majority value for those three taps determines 
which LFSR actually advance. Only those LFSR whose clock taps agree with the 
majority will advance. The LFSR’s used that is defined by polynomials as in 
Equation (3.9)-(3.11) in GF(2). 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Tests for Keystream Generator 
 
 
There are several tests that can be used to quantify the strength of stream 
ciphers. Standard tests that are independent of the algorithm are statistical tests, 
correlation attack and linear complexity profile. Nonstandard test specific to the 
algorithm based on the guess-and-determine attack is also used. 
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3.3.1 Statistical Tests 
 
 
A binary sequence is said to be random if there is no obvious relationship 
between the individual bits of the sequence. Since the sequence generated by the 
LFSR is periodic with a period p, then it is not considered a true random sequence 
but is referred as a pseudorandom sequence or a pn (pseudonoise) sequence. For this 
class of sequences, the randomness postulates by Golomb (Golomb, 1967) is 
applicable. If the period p is large, it is of interest to evaluate the randomness of the 
sequence within an observation interval that is referred as the local randomness. The 
statistical tests are derived from hypothesis testing and the standard statistical tables 
utilized are found in (Johnson, 1992). A set of statistical tests applicable is frequency 
test, serial test, poker test, autocorrelation test and runs test (Beker and Piper, 1982). 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Frequency Test 
 
 
The test check for the distribution of 1’s and 0’s present in a binary sequence. 
If N is the observed sequence length, the numbers of 1’s N1 and 0’s N0 present should 
be equally distributed at N/2. The calculated chi-square value is 
 
                  ( )
N
NN 2012 −=χ            (3.25) 
 
From the statistical tables, the chi-square value for 5% significant level is 
3.84. Accept the sequence if the computed chi-square value is less than the tabulated 
value. 
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3.3.1.2 Serial Test 
 
 
This test is used to check the transition characteristics of the sequence that is 
‘00’,’01’,’10’, and ‘11’. For N length sequence, the number of transitions N00, N01, 
N10, and N11 should be equal at N/4. The calculated chi-square value is 
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For 5% significant level, the tabulated chi-square value is 5.99. A sequence 
that has calculated chi-square values less than this value is acceptable. 
 
 
3.3.1.3 Poker Test 
 
 
N length sequence is segmented into blocks of M bits and the total number of 
segments is N/M. Within each segment, the integer value can vary from 0 to m=2M-1. 
The objective of this test is to count the frequency of occurrence of each M length 
segment. If the frequencies of occurrence are f0,f1,f2, ……fm-1  then f0 is the frequency 
of occurrence for a segment with an integer value of zero. Ideally, all the frequency 
of occurrences should be equal. If the mean of the frequency of occurrence is 
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then the chi-square value is 
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For a significant value of 5%, the calculated chi-square value is compared 
with the table for a degree of freedom of 2M-1. The sequence is accepted if the 
computed chi-square value is less than the table value. For analysis purpose, M is 
equal to 4 bits and the degree of freedom is 24-1 as well. Thus, the calculated chi-
square value is 25 for a chosen significance value of 5 percent. 
 
 
3.3.1.4 Autocorrelation Test 
 
 
The autocorrelation function measures the similarity between the elements of 
a binary sequence. It is defined as 
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where m is the number of shifts and N is the number of bits in the sequence. 
 
 
For a random sequence, the autocorrelation function Rss(m) is approximately 
Gaussian with mean of 0.5(N-m) and variance 0.25(N-m) that is obtained from the z 
tables. If a 5 percent significant level is chosen, the sequence is rejected if calculated 
z value is 
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The number of shifts chosen for analysis is 19 and it is desired to count the 
number of shifts where the calculated z value is within the significant value of 5 
percent. Ideally, the desired number is 19/19.  
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3.3.1.5 Runs Test 
 
 
The sequence is divided into contiguous stream of 1’s that is referred as 
blocks and contiguous stream of 0’s that is referred as gaps. If r0i is the number of 
gaps of length i, then half of the gaps will have length 1 bit, a quarter with length 2 
bits, and an eighth with length 3 bits. If r1i is the number of blocks of length i, then 
the distribution of blocks is similar to the number of gaps. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Correlation Attack 
 
 
A pseudorandom sequence z(n) is generated by a combination of N LFSR 
where s0(n), s1(n) ….. sN(n) and p0, p1 ….. pN are their input sequences and periods 
respectively in Figure 3.2. There is a possibility that any one of the input sequences 
will leak into the output z(n). A sequence is said to be N-th order correlation 
immuned if it is not possible to correlate any combination of m input sequence to the 
output (Siegenthaler, 1984). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Methodology for performing correlation attack on a keystream 
generator 
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For a pseudorandom sequence that is proven statistically random, it is desired 
to find a sequence from an external register that is correlated to this sequence. The 
following block diagram in Figure 3.10 explains how this is done. The setting of the 
attacking register to anyone of the input register will result in the resulting sequence 
z0(n) to be nonrandom. The randomness of zA(n) is quantified by performing a 
statistical test such as frequency test on the sequence. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Linear Complexity Profile 
 
 
If N length sequence is 
 
                                 s(n)=[ s(0) s(1) s(2) …….. s(N)]          (3.31) 
       
then the linear complexity of the sequence, denoted by L(N), is the length of the 
shortest LFSR that will generate the first N terms of s(n). The properties of the linear 
complexity for random sequence s(n) and r(n) are 
 
(i) For any N ≥1, the linear complexity of a sequence s(n) satisfies 
0≤L(N)≤N. 
(ii) L(N)=0 if and only if s(n) a zero sequence of length N. 
(iii) L(N)=N if and only if s(n)=[0,0,0,0 ….. 1]. 
(iv) If s(n) is periodic with period N, then L(N)≤N. 
(v) If the linear complexity of s(n) and r(n) are L(N) and L(M) 
respectively, the linear complexity of a sequence  
 
          z(n)=s(n)+r(n)           (3.32) 
 
Its relation to L(N) and L(M) is 
 
      L(P)≤L(N)+L(M)           (3.33) 
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If s(n) sequence is defined as in sequence (3.31), then the linear complexity profile 
LN of the sequence up to N is  
 
        L1,L2,…… LN            (3.34) 
 
 
Ideally, the linear complexity profile of a random sequence will increase 
linearly with the n. If the linear complexity approaches a constant value L, the 
resulting L-th length LFSR can be used to regenerate the random sequence. For this 
analysis, Berlekamp-Massey algorithms used as Linear Complexity Profile test and 
details of the algorithm can be found in (Massey, 1969). Analysis was done based on 
10,000 bits sequences that provided by each keystream generator.  
 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Guess and Determine (GD) Attack 
 
 
Guess and Determine (GD) is a nonstandard and effective method in 
analyzing stream ciphers. By considering the worst-case condition, this attack will 
exploit the relationships between internal values (such as the recurrence relationship 
in a shift register) and the relationship used to construct the keystream values from 
the internal values (Hawkes and Rose, 2002). A GD attack guesses some internal 
values and then exploits the relationships to determine other internal values. The 
cipher is broken when a complete internal state has been determined from the 
guessed values. However, this attack limits on generators that uses more than one 
LFSR and their nonlinear functions is not complex where register value and 
keystream that is produced correlates either forward or backward processes.  
 
 
From the study, Self-shrinking is uses only one LFSR and for XOR-
Shrinking, W7 and both Memory Generators, their nonlinear combination are 
complex. Therefore, these ciphers are immune on GD attacks. The following are the 
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summary of GD attacks that performed on stream ciphers during the study. The 
example of full processes on this attack can be found in Appendix A.  
 
 
3.3.4.1 Multiplexing Generator 
 
 
First, consider all these following assumptions: 
 
(i) LFSR 0 become a selector and polynomial of LFSR 0 is GF(23):   
(ii) f(x) = 1 + x2 + x3 
(iii) LFSR 1 as input and polynomial of LFSR 1 is GF(24) :  f(x) = 1 + x3 + 
x4 
(iv) Amount of keystream is known. For example: K(n) = 1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1 
(v) Complete knowledge of algorithm. In this case, the algorithm is using 
4 to 1 multiplexer and X3 and X2 states as selectors. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Truth table for both LFSRs 
 
a) LFSR 0   b) LFSR 1 
 
 
 Then, guess the initial condition of LFSR 0. In this case, total guessing 
equal to 23. For each trial, the attackers will have the selector value of multiplexer 
and from this value; the binary bit for each state of LFSR 1 will be determined. To 
make it easy, build a truth table of LFSR 0 and LFSR 1 as shown in Table 3.2. Then, 
put the keystream bit by bit to each state of LFSR 1 depending on the selector value. 
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Table 3.2 shows that every row of truth table filled with the keystream. Finally, fill in 
the truth table for LFSR 1. From the truth table of LFSR 1, another secret or private 
key will appear and the algorithm not secure anymore. As a conclusion, the real 
strength of this algorithm depends on LFSR 0 and in this case, instead of 27 the real 
strength of Multiplexer Generator is 23. With reference to common key 64 bit, the 
strength of Multiplexing Generator is 229 not 264 as claimed. 
 
 
3.3.4.2 Linear Generator 
 
 
Linear Generator is built from linear combination of 3 LFSRs as discussed in 
previous section. In order to perform GD attack on this cipher, the attackers need to 
guess the initial condition at least for 2 LFSRs. Then, with some amount of 
keystream, reverse the process to determine the other initial condition of LFSR 2. 
Table 3.3 shows the example of the initial conditions required before reversing the 
process. Usually, the attackers will guess 2 smallest LFSRs to reduce number of 
trials. After GD attack, the real strength of Linear Generator reduces to 242. 
 
 
Table 3.3: The value of LFSR 2 can be determined by reverse the linear process. 
LFSR 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
LFSR 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
LFSR 2               
Keystream K(n) 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
 
 
3.3.4.3 Improved Geffe 
 
 
 Improved Geffe Generator is more complicated compared with linear 
generator. Beside linear function, it also had nonlinear combination, which is a 
logical-AND functions. However, it is still not immune from GD attacks. Unlike 
linear generator that attackers will guess 2 smallest LFSR, this time they need to 
guess the small and the larger LFSR together. Then, with some amount of keystream, 
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the nonlinear combination could be reverse to determine the other initial condition of 
LFSR 1. Table 3.4 shows the example of the initial conditions and keystream that are 
required before reversing the process. Although it is not immune against GD attacks 
but this generator is better compare to linear generator with the real strength is 248. 
 
 
Table 3.4: The value of LFSR 1 can be determined by reverse the generator 
process. 
LFSR 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
LFSR 1        
LFSR 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Keystream K(n) 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
 
 
 
3.3.4.4 Summation Registers 
 
 
  Summation 2 Registers generator consist 2 LFSRs that is combine each 
other to generate keystream. It also had an internal memory that gives an effect to the 
keystream generated. The attackers need to guess each one of the LFSR initial 
conditions and also the initial value of an internal memory as well. However, it is not 
require guessing the initial value of internal memory because it is not considered as a 
key. Under worst-case conditions, the security that algorithm had is a secret key. 
Thus, it can be assumed that the attacker has complete knowledge of algorithm 
including the initial value of an internal memory. Assume that initial value is “0”. 
Now, guess one of the LFSR and usually the attackers will guess the smaller LFSR. 
As describe in previous subsection, the smaller LFSR is LFSR 0.  
 
 
  From the known initial condition of LFSR 0, internal memory and some 
keystreams, the attackers can guess the output sequence of LFSR 2 by reversing the 
algorithm process. The initial value for each component is shown in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: The values of LFSR 1 and internal memory can be fulfilling by 
reverse the algorithm process 
LFSR 0  1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
LFSR 1         
Int. Mem. S(n) 0        
Keystream,K(n)  1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
 
. 
  By guessing the initial condition of LFSR 0, the attackers recovered another 
initial condition of LFSR 1 that is a part of secret key. From the analysis, the real 
strength of this algorithm depends on the smaller LFSR used. In this case, the smaller 
LFSR used is LFSR 0. By referring to the described algorithm in previous section, 
instead of 264 the real strength of this algorithm is 229. 
 
 
  Summation 3 Registers is another type of generator in summation register 
family. The difference between this algorithm and previous one is the number of 
register or LFSR used. This algorithm needs three LFSRs to combine them to 
generate keystream as described before. The method to break this algorithm is 
similar to previous but this time the attackers need to guess more than 1 LFSR. In 
order to minimize the number of trials, the attackers will guess 2 smallest LFSR as 
shown in Table 3.6. 
 
 
Table 3.6: The value of LFSR 2 and internal memory can be fulfilling by reverse 
the algorithm process. 
LFSR 0   1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
LFSR 1   1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
LFSR 2                 
Int. Mem S(n) 0               
Keystream K(n)   1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
 
 
  From the GD attacks, the real strength of algorithm is 242. Although it is not 
as good as claimed, 264 but this algorithm is better than the previous. 
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3.3.4.5 Shrinking 
 
 
  Shrinking Generator needs 2 LFSRs in order to generate sequence of 
keystream, which are LFSR 0, and LFSR 1 respectively. The output of LFSR 0 will 
determine whether output of LFSR 1 become a keystream or not. This condition 
increases the LCP linearly with sequence but at the same time it reduces the number 
of keystream-produced compare with actual sequence of LFSR 1.  
 
 
  To verify the real strength of algorithm, attackers have to guess each one of 
this LFSR. Different LFSR chosen will cause different reverse process and also 
different number of trials as well. Usually, LFSR 0 uses smaller polynomial compare 
with LFSR 1. Because of that, attackers will guess the LFSR 0 and from the known 
keystream, backward process performed in order to get the initial condition of LFSR 
1. Table 3.7 shows the example of initial condition required before making reverse 
processes. 
 
 
Table 3.7: By doing the reverse process of algorithm, all initial conditions of 
LFSR 1 can be determined. 
LFSR 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
LFSR 1               
Keystream K(n) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
 
 
  From the guess and determine attack, the number of trials or complexity to 
break this algorithms is 229 not 264 anymore.  
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3.4 Register Setup and Initial Condition 
 
 
Keystream generator should provide a randomness of sequence for any initial 
condition in order to make it usable in implementation because in practical, the initial 
condition produced randomly. To verify whether this characteristic provides by 
keystream generator or not, 1000 initial conditions were chosen randomly for each 
polynomial. For the Linear, Improved Geffe, Summation 3 Registers and both 
Memory Generators, their example of 20 random initial conditions for LFSR 0, 
LFSR 1 and LFSR 2 respectively are described in Table 3.8 to Table 3.10.  
 
 
Table 3.8: The initial value for polynomial f(x)=1 + x + x2 + x5 + x19 
Bil Initial Condition 
1 1111111111111111111 
2 1000000000000000000 
3 1010101010101010101 
4 1100110011001100110 
5 0000111100001111000 
6 1110010000000000000 
7 0011110001110011010 
8 1111111111111111111 
9 1000100110101011110 
10 1111111011011100101 
11 1111111111111111110 
12 0111111111111111111 
13 0101010101010101010 
14 0011001100110011001 
15 1111000011110000111 
16 0001101111111111111 
17 1100001110001100101 
18 1111111111111111100 
19 0111011001010100001 
20 0000000100100011010 
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Table 3.9: The initial value for polynomial f(x)=1+x5+x23 
Bil Initial Conditions 
1 11111111111111111111111 
2 11111111111111111111111 
3 01101101101101101101101 
4 10111011101110111011101 
5 11111111110000000000111 
6 11001100110011001100110 
7 11111000001111000011100 
8 11100011100011100011100 
9 00000001001000110100010 
10 10101010101010101010101 
11 00110011001100110011001 
12 00000111110000111100011 
13 00011100011100011100011 
14 11111110110111001011101 
15 01010101010101010101010 
16 11111111111111111111000 
17 11111111111111111110000 
18 10010010010010010010010 
19 01000100010001000100010 
20 00000000001111111111000 
 
 
Table 3.10: The initial value for polynomial f(x)=1+x2+x29 
Bil Initial Conditions 
1 11111111111111111111111111111 
2 10000100001000010000100001000 
3 11100111001110011100111001110 
4 00100000000000000000100000001 
5 10011110100111101001111010011 
6 10110011100011110000111110000 
7 11111111111000000000011111111 
8 01001100011100001111000001111 
9 01111000100110101011110011011 
10 10110011100011110000111110000 
11 11111111111111111111111100000 
12 01111011110111101111011110111 
13 00011000110001100011000110001 
14 11011111111111111111000000001 
15 01100001011000010110000101100 
16 01001100011100001111000001111 
17 00000000000111111111100000000 
18 10110011100011110000111110000 
19 10000111011001010100001100100 
20 01001100011100001111000001111 
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The example random initial conditions for both LFSR that is used for the 
Summation 2 Registers, Multiplexing, Shrinking and XOR-Shrinking generator are 
shown in Table 3.11 and Table 3.12. And finally, for Self-shrinking generator, its 
random initial conditions are described in Table 3.13. 
 
 
Table 3.11: The initial value for polynomial f(x) = 1 + x2 + x29 
Bil Initial Conditions 
1 11111111111111111111111111111 
2 10101010101010101010101010101 
3 10011001100110011001100110011 
4 11100100000001010011100101110 
5 00100011010001010110011110001 
6 11100011100011100011100011100 
7 00000000000000000000000000001 
8 10000000000000000000011101100 
9 11110000111100001111000011110 
10 10110011100011110000111100001 
11 11111111111111111111111000000 
12 01010101010101010101010101010 
13 01100110011001100110011001100 
14 00011011111110101100011010001 
15 11011100101110101001100001110 
16 00011100011100011100011100011 
17 11111111111111111111111111110 
18 01111111111111111111100010011 
19 00001111000011110000111100001 
20 01001100011100001111000011110 
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Table 3.12: The initial value for polynomial f(x) = 1 + x3 + x41 
Bil Initial Conditions 
1 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
2 11101100111011001110110011101100111011001 
3 01001100011100001111000001111100000011111 
4 00000000000000000000111111111111111111111 
5 10011010101111001101111011110000000100100 
6 00000001001000110100010101100111100010011 
7 00000000000000000000100110011001100110011 
8 10101010101010101010100000000001111111111 
9 00110011001100110011001100110011001100110 
10 01001100011100001111000001111100000011111 
11 10110011100011110000111110000011111100000 
12 11001100110011001100110011001100110011001 
13 01010101010101010101011111111110000000000 
14 11111111111111111111011001100110011001100 
15 11111110110111001011101010011000011101100 
16 11111111111111111111111111111111110000000 
17 00010011000100110001001100010011000100110 
18 10110011100011110000111110000011111100000 
19 11111111111111111111000000000000000000000 
20 01100101010000110010000100001111111011011 
 
 
Table 3.13: The initial value for polynomial f(x) = 1 + x2 + x3 + x64 
Bil Initial Conditions 
1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
2 1110110011101100111011001110110011101100111011001110110011101100 
3 0100110001110000111100000111110000001111110000000111111100000000 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000011111111111111111111111111111111 
5 1001101010111100110111101111000000010010010011010101111001101111 
6 0000000000000000010010001101000101011001111000100111001000110100 
7 0000000000000000000000000000001001100110011001100110011001100110 
8 1010101010101010101010101010101010101010100000000000011111111111 
9 0011001100110011001100110011001100110011001100110011001100110011 
10 0100110001110000111100000111110000001111101001100011100000100110 
11 1111111111111111111101101110010111010100110000111011000011101100 
12 1111111111111111111111111111110110011001100110011001100110011001 
13 0101010101010101010101010111111111111111111110000000000000000000 
14 1100110011001100110011001100110011001100111111111111111100000000 
15 1011001110001111000011111000001111110000001111110000001111110000 
16 1111111111111111111111111111111111000000011111111111111111110000 
17 0001001100010011000100110001001100010011011101100111011001110110 
18 1011001110001111000011111000001111110000001010101010101010101010 
19 1111111111111111111100000000000000000000011111111111111111111000 
20 0110010101000011001000010000111111101101101100110001110110110011 
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For all keystream generators, the simulation program was written in C++ 
language and by using small LFSR, the program is checked step-by-step process to 
verify the output at every stage in the algorithm. The verification of the generator can 
be found in Appendix A. Then, the keystream for each generator was analyzed to 
determine their statistical properties, correlation immunity and complexity. 
 
 
 The statistical test programs were checked by testing a number of large 
sequences that are well known to have good statistical properties confirming that 
they will pass the entire test. For correlation attack, the program was checked by 
XOR a sequence N length of LFSR with the output of external register using the 
same initial state and coefficient. The result from the frequency test should be equal 
to N. Finally for linear complexity profile, the program was checked by finding the 
linear complexity of a number of sequences from known linear feedback shift 
register.  
 
 
The entire simulation program must working properly to ensure the results 
obtained from the analysis are accurate in order to determine the good stream cipher 
system. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Analysis Results 
 
 
The analyses were performed using standard test such as statistical tests, 
correlation attack and linear complexity profile and also nonstandard test that is the 
guess-and-determine attack. The following are the results for each test that were 
made.  
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3.5.1 Statistical Test 
 
 
The statistical test consists of 5 series of test and each series were performed 
with 1000 different initial conditions that were selected randomly as described in 
previous section. This is to determine the number of keys that will produce a 
statistically random sequence. In practice, session keys will generate randomly and 
not selected by any parties (Stallings, 2003). A good generator will present a good 
statistical characteristic in whatever key used. The summary of statistical test results 
is shown in Table 3.14. 
 
 
Table 3.14: Results of statistical test for each generator 
Bil Generator Frequency Test Serial Test Poker Test 
Autocorrelation  
Test Runs Test 
1 Linear 830/1000 941/1000 1000/1000 18522/19000 920/1000 
2 Geffe 956/1000 818/1000 732/1000 17962/19000 800/1000 
3 Sum 2 reg. (z0 output) 
986/1000 975/1000 979/1000 18002/19000 863/1000 
4 Sum 2 reg. (Cout output) 
689/1000 760/1000 728/1000 18231/19000 981/1000 
5 Sum 3 reg. (z0 output) 
1000/1000 984/1000 1000/1000 16748/19000 915/1000 
6 Sum 3 reg  (Cout output) 
0/1000 0/1000 0/1000 1000/19000 691/1000 
7 Multiplexing 963/1000 0/1000 0/1000 15562/19000 865/1000 
8 Shrinking 992/1000 739/1000 981/1000 17316/19000 933/1000 
9 XOR-Shrinking 987/1000 992/1000 663/1000 17726/19000 961/1000 
10 Self-Shrinking 998/1000 989/1000 993/1000 18578/19000 974/1000 
11 Memory Gen.(16Add) 842/1000 0/1000 0/1000 2082/19000 579/1000 
12 Memory Gen.(64Add) 882/1000 636/1000 994/1000 12360/19000 937/1000 
13 W7 988/1000 994/1000 971/1000 18359/19000 969/1000 
 
 
Table 3.14 presents the number of keys that passed for each statistical test. 
Based on 95% significant level, a good generator should passes at least 950 over 
1000 initial conditions or keys. This is true for only 2 generators and they are Self-
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Shrinking and W7 generator. Thus, the probability of choosing a set of keys that 
generate a statistically random sequence is higher for these generators as compared 
to the Linear, Gaffe, Multiplexing, both Summation Registers (Z0 and cout output), 
XOR-shrinking, and both Memory (16 and 64 addresses) generator. Even though 
Self-Shrinking has good statistical properties but on average, the sequence length of 
LFSR to produce same amount of keystream with W7 is double. This is because the 
characteristic of Self-Shrinking itself that need 2 bits or more to produce 1 bit of 
keystream. Therefore, the processing time to produce keystream also increases.  
 
 
For memory generators, the size of memory obviously influences their 
randomness. A large memory size will present a better keystream compare with 
smaller memory due to statistical characteristics. From the table, both Summation 2 
and 3 registers (Z0 output) give a good statistical result as compared to both 
Summation 2 and 3 registers (Cout output).  Summation 3 register present (Z0 output) 
present a better statistical characteristic as compared to Summation 2 registers (Z0 
output). From this observation, the number of register used in this generator 
influences their randomness.  
 
 
 The XOR-Shrinking generator, which modified by researcher also present 
better statistical results compared with the original Shrinking generator. However, it 
still not passed for 95% significant level. 
 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Correlation Attack 
 
 
This standard test is to examine the strength of each generator in terms of 
register correlation as explained in previous section. The test was conducted for each 
initial condition that was used in statistical tests. But the numbers of attack between 
generators are different because it depends on numbers of LFSR that was used inside 
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the generator. The frequency test is performed to check the output of correlation 
attacks in order to verify the sequence of LFSR used into combining function leaks 
into keystream or not. The summary of correlation attacks is shown in Table 3.15. 
The strength of generators is presented as correlation immunity, which is the 
numbers of attacks that passes the frequency test.  
 
 
Table 3.15: Result for Correlation Attacks 
Bil Keystream Generator Correlation Immunity 
1 Linear generator 56 out of 60 were immune 
2 Improved Geffe 0 out of 60 were immune 
3 Summation 2 registers (z0 output) 25 out of 40 were immune 
4 Summation 2 registers (Cout output) 3 out of 40 were immune 
5 Summation 3 registers (z0 output) 54 out of 60 were immune 
6 Summation 3 registers (Cout output) 5 out of 60 were immune 
7 Multiplexing 19 out of 40 were immune 
8 Shrinking 38 out of 40 were immune 
9 XOR-Shrinking 38 out of 40 were immune 
10 Self-Shrinking 19 out of 20 were immune 
11 Memory Generator (16 Addresses) 33 out of 60 were immune 
12 Memory Generator (64 Addresses) 50 out of 60 were immune 
13 W7 Generator 58 out of 60 were immune 
 
 
From observation, Linear generator, Summations 3 Registers (Z0 output), 
Shrinking, XOR-shrinking, Self-shrinking, Memory generators (64 addresses) and 
W7 generator present good performance where 80% of attacks were immune. For 
Multiplexing, Memory Registers (16 addresses) and Summation 2 Registers (Z0 
output), half of the possible attacks were successful. Others generators were 
absolutely not immune and can be easily broken by this attack. Notice that the 
strength of generator will reduce to 2N trials with, N as the length of LFSR that leaks 
into keystream. With reference to Table 3.14, both self-shrinking and W7 generator 
that pass the statistical test are immune on correlation attack as shown in Table 3.15.  
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3.5.3 Linear Complexity Profile (LCP) 
 
 
Linear Complexity Profile (LCP) is another standard test for measurement of 
strength, and one of the popular methods is Berlekamp Massey algorithm. Ideally, 
the linear complexity profile increases linearly with the sequence length. If the linear 
complexity becomes a constant with the increasing of sequence length, the maximum 
linear complexity profile is the equivalent length estimated coefficient of LFSR that 
can generate the sequence, and for analysis purpose, 10,000 bits keystream for each 
generator used. Ideally, the LCP for each generator should be half of sequence 
length, which is 5000. Below is the result of LCP for each generator. 
 
 
Table 3.16: Result for Linear Complexity Profile test 
Bil Keystream Generator Linear Complexity Profile (Maximum) 
1 Linear generator 71 
2 Improved Geffe 1665 
3 Summation 2 registers (z0 output) 5000 
4 Summation 2 registers (Cout output) 2378 
5 Summation 3 registers (z0 output) 5000 
6 Summation 3 registers (Cout output) 2556 
7 Multiplexing 5000 
8 Shrinking 5000 
9 XOR-Shrinking 5000 
10 Self-Shrinking 5000 
11 Memory Generator (16 Addresses) 5000 
12 Memory Generator (64 Addresses) 5000 
13 W7 5000 
 
 
 From Table 3.16, Linear generator, Improved Geffe and Summations 
Register (cout output) is not secure against LCP attack.  Others are immune that have 
large LCP, which increase linearly with sequence length until 5000. Which means 
that, 10,000 bit keystream is not enough to find their equivalent LFSR. From the 
LCP test, a relation between LCP and key length can be derived but limited for 
certain generators such as linear generator and summation 2 registers (cout output). 
Their relations are as follows: 
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(i) Linear generator: Lmax = N0+N1+N2 = 19+23+29 = 71 
(ii) Summation 2 registers (cout output): Lmax = 2N0N1 = 2(29)(41) = 2378 
 
 
 The summary of strength for each generator based on standard test is shown 
in Table 3.17. From the table, only two generators succeeded all statistical tests and 
immune for strength test. They are Self-Shrinking and W7 generator.  
 
 
Table 3.17: Summary of strength based on standard test 
 
Indicator: 
√ - Pass × - Fail 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bil Generator Freq.Test 
Serial 
Test 
Poker 
Test 
Auto. 
Test 
Runs 
Test 
Corr. 
Attacks 
 
LCP 
(Max) 
1 Linear × × √ √ × √ × 
2 Geffe √ × × × × × × 
3 Sum 2 reg. (z0 output) 
√ √ √ × × × √ 
4 Sum 2 reg. (Cout output) 
× × × √ √ × × 
5 Sum 3 reg. (z0 output) 
√ √ √ × × √ √ 
6 Sum 3 reg (Cout output) 
× × × × × × × 
7 Multiplexing √ × × × × × √ 
8 Shrinking √ × √ × × √ √ 
9 XOR-Shrinking √ √ × × √ √ √ 
10 Self-Shrinking √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
11 Memory Gen.(16Add) × × × × × × √ 
12 Memory Gen.(64Add) × × √ × × √ √ 
13 W7 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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3.5.4 Guess-and-Determine (GD) Attack 
 
 
 A Guess-and-Determine attack is called nonstandard test because this attack 
performs depends on generator. Different generators will produce different GD 
attacks. Because the key length is fixed 64 bits, so the best result for this attack is 264. 
Summary of GD attack is shown in Table 3.18. 
 
 
Table 3.18: Result for Guess and Determine (GD) attack 
Bil Keystream Generator Number of trials after GD attacks 
1 Linear generator 242 
2 Improved Geffe 248 
3 Summation 2 registers (z0 output) 229 
4 Summation 2 registers (Cout output) 229 
5 Summation 3 registers (z0 output) 242 
6 Summation 3 registers (Cout output) 242 
7 Multiplexing 229 
8 Shrinking 229 
9 XOR-Shrinking 264 
10 Self-Shrinking 264 
11 Memory Generator (16 Addresses) 264 
12 Memory Generator (64 Addresses) 264 
13 W7 Generator 264 
 
 
 Table 3.18 presents the results of Guess and Determine (GD) attack. There 
are 5 generators that were immune on this attack where their strength after the attack 
is 264 same as they claimed. They are XOR-shrinking, Self-shrinking, both of 
Memory generators and W7 generator. While, for others the strength of generators 
were reduced to 229, 242 and 248 respectively. 
 
 
  Both generators that succeeded standard tests are immune of GD attacks. 
They are really robust and satisfy the properties of good stream cipher as mentioned 
in previous section. But, it does not mean that they are unbreakable. They could be 
break with another nonstandard or mathematical attack, which not consists in this 
study. 
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3.5.5 Discussion 
 
 
 After the analyses of 13 keystream generators, there are 2 cipher systems that 
pass all tests. They are Self-Shrinking andW7 stream ciphers. Due to the 
performance of computer technology at present in term of speed and memory space, 
both cipher system can be implemented easily on Secured HF Transmission System 
but only W7 generator is adopted. Based on the performance, this cipher system will 
guarantee the digital information that exchange through radio communication, which 
is confidential. For other cipher systems, analysis shows that they have some strength 
and weaknesses. However, it does not mean that they are useless because they are 
still applicable for implementation depending on application and information to 
protect. 
 
 
 Basically, the encryption purpose correlates with cover time. Cover time is 
defined as the length of time the encryption algorithm can protect plaintext when 
subjected to an attack (Nichols, 2002). The cover time should also consider the 
expected security value of the information and the existing computer technology that 
is presently available. Usually, longer cover time requires stronger encryption 
algorithm. 
 
 
 The time, T to crack the algorithms is  
 
             T = 2L/R                  (3.35) 
 
where L is the key length and R is the processing rate expressed as key per second 
(Nichols, 2002). With current computer processing which is capable to process 100 
million keys per second, the 128 bit key length is preferred because it would take 
1020 years to search all possible keys. Due to Secured HF Transmission System, if 
the information is top secret, then the key should be increase to 128 bits key. 
Expanding the polynomial of W7 cipher system can do this but the structure of 
algorithm is still the same.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
 
The stream cipher is a type of cipher system where the process of enciphering 
and deciphering is performed one bit at a type. This type of cipher is useful in noisy 
channel conditions such as in radio communication environment and bulk data 
transmission. Comparisons in performance are made for several stream ciphers based 
on the statistical test, correlation attack, linear complexity profile and guess-
determine attacks. From analyses, a cipher system which succeeds all the tests is 
chosen to adopt in Secured HF Image Transmission System. It is the W7 cipher 
system.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DQPSK HF MODEM 
 
 
 
 
 In digital communication, modulation and demodulation are important aspect 
to make communication possible. They are compromise with the type of channel 
propagation. As mention in Chapter 2, HF propagation is unpredictable and varying 
by time. Therefore the suitable method or technique for both modulation and 
demodulation are needed to increase the reliability and throughput during data 
transmission.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (DQPSK) Theory  
 
 
DQPSK is a derivation of Differential Phase Shift Keying (DPSK) where the 
two main characteristics of DQPSK and DPSK are the same; information is encoded 
in the phase transition and previous signal is used as the reference signal. The 
advantage of DQPSK is that it is more spectrums efficient, which make its 
transmission rate to be double compared to DPSK. DQPSK data transfer rate is twice 
the transfer rates of DPSK. In DQPSK, a symbol represents 2 bits of data, and this is 
achieved by encoding the data in the constellation as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The 
 79
constellations of symbols are arranged in the Gray code pattern as shown in Table 
4.1, so that the difference of every adjacent symbol is only one bit. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: QPSK Constellation Diagram 
 
 
Table 4.1: Arrangement of QPSK Symbols 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Generation of DQPSK Signal 
 
 
In differential encoding, the data are encoded in the phase transitions. The 
information is contained in the transition from 1−kφ  to kφ . Sequence encoded at the 
transmitter are represented as 
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kkkkk sasaa .. 11 −− ⊕=            (1) 
 
where ks is the true sequence and ka is the encoded sequence. Generation of DQPSK 
signal for a given sequence 10011101 is shown in Table 4.2. Odd placing numbers is 
taken as the true sequence ks and the differential encoding is produced by placing the 
initial condition as 1 in the encoder ka . This process is repeated for the even placing 
numbers and both of the generated bits are grouped in one symbol. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Generation of DQPSK Signal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Demodulation of DQPSK Signal 
 
 
Structure of DQPSK receiver is shown in Figure 4.2. From practical point of 
view, this structure can only work if perfect synchronization is achieved, where no 
sample delay occurs in the start bit detection. If the detection is delayed by even one 
sample, the signal would be corrupted because the correlation part will correlate the 
incoming signal with cosine waveform and sine waveform, thus the result of the 
sequence, 
ks  
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
encoder, 
ka   
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Signal Transmitted 
   φ  0 0 π 0 0 0 0 π π  
tf12cos π  ? ?  ? ? ? ?   
tf12cos π−   ?     ? ? 
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correlation is not accurate. The correlation procedure needs to be precise to 1 sample 
value. Differential modulation method does not actually need the perfect phase 
synchronization method, but the correlation part requires the perfect synchronization 
with the incoming signal.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Block Diagram of DQPSK Receiver 
 
 
To actually implement DQPSK and really make it work, certain modification 
had to be made on the DQPSK receiver structure. The real solution is to make the 
correlation part to be perfectly synchronized with the incoming signal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Modified DQPSK Receiver Structure 
 
Correlation 
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To achieve the perfect synchronization with the incoming signal, the selector 
needs to retrieve the reference signal from the incoming signal itself as shown in 
Figure 4.3. This is done on the assumption that the start bit detector is not efficient. 
The selector taps the incoming signal that has been filtered and adjust the waveform 
to get the in-phase and quadrature components. Since in this case, the phase 
difference between 2000Hz cosine component and 2000Hz sine component is only 2 
samples, the selector only needs to shift 2 samples to the left to get the quadrature 
waveform. This process ensures that the first branch is perfectly in the same phase 
with the incoming signal and the second branch differs by 90 or 270 degrees with the 
incoming signal. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 DQPSK Theoretical BER 
 
 
 Theoretical BER for DQPSK is derived from DPSK theoretical BER shown 
in Equation (4.2).  The union bound theory is also applicable for DQPSK as 
illustrated in Figure 4.4 where errors are more likely to occur in the adjacent symbols. 
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Figure 4.4: Union Bound Border 
 
 
BER for DQPSK is the sum of error probability eP  as shown in Equation 
(4.3) where 011011 ,, eee PPP  and 00eP  are also the conditional error probabilities for each 
symbol and )01(),10(),11( === sPsPsP  and )00( =sP  are the probabilities of 
occurrence or priori probabilities for each symbol that is equal to ¼. For example, 
11eP  is the probability of getting s=01 or s=10 if actual data transmitted is s=11. If 
s=11 is transmitted, error 11eP  occur if s=01 or s=10 is decoded at the receiver. 11eP  
is the sum of the distance at the two borders 
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where the relation of PN  is shown in Equation (4.5), br  is the bit-rate, bT  is the bit-
duration and 0N is power of the additive white noise. Since signal per direction is 
DPSK and conditional error probability 00011011 eeee PPPP ===  then BER for 
DQPSK is calculated as 
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BER for DQPSK is the sum of probability of occurrence for each symbol 
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Table 4.3 is summarized of BER for several modulation techniques. It shows that 
BER for DQPSK is double the BER of DPSK.  
 
 
Table 4.3: Theoretical BER for Various Method of Modulation 
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4.2 Theoretical and Simulation Result 
 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the result of theoretical BER on various modulation 
methods in the presence of additive white Gaussian noise. It shows that the 
performance of DPSK and DQPSK are very close, but DQPSK has more advantage 
from DPSK in terms of spectrum efficiency where its transmission rate is twice than 
DPSK. The more complex modulation method D8PSK and D16PSK can encode 3 
bits per symbol and 4 bit per symbol respectively, but they require an even higher 
SNR to get the same performance as DQPSK. Non-coherent FSK is much easier to 
implement but from the performance wise, non-coherent FSK lies between D8PSK 
and D16PSK as shown in the graph. More detail explanation on modulation, 
demodulation and simulation of FSK, D8PSK and D16PSK can be referred from 
(Norhashimah, 2004).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Theoretical BER Result 
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Figure 4.7: Simulation BER Result 
 
 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the result of BER from simulation. Random sample 
delay is introduced in the detection to simulate the real condition in synchronization. 
This simulation study did not take into account the effect caused by multipath fading 
and Doppler effect. Here we can see that, without perfect synchronization PSK and 
QPSK are the worst in terms of BER. The graph shows that to get the same 
performance at BER 210− , the difference between DQPSK and DPSK is only 3dB. 
D8PSK and D16PSK require a higher SNR to get the same performance at BER 
of 210− . DQPSK is chosen as the modulation method best option in terms of 
performance, spectrum efficiency and complexity. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Linear Phase FIR Filter 
 
 
The FIR (Finite Impulse Response) filter which has an impulse response 
sequence h(0),h(1),… , h(N-1) has N coefficients and is said to be an N th order filter. 
The transfer function for this filter is: 
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The output of the system shown in Figure 4.8 is described by the equation 
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Figure 4.8: Description of a FIR Filter 
 
 
The signal flow graph for the filter given by Equation (4.9) is shown in 
Figure 4.9. This structure is called a direct form of a FIR filter (Oppenheim, 1999). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: First Direct Form of a Transversal Filter 
 
 
When the impulse response of a FIR filter satisfies h(n) = h(N-1-n), the filter 
is a symmetrical FIR filter and has a linear phase response. This symmetry allows the 
symmetric coefficients to be added together before they are multiplied by the 
coefficients. Taking advantage of the symmetry lowers the number of multipliers 
from N to N/2 if N is even and from N to (N+1)/2 for N odd. 
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4.4 Error Control 
 
 
The signal containing information may not be interpreted correctly at the 
receiver due to the distortion and interference in the channel between the transmitter 
and receiver. An effective communication system will incorporate an error control 
method to minimize the probability of making errors while simultaneously 
maintaining the system complexity (Sklar, 2001). In general, error control can be 
classed into:- 
 
(i) Auto repeat request (ARQ) 
(ii) Forward error correction (FEC) 
 
 
In ARQ method, the receiver sends acknowledgement to the transmitter 
regarding the status of the received packet. If the received packet is free of error, the 
receiver sends an acknowledgement that tells the transmitter to send the next packet 
of data. Even if one error occurs in a packet, the receiver sends an acknowledgement 
to request the same packet of data. This type of error control does not repair the error 
on its own but it depends on the transmitter to resend the same packet of data 
whenever error occurs. The most common and frequently used error detection 
technique is the cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Four most favored versions of CRC 
are CRC-12, CRC-16, CRC-CCITT and CRC-32. CRC-12 uses 12th order of pattern 
polynomial, CRC-16 and CRC-CCITT use 16th order pattern polynomial and CRC-
32 utilizes 32nd order of pattern polynomial (Stalings, 2000). The longer the 
polynomial pattern, the more error it can detect. 
 
 
FEC is more complicated than ARQ because not only it has to decide whether 
there is an error, it also need to determine where the error is, in order to correct the 
error. This means that FEC is capable of correcting error on itself, but only to a 
certain limitation of number of errors. The more complicated the error control coding 
is the more error it can detect and repair.  Error control techniques for FEC are 
classed as block coding and convolutional coding. The main difference between 
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block coding and convolutional coding is that the calculation process for block 
coding is done in the fixed length of data in a block whereas for convolutional coding, 
the calculation is done bit by bit. Some of the well-known block codes are Hamming 
codes, BCH codes, Reed-Solomon codes and Golay codes. Golay code is chosen to 
handle the error correction part for this system. Golay code is a ½ code rate and it is 
capable in correcting all triple errors or less. Hamming codes can only correct one 
error. BCH codes and Reed-Solomon codes are not ½ code rate coding but they can 
correct triple error. 
 
 
Both ARQ and FEC are implemented using binary cyclic code method which 
is explained in detail in section 4.4.1. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Binary Cyclic Code 
 
 
Binary cyclic codes are an important subclass of linear block codes. The 
codes are easily implemented with feedback shift registers and the syndrome 
calculation is easily accomplished using similar feedback shift registers. The cyclic 
nature of the code can be expressed in polynomial form. In order to clearly 
understand the process, the method should be viewed as a long division in the Galois 
field (GF (2)) or polynomial form. If we have a binary sequence 
m= [ ]1 1 1 1    1 0 0 0    0 0 1 1 , the polynomial representation in the GF (2) is 
 
m(x) = 12341011 ++++++ xxxxxx      (4.10) 
 
 
The polynomial is shifted 12 bits to the left to calculate the checksum for 
extended Golay code application. Left shift operation is denoted as multiplication 
with 12x  as shown below: 
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 )()(' 12 xmxxm =        (4.11) 
 
 
Referring to Equation (4.10), the 12 bits left shift operation produces 
Equation (4.12) where the power of every polynomial increases. 
 
12131415162223)(' xxxxxxxxm ++++++=     (4.12) 
 
 
Various types of error control method exist and each utilizes a completely 
different pattern polynomial. This example is based on the implementation of 
extended Golay code.  The polynomial in Equation (4.12) is then divided with a 
p= ]001111101010[  pattern sequence that has a polynomial representation 
 
p(x) = 1567911 ++++++ xxxxxx      (4.13) 
 
 
The remainder r(x) or checksum is calculated by dividing the sequence m’(x) 
with its pattern polynomial p(x) as shown in the following equation 
 
)(
)(
)(' xu
xp
xm =  with remainder r(x)  
)(mod)(')( xpxmxr =       (4.14) 
 
where u(x) is the result of the long division. Actual long division operation is 
illustrated in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10: Long Division Operation in Galois Field (2) 
 
 
The shifted polynomial is as follows 
 
 t(x) = m’(x)+r(x)       (4.15) 
 
where the final message is 
 
t(x) = 5891012131415162223 xxxxxxxxxxx ++++++++++  (4.16) 
 
The similar operation in binary is represented in Figure 4.11. This operation 
implements binary addition without carry, which is an exclusive-OR operation. 
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Figure 4.11: Actual Binary Operation 
 
 
The operation above utilizes the shift register and the value of MSB (most 
significant bit) is checked after every XOR operation. If the MSB is 0 than the 
remainder bits are copied down. If the MSB is 1, then the binary sequence is XORed 
with the shifted pattern. The operation is continued until 12 bits remainder is 
obtained. The next step is attaching the remainder or checksum at the back of 
original binary sequence as follows 
 
[ ]0 0 0 0    0 1 0 0    1 1 1 0    1 1 1 1    1 0 0 0    0 0 1 1=t    (4.17) 
 
 
The sequence obtained from Equation (4.17) is the actual data to be 
transmitted. At the receiver end, the received sequence is then divided with the same 
pattern polynomial p(x) shown in Equation (4.13). If the remainder is zero, then the 
received sequence is the same as the transmitted sequence and no error occurred. If 
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the remainder is not zero, the remainder is then used as the error syndrome to locate 
where the errors are.  
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Cyclic Redundancy Check 
 
 
Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is one of the most common, and one of the 
most powerful error detecting codes. The operation of CRC is similar to the example 
in previous section except that a different pattern polynomial is used and the receiver 
does not check the syndrome to locate the error position. CRC only tells whether or 
not an error has occurred. If an error is detected the receiver will post a request to the 
transmitter to retransmit the same packet. Pattern polynomials p(x) for the most 
common use CRC methods are listed in the table as follows: 
 
 
Table 4.4: CRC Pattern Polynomial 
 
 
 
An error will only be undetectable if the received sequence is divisible by 
p(x). Error will be detected in the following cases (Stalings, 2000) 
 
(i) All single-bit errors 
(ii) All double-bit errors, as long as p(x) has at least three 1s 
(iii)Any odd number of errors, as long as p(x) contains a factor of (X+1) 
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(iv) Any burst error for which the length of the burst is less than the length of the 
pattern polynomial; that is, less than or equal to the length of the frame check 
sequence or check sum 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Extended Golay Code 
 
 
One of the more useful block codes is the binary (24, 12) extended Golay 
code, which is formed by adding an overall bit to the perfect (23, 12) code, known as 
the Golay code (Sklar, 2001). This added bit increases the minimum distance mind  
from 7 to 8 and produces a rate 1/2 code, which is easier to implement than the 12/23 
original Golay code. Minimum distance for the extended Golay code, mind = 8, where 
the code is guaranteed to correct all triple errors.   
 
 
Total error pattern possibilities for 12 bits of data plus 12 bits of checksum 
are 2046. A look-up table is implemented since the size of memory needs to be 
allocated for the look-up table is quite small. Error syndrome for Golay code is 
stored in external memory on board DSK board starting from address 0xF000 until 
0xFFFF. 
 
 
A snippet of error correcting code is inserted in Figure 4.12 to show how the 
error correction is performed at the receiver. Before proceeding to the error control 
part, the received bit is divided to 6 groups of 24 bits of data. Each group of 24 bits is 
then decoded to calculate the syndrome. Error occurs in the packet if the syndrome is 
not equal to zero. As shown in the code in Figure 4.12, error correction is only 
executed if error occurred in the packet. Error pattern is located by referring to the 
error syndrome, where the error syndrome acts as a binary pointer to point to the 
exact location inside the memory.  
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Figure 4.12: Error Correction Procedure 
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4.4.4 Interleaving 
 
 
Extended Golay code is capable in correcting all triple errors in a block of 24 
bits. Error may occur anywhere in the packet of 144 bits, which are actually 6 groups 
of 24 bits of data. Since error tends to appear in burst, there is a tendency of some of 
the group containing more errors while the other groups may contain none at all. 
Interleaving is done to distribute the errors evenly throughout the whole packet. The 
process is shown in Figure 4.13.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Interleaver and Deinterleaver Block 
 
 
The actual process employs 144 bits of data but the example shown here only 
deal with 9 bits of data to simplify the explanation. Figure 4.13 shows that at the 
transmitter, the original sequence is placed systematically from top to bottom in a 
square box. The interleaved sequence is obtained by reading from left to right. De-
interleaving process is actually the reverse process of the interleaving process done 
earlier. This is the process, which is executed at the receiver side to actually spread 
the errors as far as possible in a packet if any error occurred. Here the received data 
is placed from left to right, then to get the original data the sequence is read from top 
to bottom. 
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The interleaving process ensures that errors are located randomly inside the 
full length of the packet. For example, if the transmitted sequence is A D G B E H C 
F I, but during the transmission errors are introduced to the 4th, 5th and 6th bit, the 
received sequence is A D G 321 xxx  C F I. De-interleaving produces A 1x  C D 
2x  F G 3x  I. If the sequence used is 144-bit length, the result of de-interleaving 
will be more obvious. 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Platform Overview 
 
 
Texas Instruments produces a wide range of dsp processors in the market. 
The ranges include C2000 family, C5000 family and C6000 family. The latest 
processors in C2000 family are TMS320C24x and TMS 320C28x fixed-point dsp 
processors. C5000 family consists of TMS320C54x and TMS320C55x fixed-point 
dsp processors. C6000 family are consists of fixed-point TMS320C62x and floating-
point TMS320C67x dsp processors. C2000 family is designed for low performance, 
where these processors are best use for control application. One of the application 
where these dsp processor is used is in motor control for air conditioning system. 
C5000 family is targeted for a high efficiency and low power application. These 
processors are best used for handheld portable devices or wireless communication 
devices which operate on limited power supply such as batteries. The last family 
which is C6000 family is the highest performance dsp processor in the market but the 
disadvantage is, it requires a constant power supply which makes it unsuitable for 
handheld device (Texas Instruments, DSP Selection Guide). C6000 family 
processors are used in High Definition TV (HDTV) where high speed processing of 
image is required. C6000 family can reach up to 1 GHz clock speed. Table below 
displays the characteristics of the processors from each family. 
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Table 4.5: Comparison of Various Types of DSP Processors 
 
 
 
 
Based on the characteristics that are shown in Table 4.5, it is clear that Texas 
Instruments DSP C5000 family processor is the suitable choice for implementation 
purposes. In addition, company like Motorola also using the C5000 family DSP 
processor for their product. The two best choices are TMS320VC5509 and 
TMS320VC5416 but during the initial stage of the project, TMS320VC5509 was not 
available yet to the market. Therefore, TMS320VC5416 is chosen because of the size 
of RAM and ROM is larger compared to DSP processors from different makers. 
Number of MIPS is also high that can also ensure a very effective implementation. 
This project is targeted to be a stand alone system which means that C6000 family 
DSP processors are not suitable, eventhough they are faster and more powerful 
compared to C5000 family. 
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Figure 4.14: TMS320VC5416 DSK Overview Block Diagram (TMS320VC5416 
Tech. Ref. 2002) 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Synchronization 
 
 
Digital communication requires some sort of synchronization in order for the 
receiver to recognize the incoming signal. Coherent detection requires perfect phase 
synchronization whereas for non-coherent detection phase synchronization is not 
critical. The most widely used synchronization method for coherent detection is 
frequency and phase synchronization or also known as phase-locked loop (PLL). 
Symbol synchronization and frame synchronization are less complicated than the 
first method. A system using non-coherent detection may use either symbol 
synchronization or frame synchronization as its synchronization method where 
accurate phase lock is not required. 
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Frequency and phase synchronization or PLL has three basic components 
which are a phase detector, a loop filter and a voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) 
(Sklar, 2001). The phase detector measures the phase difference between incoming 
signal and local oscillator. The loop filter controls the variations in the phase 
difference between incoming signal and local oscillator. And the last component, 
VCO is responsible in producing the carrier replica.  
 
 
Symbol synchronization is classed into two types (Sklar, 2001); non-data-
aided (NDA) and data-aided (DA). The similarity between symbol synchronization 
and phase synchronization is that both methods incorporate the process of producing 
a replica of a portion the transmitted signal. Symbol synchronization method 
generates a square wave at each symbol transition, whereas phase synchronization 
needs to replicate an accurate replica of the carrier.  
 
 
Frame synchronization is the simplest method of detection. This type of 
synchronization is required when the information is organized in blocks (Sklar, 
2001). Similar to symbol synchronization, frame synchronization is required to 
generate a square wave at the frame rate. Systems using non-coherent detection 
method employ symbol synchronization or frame synchronization depending on the 
organization of the information. 
 
 
One of the major hurdles during implementation is the synchronization 
problem. In the case of coherent PSK demodulation, the receiver is assumed to be 
able to generate the reference signals where its phase is identical to the incoming 
signal transmitted from the transmitter. These reference signals are compared with 
the incoming signals in order to get back the signal, which is modulated, onto the 
carrier. 
 
 
In this project, the need to generate the reference signal is eliminated since 
the type of modulation is non-coherent. The complexity of the receiver is reduced 
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since the circuitry to obtain the exact phase synchronization is not required. Phase 
synchronization is not a critical issue in non-coherent type of modulation. In non-
coherent demodulation, envelope demodulation is employed and there is no need for 
precise tracking of the phase and frequency of the carrier at the receiver.  
 
 
Even though phase synchronization is not a critical issue in non-coherent 
demodulation, the process of detecting the start of the frame is still important. The 
synchronization has to be performed effectively so that the data is not lost due to 
some of the data being discarded at the beginning of the packet. This may happen if 
the synchronization is not perfect. The detector may not be able to detect whether or 
not the signal which is passing through the detector, contains data. Normally, the 
detector can only detect whether the signal contains data after a certain amount of 
signal has passed through the detector and some calculations have been done. A good 
detector only requires a small amount of signal in order for it to be able to decide 
whether a signal contains data. The synchronization method used for this project is 
an adaptation of frame synchronization as explained earlier in previous section. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Start and Stop Bit Detector 
 
 
Shown above is the block diagram for the start and stop bit detector. At the 
first stage, signal and noise will pass through the band pass filter. Filtering for 
frequency 2000 Hz is done and the sample is squared and summed. Once the start bit 
is detected, the exact location of the stop bit is determined. This method of detection 
ensures the perfect knowledge of the exact location where the data starts. Flow chart 
for start and stop bit detection is shown in the Figure 4.16. 
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Figure 4.16: Start bit and Stop bit detection Flowchart 
1st threshold 
value 
2nd threshold  
value 
3rd threshold 
value 
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Although phase synchronization is not as critical in DQPSK compared to 
QPSK, delay in samples due to poor method of detection will introduce error. In 
order to overcome this problem, the sample duration of the start bit is increased to 
400 samples and sample duration of stop bit is increased to 120 samples. The method 
is done in such a way that after the start bit is detected, the exact location of the stop 
bit is located by using two methods of calculation. First stop bit calculation 
calculates the instantaneous power of 5 samples starting from the supposedly end of 
packet location. The total of instantaneous power is compared whether it is larger 
than a fixed threshold value. If this condition is fulfilled, second type of stop bit 
calculation is executed. If the condition is not fulfilled, the starting point of the 
samples is shifted 5 samples backward and the process is repeated. 
 
 
The second type of stop bit calculation is the backup of the first, in case the 
result of first calculation failed to locate the exact location of stop bit. Sample 
location calculated previously is shifted 4 samples forward and the value 
instantaneous power for the next subsequence 2 samples is calculated. The value of 
instantaneous power is then compared with another fixed threshold value. Three 
threshold values are used in this project for the purpose of detecting the start bit and 
the stop bit. These threshold values are acquired from the experiment when the SNR 
is at 16 dB. 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Modulation and Demodulation 
 
 
Digital modulation is a process where digital data are converted to waveform 
that suits the characteristics of the channel. It involves the process of translating 
information to radio form, before letting it travel in radio wave. The process starts 
from extracting files from the host computer and sending 9 characters each time to 
the target DSK board. The 9 characters contain 72 bits of data which are divided into 
6 groups. Each of the group which consists of 12 bits of data is then encoded with the 
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Golay code pattern to get the check sum. The 12 bits of check sum is attached at the 
back of each group. This process is repeated for the remaining groups of data. 
 
 
A graphical user interface is built on the host computer using Microsoft 
Visual C++® as shown in Figure 4.17. Users only need to browse to the text file that 
needs to be transmitted, regardless of the size of the file. Visual C++ at the Host 
sends 9 characters each time to the VC5416 board or known as Target from now on. 
The Target handles most of the process. It reads the 9 characters sent from the Host 
and converts it to the binary representation.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Visual C Graphical User Interface 
 
 
The combined 6 groups of data with check sum are then interleaved to ensure 
that errors if occurred are separated as far as possible in the packet. Total 144 bits are 
interleaved as explained in previous section. The bits are then differentially encoded 
and then modulated, before they are combined with the additional start bit and stop 
bit prepared earlier. This step increases the length of the packet duration and this 
Transmit 
Receive 
Counter 
Browse 
Browse 
Send
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increase length of start and stop bits are important to ensure the correct detection of 
data packet. The completed data packet is then transmitted through radio. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18: DQPSK Packet Structure 
 
 
 DQPSK packet structure implemented is illustrated in Figure 4.18. The 
packet is made of 9 characters or 72 bits of data and another 72 bits of check sum for 
the FEC overhead. As explained earlier, the length of the actual data is only 0.740 
seconds or 5920 samples, but in order to increase the signal detection efficiency, 400 
samples are added at the front of the packet and another 120 samples are added at the 
back of the packet. These additional samples are comprised of single harmonic 
2000Hz cosine waveform which is used as in-phase reference signal and quadrature 
reference signal at the receiver. These additional samples do not affect the overall 
processing time because these samples are not used in the actual demodulation 
process. The total length of the packet is 6440 samples or 0.805 seconds. Packet 
cycle is fixed at 6 seconds to allow for processing time at both transmit and receiver. 
 
 
The receiver side captures 35 samples of data and the captured data are 
processed to detect the start bit. This process is repeated until start pattern is detected. 
The whole packet of data is captured once the start pattern is detected. Stop pattern 
detection is then and from this stop pattern information, the exact sample where the 
data starts can be calculated. Data is shifted, to get the actual data, according to the 
number of samples calculated from above. The whole length of the data packet is 
then passed through a band pass filter with lower cut off frequency 1900Hz and 
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higher cut off frequency 2100Hz. The band pass filter is designed to be a 35 filter 
length FIR filter. Only frequency component of 2000Hz will pass through while 
other frequency ranges is attenuated. The flowchart of modulation and demodulation 
process is illustrated in Figure 4.19. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Modulation and Demodulation 
Modulation Demodulation 
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Figure 4.20: Transmitter Side Operation Flowchart 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Receiver Side Operation Flowchart 
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Target 
Target 
Host 
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Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21 explain the processes that occur in both 
transmitter and receiver side respectively. Here we can see that the host and target 
operate independently. The host only handles the process of extracting file or storing 
the received file, the target handles all the extensive computation.  
 
 
 
 
4.8 Selection of Field-test Sites 
 
 
HF is most suitable for long distance, where in this case the distance between 
the transmitter and receiver station are separated for more than 100 kilometers. This 
assumption is done to exclude the line of sight signal components from reaching the 
receiver. The prototype HF DQPSK modem was tested between DSP Lab in UTM 
Skudai and Kuala Jasin Camping Site in Taman Negara Endau, Baling which is in 
Kedah and also Chemor which is in Perak. Endau Rompin was chosen based on these 
reasons; no other means of communications, located in a remote place and far from 
Skudai to ensure no ground wave communication, thick forest with a lot of ceiling 
coverage that prohibit satellite communication and blocked by mountain range on all 
sides to ensure no line of sight communication or VHF signal can pass through. 
Baling and Chemor were chosen because the distance is greater and there isn’t any 
mobile phone coverage to the Baling test site and Chemor is situated in the lowlands.  
 
 
 
 
4.9 Test Equipments Setup 
 
 
Test setup is as shown in Figure 4.22. A Transmitter side is placed in Skudai, 
where the main function is to transmit known file. The difference between the 
transmitter side and the receiver side is that the transmitter side utilizes the 
TMS320VC5416 DSK board to generate the transmit signal, whereas the receiver 
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side records the signal for analysis. Figure 4.23 shows the connection between 
TMS320VC5416 DSK board and the transceiver. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Test Setup 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23: TMS320VC5416 DSK Board and Transceiver Connection 
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4.9.1 Computer Setup 
 
 
The receiver side requires a simple connection from the radio to the line input 
of the sound card in the computer. The received signal is recorded in the computer 
using the common sound recorder program in the computer. Certain initial settings 
need to be done before proceeding with the actual recording of the received signal. 
These settings are essential in order to get the correct signal, with the correct 
sampling frequency and unclipped signal. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 illustrates the properties of the sound card. We need to select 
Recording before a signal can actually be recorded. After pressing the OK button, we 
need to reduce the Line In level to control the magnitude of the received signal, in 
order to record without clipping the signal. A clipped recorded signal will produce a 
different result since it changes the frequency component of the received signal. 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Sound Card Properties 
 
Recording 
ok Line In 
input level 
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Figure 4.25: Sound Recorder Properties 
 
 
Properties for the sound recorder are illustrated in Figure 4.25. The 
transmitter is programmed to produce signal using sampling frequency sampling of 
8000 Hz and in order to record the correct information, the properties of the sound 
recorder has to be adjusted to the proper settings. By pressing the convert button, we 
can configure the sound recorder parameter to 8000Hz frequency sampling, 8 bit 
input and mono from the drop-down table at the attributes. 
 
 
 
 
4.9.2 Transceiver setup 
 
 
Hardware setup for the transmitter side is as shown in Figure 4.23. The 
receiver only utilizes the common sound recorder program already installed inside 
the computer. The reliability of the dipole antenna needed to be checked before 
transmission could be conducted. Chapter 5 explained in detail the method to check 
the ratio of forward/reverse power for a dipole antenna. Squelch level in the receiver 
radio is adjusted until the threshold level is just above the noise level. This step is 
Convert 
Attributes 
drop-down 
table 
Record 
ok 
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done to ensure only the true signal is received at the receiver. The next crucial step is 
to set the mode to LSB+FSK in the receiver radio. By setting this particular mode, 
we are utilizing the built-in bandpass filter inside the Kenwood HF transceiver to 
reduce noise. The bandwidth of this built-in bandpass filter is 300Hz. The final step 
is to connect the stereo cable from the receiver radio to sound card Line In to record 
the received signal. 
 
 
 
 
4.10 Results 
 
 
Data transmission testing was conducted in the morning and evening to 
monitor the effect of various time during the day. The received signal power and the 
SNR can be measured using spectrum analyzer. Only DPSK signal was transmitted 
during the Endau Rompin field-testing. The frequency used is 7.1MHz. The BER 
result and its SNR are listed in Table 4.5. The method to calculate the theoretical 
uncoded BER from the measured SNR is explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 The actual transmit power was 10Watt and signal transmitted during this 
field-testing was only DPSK because the proper way to synchronize the incoming 
signal for DQPSK was not yet solved. DPSK does not require the strict 
synchronization as DQPSK since it does not need to perform any correlation process. 
Night-time shows a drop in SNR compared with day-time transmission. Day-time 
transmission is at 17dB and the uncoded BER is around 0.03. Compared with 
simulation result in Figure 4.7 and theoretical BER in Table 4.5, it is clear that BER 
during field-testing are far worse. This is expected since the theory and simulation 
result did not take into account the effect introduced by multipath fading and Doppler 
effect. 
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Table 4.5: Endau Rompin Field-testing BER and SNR 
 
 
 
 
 Field-testing in Baling was conducted after the problem in synchronization 
had been solved. The solution was explained in detail in previous section where the 
in-phase component and quadrature component is recovered from the incoming 
signal itself. Even if the detection is delayed by certain samples, the received signal 
would not be corrupted since the in-phase correlator and quadrature correlator will 
shift accordingly.   
 
 
Table 4.6: Example of Error Syndrome and Number of Errors per Packet 
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Table 4.6 shows the example of error syndrome and number of errors per 
packet. This example listed the errors and its syndrome for 10 packets of data. The 
packets which contained the same 9 characters ‘ABCDEFGHI’ were sent 
continuously and their number of errors were totaled to get the overall number of 
errors. All of the errors were corrected in this example. Total of bits transmitted are 
1440 and total number of errors are 59, which resulted in uncoded BER of 0.04 for 
this example.  
 
 
Table 4.7: Baling Field-testing BER and SNR 
 
 
 
Minimum of 100 packets were sent to get the average of uncoded BER for 
the field test. Result of uncoded BER and SNR for Baling filed-testing are listed in 
Table 4.7. Testing was conducted on August, 18th 2004, once in the morning and 
once in the evening. The field-testing was conducted to test the performance of the 
prototype DQPSK modem and not to find the characteristics of the channel. The 
method to calculate the theoretical uncoded BER from the measured SNR is 
explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
Chemor field-testing result is listed in Table 4.8. The method of the test was 
the same with the test done in Baling, where the same packet of characters was sent 
continuously. Minimum 100 packets were sent for every session. This was done to 
get the average uncoded BER for that particular session. Carrier frequency used in 
the morning test session was 6.65 MHz and the transmit power was set at 10 Watt. 
The transmit power for the test in the evening session and night session were set at 
15 Watt. Carrier frequency used in the evening was 7.08 MHz while at night was 
6.65 MHz.  
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Table 4.8: Chemor Field-testing BER and SNR 
 
 
 
From these test it is clear that the actual uncoded BER is at 210−  if the SNR 
of the channel could be maintained at 16~17dB. If the selection of the frequency is 
inappropriate, transmitting at a higher power will not be able to increase the SNR at 
the receiver. Most of the signal will be transmitted to a farther distance or the 
receiving station will be located in the skip zone if the selection is inappropriate. The 
selection of frequency was based on prediction software and given licensed by 
MCMC which will explain detail in Chapter 5. It is found that the frequency used in 
the morning may not be usable in the afternoon and at night.  
 
 
This prototype HF modem is guaranteed to be able to correct errors if the 
BER is at 210− . Extended Golay code is capable in correcting 3 errors in a packet of 
24 bits. This prototype DQPSK HF modem utilizes 6 packets of 24 bits as the data 
format, where the maximum number of errors which it can correct is 18 errors and if 
the numbers of errors in the 24 bits packet are not more than 3 errors. A serious 
problem that is discovered in these tests is that numbers of errors do not increase but 
the whole packet is lost instead. These may be due to the packet being corrupted or 
the receiver failing to even detect the incoming signal. The start and stop bit 
detection explained in detail in previous section is designed to detect signal at SNR 
16dB. It may not be functioning properly if the SNR is lower or if the front end of 
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the packet itself is corrupted. Examples of corrupted packets are shown in the 
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
 
The results show the comparison of BER and SNR between theoretical, 
simulation and experimental. It is found that the prototype is designed to operate at 
SNR 16dB. Due to propagation in HF, the prototype found difficulties to fulfill the 
objective to transmit secured image over HF radio. However, the research found the 
significant in term of modulation technique, channel propagation and error control 
which believed could be used to develop stand alone and high speed HF modem in 
future.   
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURED HF 
MESSENGER 
 
 
 
 
Besides an HF modem, another important part in secured HF transmission 
system is the application software that executes in a computer. The software will 
handle the process of digital information and security before converted to analog 
signal by HF modem. Due to the problem of development DQPSK HF modem using 
TMS320C5416, the commercialized stand alone modems were purchased. The 
application software is needed to control every function of HF modem to ensure 
image transmission is possible over HF radio.  
 
 
 
 
5.1 System Components 
 
 
Basically, the system needs two stations, which are connected to each other 
via HF medium. Each station needs a computer, HF modem, transceiver and antenna 
to allow them to communicate as shown in Figure 5.1. Usually, the communication 
occurs between based station and mobile station. The antenna used could be wide 
band or narrow band as long as it supports the compatible range of frequencies for 
  
119
both stations. This antenna is connected to the transceiver using coaxial cable. Then, 
the transceiver is connected to HF modem. For this project, Kenwood Ts-570D is 
used as transceiver while KAM’98 as HF modem. Detail specification of these 
components can be found in Appendix C.  
 
 
Instead of all equipments, another important part is Secured HF Messenger 
software, which is installed in the computer. The application is capable to control HF 
modem through computer serial port. By using this application, both stations can 
exchange their digital information such as JPEG image , text file, winzip file and 
short message confidentially. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: System structure for both Stations 
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5.1.1 Operating Frequency 
 
 
As known that HF propagation always changes by a lot of factors. So, a 
chosen of operating frequency is very crucial to enhance the quality of transmission. 
For this project, the frequencies used are referred to experimental license that has 
been given by Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Communication 
(MCMC). There are 15 usable frequencies and details of the license shows in 
Appendix C.  
 
 
Due to HF propagation, selected suitable frequency is crucial for optimizing 
data transmission. Therefore, a prediction needed to find which frequency is suitable 
to use at certain time. Here, third party software which is Advanced Stand Alone 
Prediction System (ASAPS) is used to predict the Optimum Working Frequency 
(OWF) as shown in Figure 5.2. Based on OWF, the best usable frequency is chosen 
for testing purposes as shown in Figure 5.3.  Besides predict OWF, the software is 
also capable to predict the field strength based on antenna and power chosen. So, 
both stations can determine whether they need to increase the transmission power or 
not during the communication. Figure 5.4 presents the prediction of Signal to Noise 
Ratio (SNR) based on 25 Watt power transmit and half wavelength horizontal dipole 
antenna (half-wave height). 
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Figure 5.2: Prediction result shows the OWF for F and E layer 
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Figure 5.3: The usable frequencies based on OWF 
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Figure 5.4: The SNR prediction based on 25Watt power transmit and half 
wavelength horizontal dipole antenna (half-wave height). 
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5.2 Antenna 
 
 
  Antenna is a transducer that converts electrical alternating current oscillations 
at a radio frequency to an electromagnetic wave of the same frequency. 
Fundamentally, the electric and magnetic field radiated from an antenna form the 
electromagnetic field and this field is responsible for the transmission and reception 
of electromagnetic energy through free space (Carr, 2001). Various types of antenna 
exist nowadays, and each type of antenna produces different types of electromagnetic 
radiation. The type of antenna chosen depends heavily on the purpose of the 
application, whether it is mainly for receiving or whether the orientation of the 
(receiving and transmitting) station is critical. For this project, narrow band 
horizontal dipole antenna was used due to lower power transmission, low cost built 
and radiation pattern.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Dipole Antenna 
 
 
The dipole or direction antenna in Figure 5.5 allows for a very low power 
transmission. A low power transmission will prolong the life of the equipment used. 
The length of dipole antenna that used in this project is a half-wavelength which also 
claimed as most practical antenna for communication purpose (Mohamad Kamal, 
2005). An approximation for a free space half-wavelength as explained in (Carr, 
2001) is 
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    (5.1) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Example of half-wavelength dipole antenna 
 
 
By using Equation (5.1), a 6 MHz horizontal dipole is constructed as shown 
in Figure 5.6. For effective forward transmit power from the transmitter to the 
antenna, the transceiver should be placed close to the antenna so that the feeder line 
is stretched as short as possible. 
 
 
After an antenna is designed, the next crucial step is the installation of the 
antenna. The height of the antenna from the ground is important in order to get the 
correct radiation pattern. Different kind of pattern radiates when the antenna is fixed 
at different height. The height could be one, half or quarter wavelength. In this 
project, half-wave length height from the ground is chosen and its vertical radiation 
is shown in Figure 5.7.  
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Figure 5.7: Antenna radiation pattern for half-wave length dipole (half-wave 
height) 
 
 
An antenna might not be able to transmit full power during transmission 
because the impedance is not matched. Impedance matching process is essential to 
ensure that full power is transferred from the radio to the antenna. It is important to 
avoid the signal from losing during transmission. This process is easily done with 
Kenwood transceiver since it already has a built in antenna tuner and the process can 
be performed by merely a push of a button. The location of built-in antenna tuner 
button is shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
One important equipment (besides the multimeter to check the continuity) 
used in antenna installation is the transmit power wattmeter as shown in Figure 5.8. 
The equipment can be used to check the forward-transmit power, which is from the 
radio to the antenna and the reverse-transmit power, which is from the antenna to the 
radio. If in any case the reverse-transmit power is larger than forward-transmit power 
in the frequency band of antenna designed, we will straightaway know that the 
antenna is faulty. No signal will be transmitted even if we transmit at high power. 
Figure 5.9 shows the antenna characteristic based on standing wave ratio (SWR) for 
6 MHz horizontal dipole antennas. SWR is the term used to explain the ratio of the 
effective forward power and reflected on the transmission line (Carr, 2001).  
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Figure 5.8: Power Wattmeter 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Dipole Antenna Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Transceiver 
 
 
Kenwood TS-570D (Kenwood Corp, 1998) transceiver is used in this project 
for monitoring and field-testing purposes. This transceiver includes a 16-bit DSP unit 
to process audio frequencies. By taking maximum advantage of DSP technology, the 
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transceiver provides enhance reduction capabilities and improves the quality of audio 
when transmitting. Some of this transceiver features are: 
 
(i) Provides high performance receive filters 
(ii) Enhances the Beat cancel and Noise Reduction tools 
(iii) Allows total customization of transmitted audio through the use of 
functions such as the Transmit Equalizer 
(iv) Enables Automatic Zero-beating for CW operation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Kenwood HF Transceiver TS-570D 
 
 
 Figure 5.10 shows the HF transceiver front connection utilizes the Mic. 9-pin 
connector, which comprises the PTT pin, receive pin and transmit pin. After each 
transmission, the transceiver needs to be toggled back to the Receive mode to 
eliminate the AC hum from interfering with the channel. Besides using Mic 9-pin 
connector, the transceiver also can be controlled by sending the command through 
RS-232C COM connector. For this project, the transceiver controlled by HF modem 
(KAM ’98) and the connection between them will be discussed in next section. 
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5.4 HF Modem 
 
 
KAM’98 Multi-Mode Terminal Node Controller (TNC) (Kantronics Co, 
1998) as shown in Figure 5.11 is a modem for digital data transmission. The 
KAM’98 can be used either for HF or VHF communication. Beside ASCII mode, 
this modem provides PACTOR, AMTOR and GTOR modes of operation. Some 
properties of KAM’98 modem are listed below: 
 
(i) Packet modes: users can communicate with the full range of TOR 
modes either linked or unlinked. 
(ii) Non-packet modes: users can communicate using RTTY, CW, or 
ASCII protocols. 
(iii) More speeds of communication. For HF TOR modes, transmission 
can be done at 100, 200 and 300 baud (bps). 
(iv) Software control capability: this modem supported with RS232 
connector which enable to be controlled using terminal 
communication programs such as Kantronics’ DOS-based Pacterm 
2.0, Kantronics’ Pacterm ’98, or by using Terminal Programs that 
included inside Windows 95/98/NT (HyperTerminal). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: HF Modem KAM ’98 
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Although there are many choices of mode supported by KAM ’98 but for this 
project PACTOR and GTOR mode are preferred. This is because both modes are 
easy to use, more speed and provide error control correction, which is to ensure the 
data transmission is error free. PACTOR mode is using Automatic Repeat Request 
(ARQ) with CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) method to handle an error in order to 
improve reception. It uses standard AFSK (Amplitude Frequency Shift Keying) tone 
pairs (mark and space) (Kantronics Co, 1998).  
 
 
PACTOR packets are either 96 bits long sent at 100 bauds or 192 bits long 
sent at 200 bauds, with the data rate dependent on conditions. Each packet consists of 
a Header byte, Data Field, Status byte, followed by the CRC byte given twice. The 
Header byte consists of the 8-bit pattern for 55 hexadecimal and is used for 
synchronization, Memory ARQ and listen mode. The Data field contains 64 bits if 
sent at 100 bauds or 160 bits if sent at 200 bauds. Its format is normally Huffman-
compressed ASCII, with conventional 8-bit ASCII as the alternative. The Status byte 
provides the packet count data format (whether standard 8-bit ASCII or Huffman-
compressed ASCII), and break-in request, for a total 8 bits. The CRC calculation is 
based on the ITU-T polynomial X16+X12+X5+1. The CRC byte calculated for the 
whole packet starting with the data field, without header, and consists of 16 bits. 
Figure 5.12 shows the packet format for both 100 and 200 bauds.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Packet formats for both 100 and 200 bauds of transmission 
 
 
PACTOR normally uses ASCII characters that have been compressed with a 
Huffman algorithm. Huffman-compressed ASCII table can be found in Appendix C. 
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This Huffman compression reduces the average character length for improved 
efficiency. The length of individual characters varies from 2 to 15 bits, with the most 
frequently used characters being the shortest. This result in an average character 
length of 4 to 5 bits for English text, instead of the 8 bits required for normal ASCII. 
 
 
PACTOR is a synchronous transmission system with packet duration of 0.96 
second, Control Signal duration of 0.12 second and an idle time of 0.17 second for a 
total cycle time of 1.25 seconds. Detail of link initialization and transmission 
procedure between terminals can be found in (ARRL, 2001).  
 
 
Like PACTOR, GTOR also operates using standard AFSK but it is using 
hybrid Forward Error Correction (FEC) and ARQ (Kantronics Co, 1998) for error 
correction. By using extended Golay forward error correction coding and full-frame 
interleaving, this mode can transmit information up to 300 baud. Therefore, GTOR 
performance is more powerful in transmission up to 3 times fasters compare the 
PACTOR (Johston. 1999). However, the transmission speed will reduce to 200 and 
100 baud depends on HF propagation.  
 
 
KAM’98 operation will control by the Secured HF Messenger application 
that is installed inside the computer. Thus, suitable connection cable between 
computer and KAM’98 required and its will be described in next section. 
 
 
 
 
5.4.1 System Integration 
 
 
In order to integrate all system components together, some installations are 
needed. It is essential to ensure the components communicate each other properly 
and this can optimize the system performance. 
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5.4.2 Assembling Computer (DB-9) and KAM’98 (DB-25) connectors 
 
 
 The connection cable between computer and KAM’98 required enabling 
Secured HF Messenger application controls KAM’98 for transmission purposes. 
Mostly computers have a standard serial (COM) port RS-232C either DB-9 or DB-
25. Since, the KAM’98 has female DB-25 connector, a male DB-25 connector 
needed to connect to the KAM’98’s female port. The pins connection between both 
connectors is shown in Table 5.1.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Pin connections between DB-9 and DB-25 connectors. 
9-Pin Connector (Computer) 25-Pin Connector (KAM’98) 
Pin 1 DCD Pin 8 DCD 
Pin 2 RD Pin 3 RD 
Pin 3 TD Pin 2 TD 
Pin 4 DTR Pin 20 DTR 
Pin 5 GND Pin 7 GND 
Pin 6 DSR Pin 6 DSR 
Pin 7 RTS Pin 4 RTS 
Pin 8 CTS Pin 5 CTS 
Pin 9 RI Pin 22 RI 
 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Assembling KAM ’98 and Kenwood TS-570D transceiver connectors 
 
 
 To integrate between Kenwood TS-570D and KAM’98 to become as part of 
the system, a suitable cable had assembled to ensure both equipments connected and 
communicate as well. In this particular case, we need DB-9 male and 8-pin Mic. 
female connectors. Both connectors are wired as shown in Figure 5.13 below.  
  
133
 
Figure 5.13: Wiring between DB-9 pin (KAM’98) and 8-pin Mic (Kenwood 
Transceiver) 
 
 
 Make sure all wiring between KAM’98 and transceiver’s microphone and 
speaker jack followed these connections: 
 
(i) Identify the microphone input connection, pin 1 and wired to pin 1 of 
KAM’98’s DB-9. 
(ii) Identify the PTT or STBY connection, pin 2 and wired to pin 3 of 
KAM’98’s DB-9. 
(iii)Identify ground connection, pin 8 and wired to pin 6, one of the ground 
pins on the KAM’98’s DB-9. 
(iv) Identify an external speaker plug and wired to pin 5 of KAM’98’s DB-9. 
(v) Identify sleeve external speaker plug and wired to pin 6, one of the 
ground pins on the KAM’98’s DB-9. 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Security Features 
 
 
The security features present in the Secured HF Messenger application are 
authentication, key distribution and confidentiality. They will be activated once a 
link is established between two communicating parties. A trusted third party is 
required to manage the authentication key and session key distribution key for each 
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site. However, it is not involved directly to both communicating parties during actual 
authentication and key distribution. The key structure is shown in Figure 5.14 and 
stored in floppy disk. For real implementation the key should be stored in a tamper 
proof storage media. The challenge and response authentication methodology 
(Menezes, 1996) is adopted and the cipher algorithm used is 256 bit key AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) (NIST, 2001). Figure 5.15 shows procedure for 
performing authentication. Here, the application provides double authentications 
where both stations need to validate their identity before they continue the 
communication. 
 
 
Next, session keys are randomly generated and exchange between both sites 
as shown in Figure 5.16. The session keys are encrypted using the session key 
encryption key and the cipher system used is the 128 bit key AES. Once completed, 
both sites can exchange information using the proprietary stream cipher algorithm.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Key structure for the secured data communication system. 
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Figure 5.15: Challenge and respond authentication. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Session key generation and distribution. 
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Based on Figure 5.15 and 5.16, the first step that application does is to ensure 
the communication is between valid users. If not, the communication is hopeless. For 
that purpose, the application uses AES 256 bits because it provides the highest 
security among the cipher system inside the system. Session key distribution is 
necessary to ensure that no one, friend or foe, is able to steal session key and 
therefore compromise the communication. It is handled using AES 128 bits. And 
finally, W7 stream cipher with 64 bits is used for confidentiality. Everything done by 
the application is to ensure both parties are valid and to maintain the integrity during 
the communication. This methodology was implemented on System 700, which 
produced by Mils Electronic (Mils, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
5.6 Radix 64 Encoding 
 
 
Radix-64 encoding also called Base64 encoding is a process to create a data 
represents protocol that would allow binary data to be encapsulated within another 
document (Stallings, 2003). The encoding has the following relevant characteristics: 
 
(i) The character set consist of 65 printable characters, one of which is used 
for padding. With 26 or 64 available characters, each character can be 
used to represent 6 bits of input.  
(ii) No control characters are included in the set. Thus, a message encoded in 
radix 64 can traverse any systems that scan the data stream for control 
characters. 
(iii) The hyphen character (“-“) is not used. This character has significance in 
the RFC 822 format and should therefore be avoided. 
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Table 5.2: Radix 64 Encoding 
6-Bit 
Value 
Character 
encoding 
6-Bit 
Value 
Character 
encoding 
6-Bit 
Value 
Character 
encoding 
6-Bit 
Value 
Character 
encoding 
0 A 16 Q 32 G 48 w 
1 B 17 R 33 H 49 x 
2 C 18 S 34 I 50 y 
3 D 19 T 35 J 51 z 
4 E 20 U 36 K 52 0 
5 F 21 V 37 L 53 1 
6 G 22 W 38 M 54 2 
7 H 23 X 39 N 55 3 
8 I 24 Y 40 O 56 4 
9 J 25 Z 41 P 57 5 
10 K 26 A 42 Q 58 6 
11 L 27 B 43 R 59 7 
12 M 28 C 44 S 60 8 
13 N 29 D 45 t 61 9 
14 O 30 E 46 u 62 + 
15 P 31 F 47 v 63 / 
        (pad) = 
 
 
Table 5.2 shows the mapping of 6 bit input values to character. The character 
set consists of the alphanumeric character plus “+” and “/”. The “=” character is used 
as the padding character. Figure 5.17 illustrates the simple mapping scheme. Binary 
input is processed in block of 3 octets or 24 bits. Each set of 6 bits in the 24 bit block 
is mapped into a character. In the figure, the characters are shown encoded as 8 bit 
quantities. In this typical case, each 24 bit input is expanded to 32 bits of output. 
Figure 5.18 shows the example of radix 64 encoding. 
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Figure 5.17: Printable Encoding of Binary Data into Radix-64 Format 
 
 
Input Data 
Binary representation                           0010 0011 0101 1100 1001 0001 
Hexadecimal representation                                    235c91 
Radix-64 Encoding of Input Data 
Character representation                                         I1yR 
ASCII code (8 bit, zero parity)        0100 1001 0011 0001 0111 1001 0101 0010 
Hexadecimal representation                                 49317952 
Figure 5.18: Example of Radix-64 encoding 
 
 
To implement Secured HF Messenger application, this method needed to 
avoid KAM ’98 HF modem from scanning data stream of control characters during 
transmitting encrypted information. This is because KAM ’98 does not transmit 
control characters. However, a modification was made to this encoding format. After 
splitting binary data to 6 bits each, it will plus with 4010 offset and kept as 8 bit 
quantities. No mapping is required. Now, the printable encoding of data is not 
followed Radix 64 format as well, and the character used is represented from 4010 to 
10310 as shown in Figure 5.19. It is also showing the control characters that are 
represented from 010 to 3210. Obviously the reason to plus 4010 is to avoid using a 
control character, which effected the transmission, and at receiver all data stream will 
minus 4010 before decrypt processing made. By implementing this method, the 
application does not need radix 64-lookup tables anymore.  
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Figure 5.19: ASCII chart 
 
 
 
 
5.7  Software Design and Implementation 
 
 
Secured HF Messenger is a software application that is developed using 
Microsoft Visual C++. Microsoft Visual C++ is the most productive tools for 
creating high performance application and also contains Microsoft Foundation 
Classes (MFC) that offers developer the ability to create robust application that 
resides on the Secured HF Messenger. Another purpose of using this software is 
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because of its capability to execute in various types of Operating System (OS) that is 
currently available such as Windows 95/98/NT, Windows ME/XP and also Windows 
2000.  
 
 
 
 
5.7.1 The Visual C++ Development Environment 
 
 
The Visual C++ consist MFC which can be used to develop Graphic User 
Interface (GUI) to provide user-friendly application and uses C++ language with 
some additional function compare Turbo C++. Therefore, most of the functions 
inside Secured HF Messaging System were designed using C++ language. Figure 
5.20 shows the development environment of Visual C++. 
 
 
5.7.1.1 The Workspace 
 
 
The workspace allows us to view the parts of application in three ways: 
 
(i) Class Views to navigate and manipulate the source code on C++ class level 
(ii) Resource View to find and edit each of the various resources in application, 
including dialog window designs, icons and menus. 
(iii)File View to view and navigate all the files that make up in your application 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
141
5.7.1.2  The Output Pane 
 
 
The Output Pane is the place to all compiler progress statement, warning and 
error messages. It reopens itself when Visual C++ has any message that need to 
display for us. 
 
 
5.7.1.3  The Editor Area 
 
 
This is the area where we perform all the editing when using Visual C++. 
Everything that has been designed in an application will display here, including 
source code. 
 
 
5.7.1.4  Menu Bar 
 
 
It consist standard toolbars such as opening and saving files, copying, 
pasting, and a variety of other command. The WizardBar toolbars enables us to 
perform a number of Class Wizard actions without opening the Class Wizard. 
Finally, the Build minibar provides with the build and run commands used to test the 
application. 
 
 
5.7.1.5  Control Palette 
 
 
It consist several standard control such as static text, edit box, command 
button, check box slider, progress bars and so on. Used for graphic user interface 
design. 
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Figure 5.20: The Visual C++ development environment 
 
 
 
 
5.7.2 System Architecture 
 
 
Basically, Secured HF Messenger consist three level of stage of software 
design, which is Graphic User Interface, Internal Function and Serial 
Communication. Figure 5.21 presents the architecture of system design. 
 
Buid MinibarStandard ToolbarWorkspace Pane Wizard Toollbar
Output Pane Editor Area
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Figure 5.21: The Architecture of Secured HF Messenger 
 
 
Graphic User Interface (GUI) is the interface between the user and the 
application. The user gives the commands to application by inserting the input or 
presses the button and the processing part is handled by Internal Function. It consist 
Main Program, Security Features and Radix 64 encoder. Main Program controls 
every action of the application such as authentication, key distribution, encryption, 
load file, sending the messages and so on. The last part is the serial communication, 
which responsible to transfer data from the application to equipment that is HF 
modem.  All the digital information transfers to HF modem through Communication 
Port 1 which existing on computer.  
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5.7.3 Software Implementation 
 
 
The most important part in the application is security features used for 
authentication, key distribution and encryption. Therefore, this subsection will 
discuss the implementation of AES block cipher for 256 and 128 bits, W7 stream 
cipher, Radix 64 encoder and also serial communication. All the programming for 
each function was done using C++ language. 
 
 
5.7.3.1 AES 128 bits 
 
 
AES process the plaintext or input with block size of 128-bits. The 
description of AES 128 block cipher can be found in (NIST, 2001). Before 
encrypting or decrypting, the system must generate the key schedule. It is happen 
every time user inserts the secret key. Figure 5.22(a) and 5.22(b) is a flowchart of 
AES 128 encryption and decryption respectively. Detail of programming on key 
expansion, encryption and decryption can be found in Appendix D.  
 
 
Table 5.3: The result for each round of AES 128 bits encryption (NIST, 2001) 
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The AES 128 bit is used in session key distribution, which only consist 64 
bits. Therefore, the others 64 bits in block are 0. Due to it purpose, only a block of 
plaintext used, therefore the cipher is implement using electronic codebook (ECB) 
mode. By using the plaintext and key that given by (NIST, 2001), the state of 
transformation is checked step by step to verify the software running correctly. Table 
5.3 presents the example of plaintext, cipher key and results for each round.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.22: Flowchart of encryption and decryption for AES-128 
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5.7.3.2 AES 256 bits  
 
 
The differences between AES 256 and the previous are the key length and 
number of round during encryption and decryption. Instead of using 128 bits key 
length and 10 rounds, this cipher uses 256 bits key length and number of rounds is 
14. Therefore, the flowcharts of encrypt and decrypt is same with AES 128 bits 
except the number of rounds. Detail of this cipher can be found in Appendix D. 
Practically this cipher is more secured and suitable of it purpose to authenticate the 
user.  
 
 
5.7.3.3 W7 Stream Cipher 
 
 
After authentication and session key distribution, the application generates 
10,000 bits of keystream using W7 generator and saves in memory. In practice, long 
messages are not transmitted to avoid Possibility of Intercept (POI) and on average, 
data format for military standard is around 4000 bits (ACP 127(G), 1988). The Main 
Program provides the confidentiality by XOR the plaintext from user with 
keystream. The description of W7 generator was discussed in Chapter 2 and Figure 
5.23 shows the flowchart of W7 implementation. Detail of W7 implementation in 
C++ language can be found in Appendix D. 
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Figure 5.23: Flowchart of W7 generator 
 
 
5.7.3.4 Radix 64 Encoder and Decoder 
 
 
After encryption process, every bytes of digital information must be encoded 
with Radix 64 format before transferring to HF modem via serial communication. 
The reverse process occurs at the receiver before decrypting the cryptogram. The 
description of Radix 64 was explained in previous section. Detail of Radix 64 
encoder and decoder can be found in Appendix D. The function is checked whether 
perform properly of not by encode 3 bytes of data as shown in Figure 5.18. The 
result must be the same with the expected.  
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5.7.3.5 Serial Communication. 
 
 
Another important part is serial communication. The application must 
capable to control this feature so it can manipulate the HF modem for transmission 
and reception purposes. Basically, to control the serial communication, we need five 
important functions which is initialization, open port, sending data, receive data and 
close port. The following code shows the function that is used to create a handle: 
 
 
 
Figure 5.24: Basic configuration for serial communication 
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5.7.3.6 Graphic User Interface (GUI) of Secured HF Messenger Application 
 
 
 Secured HF Messenger with Graphic User Interface (GUI) in Figure 5.25 is 
the final result of implementation. The application is capable of controlling the HF 
modem (KAM’98) via serial communication, RS-232C to enable data transmission 
through HF spectrum. The application was designed to handle digital information 
transmissions such as short message, text file, image file and also winzip file. Winzip 
file prefers user to send data in the compression mode and this can speed up HF 
transmission. By adopting cipher algorithms, the system will provide a practically 
secure data transmission over HF spectrum. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.25: Graphic User Interface (GUI) for Secured HF Messenger 
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5.8 System Operation 
 
 
 These are procedures required to be followed by users to allow them to 
communicate with each other: 
 
(i) First, install and run Secured HF Messenger application. Make sure to 
turn on the modem first before running the application. 
(ii) Insert the call sign for both Stations and click Set C. Sign toolbar 
button to verify both stations call sign. Message Box as shown in 
Figure 5.26 will appear for confirmation. Next, insert the secret key. 
This can be done by clicking the Key button. Get the key in the floppy 
disk as shown in Figure 5.27. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.26: Message Box for Call Sign verification. 
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Figure 5.27: User can insert the secret key by clicking the Insert Key button. 
 
 
(iii) Then, click link button to order KAM ’98 HF modem to establish the 
link between stations. After the link is established, the message 
“LINKED TO 9WN568HQ” will appear at command column as 
shown in Figure 5.28. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.28: Linked message will appear in command control column when the 
link is established. 
 
 
(iv) Next, click authenticate button to verify the user identity either valid 
party or not. If the authentication successful, the Message Box 
“Authentication Successful” will appear. Figure 5.29 shows the 
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authentication result and the information inside Key 1 and Key 2 
columns are the session keys.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.29: Message Box of authentication result will appear either its success 
or failed. 
 
 
(v) After all four steps done successful, then both users can start 
communicates each other by typing the message at transmitter column 
and the message will send after clicking Send button. 
(vi) Beside short message, user also can transmit another document such 
as Text File, Image (JPEG) and WinZip File. All these documents 
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need to load first before sending to another user. This can be done 
with click the Load File button. 
(vii) When the communication finish, user has to click Disconnect button 
and followed Unlink Button to close the communication. These 
actions will break the link and return the application as a beginning 
 
 
 
 
5.9 Experimental Setup 
 
 
A series of field-testing were conducted since April 2004 from UTM Skudai 
to various sites in Malaysia. Before both terminals start to communicate, each 
terminal has to setup their stations as shown in Figure 5.1. After that, Secured HF 
Messenger application is installed into computer. Then the procedure in section 5.10 
is followed to operate the system. During the transmission, the HF digital modes 
used are PACTOR and GTOR with the transmit power ranging from 5 to 50 watts. 
The experiments conducted consist of JPEG image, text file and  short messages.  
 
 
As known that HF propagation always changes by a lot of factors. It varies 
daily, monthly or even a year as described in Chapter 2. So, a chosen frequency is 
very critical to enhance the quality of transmission. For field-testing, the frequencies 
used are referred to experimental license that has been given by MCMC (Malaysian 
Communication and Multimedia Communication). The performance of system 
observe based on UTM Skudai to Endau Rompin, UTM Skudai to Kuala Lumpur, 
UTM Skudai to Chemor and UTM Skudai to Kota Bharu. 
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5.9.1 UTM Skudai to Endau Rompin 
 
 
Taman Negara Endau Rompin managed by Johor National Parks 
Corporation, encompasses some 49,000 ha of virgin lowland tropical rainforest. 
There are no less than 230 species of birds, 179 species of butterflies and all the great 
Malaysian mammals such as the tiger, the elephant, the tapir and the Sumatran 
rhinoceros, as well as a host of other animals. Traveling time from UTM Skudai to 
the national park by road is 5 hours. The straight-line distance is 120 km. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.30: Map of Johor Darul Ta’zim showing the location of UTM Skudai 
and Taman Negara Endau Rompin 
 
 
Before any communication is done, all equipments are needed to setup, as 
discussed in previous chapter. The most important part is antenna installation and for 
testing purpose 6 MHz half-wavelength dipole was made. The installation of antenna 
and equipments layout is shown in Figure 5.31 and 5.32.  
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Figure 5.31: The center of the dipole antenna. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.32: The layout of the equipment 
 
 
The transmission results are shown in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. Examples of 
text file and JPEG image can be found in Appendix C.  
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Table 5.4: Summary of text file transmission between UTM Skudai and Endau 
Rompin 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
File Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Mode Transmission Time 
2310 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 25 min 50 sec 19thApril 
2004 2350 7.08 4 10 300 GTOR 3 min 41 sec 
1115 7.08 4 10 300 GTOR 1 min 57 sec 
1710 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 4 min 15 sec 
1722 7.08 4 10 300 GTOR 1 min 34 sec 
20th April 
2004 
2102 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 14 min 46 sec 
0905 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 5 min 22 sec 
0940 7.08 4 10 300 GTOR 1 min 24 sec 
1325 7.08 4 50 200 PACTOR 4 min 14 sec 
1335 7.08 4 50 300 GTOR 2 min 31 sec 
1340 7.08 4 10 200 GTOR 5 min 36 sec 
1705 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 4 min 26 sec 
21st April 
2004 
1712 7.08 4 10 300 GTOR 1 min 42 sec 
 
 
Table 5.5: Summary of image transmission between UTM Skudai and Endau 
Rompin 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
Image 
Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Mode Transmission Time 
0905 7.08 10 10 200 PACTOR 22 min 50 sec 
0940 7.08 10 10 200 PACTOR 22 min 36 sec 
1040 7.08 5 10 200 PACTOR 12 min 0 sec 
1140 7.08 10 10 300 GTOR 13 min 41 sec 
1335 7.08 14 50 300 GTOR 17 min 37 sec s 
1540 7.08 9 50 300 GTOR 13 min 40 sec 
20th April 
2004 
1735 7.08 9 10 300 GTOR 17 min 44 sec 
0915 7.08 6 10 200 PACTOR 14 min 21 sec 
1045 7.08 6 50 300 GTOR 9 min 42 sec 
21st April 
2004 
1725 7.08 6 10 200 PACTOR 15 min 37 sec 
 
 
From the results, the usable frequency at that time is only 7.08 MHz while 
other frequencies are not propagating successfully. During the transmission, the 
effect of diurnal variability in frequency band has no significant affect to the 
reliability. No errors were presented during messaging and text file transfer for both 
digital modes. The transmitted image was also decoded at the receiver correctly with 
no distortion observed.  Based on the experimental results, PACTOR is more robust 
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as compared to GTOR. If it is possible to use GTOR, the transmission time is three 
times faster over PACTOR as shown in Table 5.4.  
 
 
 
 
5.9.2 UTM Skudai to Kuala Lumpur 
 
 
The site in Kuala Lumpur that became another station for field-testing is RF 
Communication (M) Sdn. Bhd. It is founded in August 1986 and located at Jalan 
Ipoh. RF Communication (M) Sdn. Bhd. has played an increasingly active role in the 
development of tomorrow’s standards in radio frequency communication. Traveling 
time from UTM, Skudai to RF Communication (M) Sdn. Bhd. is about 4 hours. The 
line of sight between UTM, Skudai and RF Communication (M) Sdn. Bhd. is about 
275 km. 
 
 
Figure 5.33: Map of Peninsular of Malaysia 
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Figure 5.34: The detail map showing the location of RF Communication (M) 
Sdn. Bhd. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.35: The installation of The Barker & Williamson Model AC2-22 
Broadband Folded Dipole Antenna 
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Figure 5.36: The arrangement equipments 
 
 
Here, the antenna used is The Barker & Williamson Model AC2-22 
Broadband Folded Dipole, which already exists on the roof of RF Communication 
(M) Sdn. Bhd. as shown in Figure 5.35. After completing equipment setup, the 
testing is performed starting with short messages, text file and JPEG image. Table 
5.6 and 5.7 show the results of transmission. 
 
 
Table 5.6: Summary of text file transmission between UTM Skudai and Kuala 
Lumpur 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
File Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Mode Transmission 
Time 
20th May 2004 
1609 7.08 4 25 200 PACTOR 6 min 41 sec 
0916 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 6 min 35 sec 21st May 2004 
1510 7.08 4 10 100 PACTOR 14 min 53 sec 
1100 7.08 4 50 200 PACTOR 11 min 51 sec 24th May 2004 
1128 7.08 4 50 100 GTOR 6 min 12 sec 
0925 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 7 min 10 sec 
1012 7.08 4 25 300 GTOR 4 min 27 sec 
26th May 2004 
1025 7.10 4 25 200 PACTOR 11 min 19 sec 
28th May 2004 1500 7.08 4 50 200 PACTOR 9 min 38 sec 
29th May 2004 0920 7.08 4 25 200 PACTOR 7 min 3 sec 
0900 7.08 4 25 200 PACTOR 7 min 8 sec 31st May 2004 
1048 7.08 4 10 200 PACTOR 8 min 24 sec 
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Table 5.7: Summary of image file transmission between UTM Skudai and Kuala 
Lumpur 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
Image 
Size 
(kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Mode Transmission 
Time 
18th May 2004 1550 7.08 3k 25 200 PACTOR 10 min 12 sec 
26th May 2004 0925 7.08 3k 10 200 PACTOR 10 min 47 sec 
1620 7.08 3k 100 200 PACTOR 23 min 11 sec 28th May 2004 
1700 7.08 3k 100 200 PACTOR 18 min 27 sec 
0920 7.08 3k 25 200 PACTOR 7 min 3 sec 29th May 2004 
0935 7.08 10k 25 200 PACTOR 55 min 43 sec 
31st May 2004 0915 7.08 3k 10 100 PACTOR 27 min 51 sec 
0906 7.08 12k 10 200 PACTOR 30 min 13 sec 1st June 2004 
1114 7.01 12k 15 200 PACTOR 32 min 42 sec 
2nd June 2004 0856 7.01 12k 10 200 PACTOR 25 min 42 sec 
 
 
 
 
5.9.3 UTM Skudai to Chemor 
 
 
Next designated site was chosen for testing purpose is Chemor. The line of 
sight between UTM Skudai and Chemor is 450 km as shown in Figure 5.37.  
 
 
` 
Figure 5.37: Map shows the location between UTM Skudai and Chemor 
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As usual the testing starts with antenna installations and followed by other 
equipments setup as shown in Figure 5.38 and Figure 5.39. Both previous field tests 
prove that HF communication is reliable and could be an alternative of 
communication especially for remote places. The tests also are conducted for JPEG 
image, short message and text file transfer. The different between this testing and 
previous are this is the first time of field test that uses secured mode. Therefore, the 
purpose of this testing is to determine the effect of encrypted and non-encrypted 
(plaintext) data during the transmission and also efficiency of authentication in term 
of time consumption. Here, some variables like frequency is used, packet mode 
(PACTOR), power and size of data become a constant value. Although both 
transmission cannot be made in parallel but the gap between those transmissions is 
very close and can be assumed as using a same ionosphere conditions. Both results 
were shown in Table 5.8 and 5.9. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.38: The center of the dipole antenna. 
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Figure 5.39: The layout of the equipments 
 
 
Table 5.8: Transmission result for non-encrypted data (plain text) 
 
Date 
Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
File Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Transmission Time 
19th Oct 2004 0939 7.08 6 10 200 8 mins 50 secs 
20th Oct 2004 1242 6.65 6 10 100 10 mins 45 secs 
21st Oct 2004 1609 7.08 3 10 200 3 mins 10 secs 
22nd Oct 2004 1018 6.65 6 10 100 12 mins 
29th Oct 2004 1556 7.08 3 10 200 4 mins 30 secs 
 
 
Table 5.9: Transmission results for authentication and encrypted data. 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
Image 
Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Authentication 
Time 
Transmission 
Time 
19th Oct 
2004 0950 7.08 6 10 200 35 Second 11 mins 10 secs
20th Oct 
2004 1305 6.65 6 10 100 42 Second 14 mins 21 secs
21st Oct 
2004 1614 7.08 3 10 100 50 second 6 mins 15 secs 
22nd Oct 
2004 1032 6.65 6 10 100 52 second 15 mins 49 secs
29th Oct 
2004 1602 7.08 3 10 200 37 second 6 mins 
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On the average, time taken for authentication is 43 seconds and time taken for 
encrypted file transfer is longer as compared to plaintext by 1.5 times. For 
authentication, the delay is not due to the algorithm implementation and the 
computing platform but the nature of the propagation medium that limits the data 
transmission rate. The encrypted file is encoded using the radix 64 format prior to 
transmission that results in file size increase by about 1.5 times as compared to 
plaintext file. This is to ensure that the encrypted characters do not correspond to an 
equivalent control character in the ASCII code. For 6 Kbytes file, the average 
encrypted and plaintext file transfer time is about 10 minutes and 13 minutes 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
5.9.4 UTM Skudai to Kota Bharu 
 
 
The final site of field-testing series was conducted between UTM Skudai and 
Kota Bharu. The line of sight between both places is approximately 535 km as shown 
in Figure 5.40.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.40: Map of location between UTM Skudai and Kota Bharu 
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Before any transmission made, all equipments including antenna were 
installed as shown in Figure 5.41 and Figure 5.42. This field-testing uses secured 
mode application and the constant variables used are the same as previous field test. 
The performance of encrypted and plaintext transmission is shown in Table 5.10 and 
5.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.41: Installation of dipole antenna 
 
 
 
Figure 5.42: The arrangement of equipments 
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Table 5.10: Transmission result for non-encrypted data (plain text) 
 
 
Table 5.11: Transmission results for authentication and encrypted data. 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
Image 
Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Authentication 
Time 
Transmission 
Time 
14th March 
2005 1049 7.080 4 10 200 40 Second 6 min 45 sec 
15th March 
2005 1312 8.002 6 10 200 42 second 9 min 
17th March 
2005 1430 8.002 4 10 200 50 second 7 min 9 sec 
21ndMarch 
2005 1238 9.146 6 10 200 60 second 10 min 30 sec 
22th March 
2005 1555 8.19 6 10 200 52 second 11 min 3 sec 
 
 
From the result, the frequencies used during this testing are higher compared 
to previous testing. This is because of equinoxes (March and September) phenomena 
where the frequencies around this period are higher from ordinary months. Table 
5.11 shows the average time taken for authentication is 48 seconds. Although the 
transmit power is 10 Watt, but the transmission still occur at 200 baud. This shows 
the importance of selecting the suitable frequency in order to optimize the 
transmission over HF spectrum. For all transmission, the average encrypted and 
plaintext file transfer time is about 9 minutes and 6 minutes respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Time Frequency 
(MHz) 
File Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmit 
Power 
(Watt) 
Baud 
Rate 
Transmission Time 
14th March 2005 1044 7.080 4 10 200 4 min 43 sec 
15th March 2005 1305 8.002 6 10 200 6 min 45 sec 
17th March 2005 1421 8.002 4 10 200 4 min 36 sec 
21ndMarch 2005 1230 9.146 6 10 200 7 min 20 sec 
22th March 2005 1545 8.19 6 10 200 7 min 17 sec 
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5.10 Conclusion 
 
 
Although several equipment were purchased, but the system is classified as 
low cost system structure because it only used commercial equipments such as 
computer, HF modem (KAM’98), HF radio (Kenwood) and antenna. With a little 
setup and installation, all equipments were integrated to become a system. Based on 
field-testing, Secured HF Messenger is user-friendly and by following a few steps as 
mentioned, users can use this application to exchange their digital information over 
HF confidentially. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
LONG RANGE HF TELEMETRY SYSTEM 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia is a maritime nation where much of its wealth in natural resources 
and assets lie within the 200 nautical mile economic exclusive zone (EEZ). Example 
of natural resources and assets includes oil and gas fields, fishing areas, shipping 
lanes, ports, and ships. From international perspective, the Straits of Malacca is an 
important waterway for international trade between Europe and the Far East with a 
traffic flow of 1000 vessels a day. Thus, it is important for maritime organizations 
such as Jabatan Laut Semenanjung Malaysia to ensure maximum reliability of their 
navigation aids assets such as light houses and beacons.   
 
 
For fleet operators, monitoring of movement of ships is important to ensure 
that product deliveries and services are on schedule with safety on passage. Any 
deviation from route and emergencies should be alerted on time to the fleet operators 
as well to the appropriate maritime organizations for further actions. Both 
applications can be best served using long range telemetry systems (Barr, 2004): 
light house telemetry system and vessel tracking system. 
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6.1 Implementation of Lighthouse Telemetry 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the diagram of light house telemetry system. For light house 
application, the basic components at the light house consist of voltage and current 
sensors, light sensors, remote terminal unit (RTU), and HF modem and transceiver. 
The basic system at the master station consists of an HF transceiver, HF modem and 
personal computer with internet connectivity. With the system in place, the marine 
organization will be able to monitor the condition of the light house at all times 
without permanent technical staff at the light house. They are only required in the 
event of equipment failure.  
 
 
By using existing equipments, RTU and software application (GUI) for 
master station are developed.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Overall SCADA system diagram 
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6.1.1 Hardware Design 
 
 
Hardware design is needed to develop the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), 
which consists of a power supply unit and also a PIC16F877A microcontroller based 
RTU circuit.  The power supply unit is capable of supplying +5V, +12V and –12V to 
the RTU. PIC16F877A is a RISC microcontroller produced by Microchip 
Technology Inc.  It can operate at a maximum clock input of 20MHz with 8k words 
of Flash Program Memory, 368 bytes of Data Memory (RAM) and 256 bytes of 
EEPROM Data Memory.  It has operating voltage range of 2.2V to 5.5V. It also has 
5 I/O ports (Port A, B, C, D and E) and some useful features includes Analog-To-
Digital Converter, Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter 
(USART/SCI) and Timer/Counter. 
 
 
6.1.1.1 RTU Circuit Board 
 
 
The RTU microcontroller circuit consists of three main parts, which are the 
PIC16F877A microcontroller basic circuit, analog voltage level shifting circuit and 
TTL voltage level to RS-232 voltage level conversion circuit.  The PIC16F877A 
microcontroller basic circuit is very important in providing an input clock signal to 
the microcontroller.  A 20M Hz crystal oscillator has been used as an input clock 
device.  Besides, two switches have been included into the circuit, which are the reset 
switch, and the interrupt input switch.  Two digital inputs have been connected to 
digital input port, RC0 and RC1.  Figure 6.2 shows the PIC16F877A microcontroller 
basic circuit for RTU. 
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Figure 6.2: PIC16F877A microcontroller basic circuit for RTU 
 
 
 The built-in Analog-To-Digital Converter of PIC16F877A is only capable of 
handling input voltage range from 0V to +5V.  For this project, the RTU needs to 
acquire ac input signal, which may have negative voltage level.  Therefore, an op-
amp circuit has been designed with the purposes of input voltage shifting and 
scaling, which has the voltage range of –5V to +5V.  
 
 
 Two analog input ports have been designed for ac analog input and dc analog 
input.  Two op-amps used for each analog input port.  First op-amp is an inverting 
summing amplifier and second op-amp is an inverter.  Both op-amps are designed to 
connect cascaded. 
 
 
Equation for inverting summing amplifier output (first op-amp): 
 
 V01 = -0.5 (Vin + 5)            (6.1) 
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where Vin is analog input voltage (V). 
 
 
Equation for inverter output (second op-amp): 
 
 V02 = - V01             (6.2) 
 
where V01 is output voltage of inverting summing amplifier (V).Figure 6.3 shows the 
analog voltage level shifting and scaling circuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Analog voltage level shifting and scaling circuit 
 
 
 PIC16F877A microcontroller is using the TTL voltage level standard (0V as 
logic ‘0’ and +5V as logic ‘1’) but the HF modem is using serial communication RS-
232 standard (+12V as logic ‘0’ and -12V as logic ‘1’) as mentioned in previous 
chapter.  In order to allow the communication between the PIC16F877A 
microcontroller and the Kantronics modem, an interface circuit has been developed. 
 
 
The interface circuit consists of a MAX232 Integrated Circuit (IC) chip with 
some 1uF capacitors.  Four pins are connected, which are the Transmit (TX) 
connected to RC6, Receive (RD) connected to RC7, Request-To-Send (RTS) 
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connected to RB1 and Clear-To-Send (CTS) connected to RB2.  Transmit (TX) and 
Receive (RD) pin are actually the data pins.  Request-To-Send (RTS) and Clear-To-
Send (CTS) are the control pins.  Figure 6.4 shows the RS-232 interface circuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
Figure 6.4: RS-232 interface circuit 
 
 
6.1.1.2 Power Supply Design 
 
 
Power supply is a device that converts power from a characteristic to another 
to meet specified requirement.  There are two types of power supply, which are 
linear regulator and switch mode power supply.  Linear power supply has been 
chosen for this project since it is a most simple type, easy to implement and small in 
size power supply.  Power supply circuit has been designed for supplying +12V, -
12V and +5V to the RTU circuit.  It is a very important part because improper design 
of the power supply circuit may affect the stability and reliability of the RTU. 
 
 
A +12V and –12V voltage regulator circuit has been developed using 7812 
voltage regulator IC and 7912 voltage regulator IC.  It is designed for supplying 
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power to the analog voltage level shifting and scaling circuit (LM324N op-amp IC).  
Some capacitors are used as filter to reduce ripple of the output voltage.  Figure 6.5 
shows the +12V and –12V power supply circuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: +12V and –12V power supply circuit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: +5V power supply circuit 
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Initially, a +5V voltage regulator circuit was designed for the PIC16F877A 
and also the MAX232 using the 7805 voltage regulator IC.  Anyway, the 7805 IC is 
only capable of provide 1.5A maximum current and was facing an overheat problem 
although it had been added with heat sink.  Another IC voltage regulator, which is 
the LM350T, is used for supplying power to MAX232 IC since it is a higher power 
consumption device.  It is capable of provide up to 3A maximum current.  Therefore, 
LM350T is designed for MAX232 and 7805 is designed for other 5V devices.  
Figure 6.6 shows the +5V power supply circuit. 
 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Programming 
 
 
The PIC16F877A microcontroller based RTU must be programmed in order 
to functions as a control unit to acquire data, process data and then transmits the data 
to HF communication network using serial communication (RS-232).  The RTU is 
programmed using C language.  A compiler is needed to convert the high level 
language (C language) to assembly language.  Therefore, MPLAB IDE is used as a 
development environment and PICC Lite is used as C compiler. 
 
 
6.1.2.1 Initialization  
 
 
Input and Output (I/O) peripheral of the PIC16F877A must be assigned as 
input port or output port at the beginning of the program.  The USART, Analog-To-
Digital Converter and interrupt features must be configured too.  Figure 6.7 shows 
the program fragment for initialization and setting of PIC16F877A. 
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Figure 6.7: Initialization and setting of PIC16F877A 
 
 
6.1.2.2 Timer  
 
 
A timer (Timer1 Module) is initiated to set a fixed sampling rate at 1.6k Hz 
(sampling interval 625us) with 32 data samples.  The Timer interrupt the PIC every 
625us (1.6k Hz) to start the ADC conversion.  Figure 6.8 shows the program 
fragment of the Timer setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. 
 
TMR1ON=0;  //off timer 
 
TRISA=0xFF;  //PortA all input: RA0 ac input, RA1 dc input 
TRISB=0x05;   //RB1 RTS_Out, RB2 CTS_In, RB0 Interrupt input 
TRISC=0x83;  //RC7 input RX, RC0 & RC1 digit input, others output 
TRISD=0x00;  //PortD all output    
 
SPBRG=129;  //BAUD=9600, SPBRG=20M/(16*9600)-1=129.208= 129 
BRGH=1;  //Set High Baud Rate 
TXSTA=0B00100100; //Set TXEN, BRGH and SYNC, 8bits asynchronous mode 
RCSTA=0B10010000; //Set SPEN, enable COM port, 8bits continuous receive mode 
OPTION=0b00000000; 
ADCON1=0b00000100;  //AN0 AN1 analog input, AN3 unused, others digital input 
INTF=0; 
TMR1IF=0; 
TMR1IE=1;   //Enable timer interrupt 
RCIE=1;  //Enable receive interrupt 
PEIE=1;   //Enable peripheral interrupt 
INTE=1; 
GIE=1;   //Enable global interrupt 
RTS_Out=0; 
 
… 
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Figure 6.8: Timer setting 
 
 
6.1.2.3 Analog to Digital Converter 
 
 
Steps to initiate the conversion of Analog-To-Digital Converter (ADC) must 
be followed carefully to ensure an accurate and reliable output conversion of ADC.  
Figure 6.9 shows the program fragment of the ADC initialization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: ADC initialization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 …. 
 
 TMR1IE=1;    //Enable Timer Interrupt 
 INTCON=0b11010000;   //Enable other Interrupts 
 TMR1L=0xCB;    //1.6kHz sampling rate so that n=32 
 TMR1H=0xF3; 
 T1CON=0b00000001;   //prescale=1:1 
 State=S_ADC; 
 
 … 
 
 …. 
 
 Delay20us();    //Delay 20us for acquisition time 
 
 ADGO=1;    //Start conversion 
 while (ADGO) 
  continue;   //Wait for conversion to complete 
 RawData[SampleCount]=ADRESH; //Read Result 
 
 Delay3_2us();    //Delay 3.2us before next conversion 
 
 … 
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6.1.2.4 RMS Calculation for AC Signal 
 
 
 RMS value for ac signal (in digital form) is calculated to reduce the size of 
the data sent to SCADA master through HF transmission.  A program has been 
written to select the peak value of the ac data from 32 data samples.  The peak value 
will only be divided at the SCADA master GUI to reduce program complexity and 
increase program efficiency since the PIC16F877A microcontroller does not have 
multiplier and divider.  Figure 6.10 shows the program fragment of RMS calculation 
for ac signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: RMS calculation for ac signal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 …. 
 
 //Change all the negative value to positive 
 
 for (SampleCount=0;SampleCount<32;SampleCount++) 
 { 
  if (RawData[SampleCount]<127) 
  { 
   RawData[SampleCount]=(127-RawData[SampleCount])+128; 
  } 
 } 
 
 
 //Select a biggest (peak) value 
 
 for (SampleCount=1;SampleCount<32;SampleCount++) 
 { 
  if (RawData[SampleCount]>RawData[0]) 
  { 
   RawData[0]=RawData[SampleCount]; 
  } 
 } 
 
 … 
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6.1.2.5 Average Calculation for DC Signal 
 
 
Just like the ac signal, average value for dc signal (in digital form) is also 
calculated to reduce the size of the data sent to SCADA master.  Figure 6.11 shows 
the program fragment of average calculation for dc signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Average calculation for dc signal 
 
 
6.1.2.6 Link Operation 
 
 
The modem PACTOR mode of operation consist of six states, which are link 
operation, enter transmit mode, data transmission, enter receive mode, wait for 
acknowledgement and unlink operation.  In order to initiate the link operation of 
PACTOR mode for modem at remote station and modem at SCADA master, RTU 
must transmit the SCADA master modem callsign through USART.  Only one byte 
transmitted for each time of transmission.  Figure 6.12 shows the program fragment 
of link operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 …. 
 
 //Add all data samples together 
 
for (SampleCount=1;SampleCount<32;SampleCount++) 
 { 
  RawData[0]=RawData[SampleCount]+RawData[0]; 
 } 
  
 RawData[0]=RawData[0]/32;  //Sum divide by number of samples 
 
 … 
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Figure 6.12: Link operation 
 
 
6.1.2.7 Data transmission 
 
 
All the information of lighthouse is grouped into an array to allow data 
transmission from RTU to modem.  Data transmission to modem is achieved through 
USART, sending byte by byte.  Figure 6.13 shows the program fragment of data 
transmission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 …. 
 
 //Initiate an array for callsign 
 const unsigned char Callsign[15]={'p','a','c','t','o','r',' ','9','w','3','2','5','2','h','q'}; 
 
 while (State==S_TransmitMode) 
  { 
  if (j<15 && !CTS_In && TXIF) 
  { 
   TXREG=Callsign[j]; //Transmit callsign byte by byte 
   j++; 
   Delay1ms();  //Delay 1ms 
  } 
  else if (j==15) 
  { 
 State=S_EnterC;  //End of callsign transmission 
   J=0; 
   Delay1ms(); 
 } 
} 
 
 … 
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Figure 6.13: Data transmission 
 
 
6.1.2.8 Delay Subroutine 
 
 
A delay subroutine has been written to perform a waiting period.  Delay 
subroutine is usually available in compiler library.  Basically, users just have to 
invoke the delay function without the need to write a program.  Anyway, the 
compiler used in this project, PICC Lite, is actually student version software.  There 
are some limitations on the usage of functions and libraries of the compiler.  
Therefore, the delay subroutine is written in assembly language to obtain a more 
precise delay time since the PICC Lite is compatible with assembly language.  Figure 
6.14 shows the program fragment of the Delay Subroutine for 1s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 …. 
 
 while (State==S_SendData) 
 { 
  if (j<16 && !CTS_In && TXIF) 
  { 
   TXREG=Data[j];  //Transmit data byte by byte 
   j++; 
  } 
 
  else if (j==16) 
  { 
   State=S_EnterD;  //End of data transmission 
   j=0; 
   Delay1ms(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 … 
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Figure 6.14: Delay subroutine for 1s 
 
 
 
 
6.1.3 Data Format 
 
 
 All the information of lighthouse is grouped into a data frame before being 
transmitted to modem through USART.  The data frame consists of 16 bytes of 
character and can be divided into three main parts, which are header, data and stop 
byte.  Figure 6.15 shows the data frame where the data structures are: 
 
(i) AA : Header of the whole data frame 
(ii) 1 : Header for first data (ac data) 
(iii) 2 : Header for second data (dc data) 
(iv) 3 : Header for third data (digital data 1) 
(v) 4 : Header for forth data (digital data 2) 
(vi) ZZ : Stop byte for the whole data frame 
 
 
 
 
 …. 
 
 #asm   //Indicate the starting of assembly language program 
 MOVLW 26 
 MOVWF _Temp3 
 MOVLW 251 
 MOVWF _Temp2 
 MOVLW 255 
 MOVWF _Temp1 
 DECFSZ _Temp1,f 
 GOTO $-1 
 DECFSZ _Temp2,f 
 GOTO $-5 
 DECFSZ _Temp3,f 
 GOTO $-9 
 #endasm  //Indicate the ending of assembly language program 
 
 … 
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A A 1    2    3  4  Z Z 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Data frame 
 
 
 Two bytes of header field, ‘AA’ are used to indicate the start of data frame.  
Character ‘1’ is used as header for the first data, indicating the start of ac data frame 
(4 bytes).  Character ‘2’ is used as header for the second data, indicating the start of 
dc data frame (4 bytes).  Character ‘3’ is used as header for the third data, indicating 
the start of digital data 1 for lamp on off information (2 bytes).  Character ‘4’ is used 
as header for the forth data, indicating the start of digital data 2 for motor on off 
status (2 bytes).  Two bytes of stop byte, ‘ZZ’ are used to indicate the end of the 
whole data frame. 
 
 
 
 
6.1.4 Graphic User Interface 
 
 
A software application for master station has been implemented by using 
Microsoft Visual C++. It is capable to display functionality of lamp and motor of the 
lighthouse.  From the received signal of remote station, the application will display 
the condition of sensors and saves into database. There are an indicator for lamp and 
motor, displaying on or off condition.  Two analog meters is used to display the ac 
 
ac data dc data digital 
data 1 
digital 
data 2 
Header Data 
Stop 
byte 
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and dc voltage level.  There are also date and time indicator on the GUI.  Besides, a 
command centre has been implemented to display the exact data being transmitted or 
received through the serial communication.  This command indicator is used for 
troubleshooting purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Software applications for light house telemetry system 
 
 
The ‘data from Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)’ column in the GUI is used to 
show the communication between remote and master station.  ‘<PACTOR 
STANBY>’ indicates the master station is in waiting state for data receiving from 
remote station.  ‘<LINKED TO 9W3252TT>’ indicates the link operation between 
remote and master station is successful.  The ‘AA122121933141ZZ’ is the 16 bytes 
data frame received by master station.  ‘DONE’ is the acknowledgement being sent 
by master station to the remote station that the data has been successfully received.  
‘<PACTOR STANBY>’ indicates the unlink operation is done.  It also indicates that 
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master station is ready for the next link operation and data transmission.  Figure 6.16 
shows the application at master station. 
 
 
A database also implemented to store information received by master station 
from time to time.  The database is able to store information like the on or off and 
analog meter reading for both lamp and motor at a particular date and time.  The 
database as shown in Figure 6.17 is important for report generation, future statistical 
analysis and possibly an evidence for the failure of equipment at lighthouse.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Database of the SCADA master 
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6.1.5 Results 
 
 
By using Protel DXP 2004, RTU Printed Circuit Bard (PCB) for remote 
station is done and ready to use. Figure 6.18 shows the view of RTU PCB. Two 
digital input and two analog inputs (one ac input and one dc input) are available, 
which are at the left side of the picture.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Picture of RTU PCB 
 
 
Figure 6.19 shows the PCB for power supply which is capable of converting 
the 240V ac voltage from mains to +5V, +12V and –12V to the RTU microcontroller 
circuit.  Since the power source is the 240V ac voltage, therefore, a transformer is 
used to scale down the voltage level.  The transformer has to be connected to the left 
hand side of the power supply PCB.  
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Figure 6.19: Picture of power supply PCB 
 
 
Due to the difficulties to test the system on real light house, a digital input 
board has been made to represent the digital input from the control system at 
lighthouse triggered by the photo sensor.  The digital input board consists of two 
switches and two indication LEDs, representing the lighthouse lamp and motor on or 
off status.  Figure 6.20 shows the picture of the digital input board. By integrate all 
the equipment as shown in Figure 6.21; a demonstrable prototype of light house 
telemetry is done.   
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Figure 6.20: Picture of digital input board 
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Figure 6.21: Pictures showing the prototype light house telemetry system: 
master station, remote station, and graphic user interface (GUI).  
 
 
 
 
6.2 Implementation of Vessel Tracking System 
 
 
The system is used to monitor the location of the ship from a location to 
another location. The differences between the system and previous are the RTU is on 
the ship not at remote area, the information sent and software application for master 
station in order to display the movement of the ship. The RTU and others equipments 
are same. Figure 6.22 shows the diagram of vessel tracking system. 
 
 
 
Remote station 
Master station 
GUI for Master Station Modem
HF radio
Modem
HF radio 
RTU 
Sensor 
signals 
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Figure 6.22: Long range HF telemetry system for vessel tracking application. 
 
 
Instead read the sensors, the RTU read the position from the GPS (Global 
Positioning System) and transmit to master station.  Figure 6.33 is a commercial GPS 
which a part of the system.  
 
 
                                               
 
Figure 6.33: Garmin GPS 76 handheld unit 
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Software application for master stations is developed using Microsoft Visual 
C++ as shown in Figure 6.34. It will indicate the position of the ship based on 
latitude and longitude which transmitted from the ship. Each received data will store 
into database for reference. Figure 6.35 shows the layout of equipments setup of 
master and remote station for a prototype of vessel tracking system. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.34:  Software applications for vessel tracking system 
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Figure 6.35: Pictures showing the prototype vessel tracking station : master 
station, remote station, and graphic user interface (GUI).  
 
 
 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
 
The long range telemetry systems developed are for lighthouse telemetry and 
vessel tracking system. Both systems are suitable for use in maritime environment 
where the distances do not allow the use of conventional communication 
technologies such as line of sight communications such as VHF and UHF radio and 
cellular communications such as GSM. HF communication technology is proposed 
due to low cost of operation. The vessel tracking system will allow fleet operators 
and marine organization to monitor the position of the vessel at all times, while the 
light house telemetry system allows the organization to monitor the condition of 
Remote station 
Master station 
GUI for Master Station 
GPS
RTU
Modem
GPS antenna 
HF radio
Modem
HF radio 
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equipment to ensure navigation safety. The present systems are already implemented 
and tested in the lab 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
HF communications is no longer limited to voice and telegraphy but today has 
included applications such as short messaging, file transfer, email and telemetry.  Long 
distance communication over the HF spectrum is achieved by the refraction of radio 
waves on the ionosphere. The outcome of this research has produced a prototype HF data 
transmission system that is capable to transmit images.  Additional features of the system 
include short messaging, telemetry and file transfer, and cryptographic features such as 
authentication, key distribution and confidentiality. The proposed system is useful any 
users that operates over large expanse of land and water where the cost of setting up and 
operating a communication infrastructure is not economical. Possible end user for this 
product includes the military, law enforcement, deep sea fishing, oil and gas and amateur 
radio. The project has achieved all of the objectives with the inclusion of telemetry 
applications.  
 
Some preliminary work was done in the development of robust high speed 
modem based on the Texas Instrument’s TMS320C5416 DSP processor. Due the effect 
of multipath fading and interference in the HF spectrum, it was concluded that further 
research should be continued in this area. Future work will also include the inclusion of 
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email function as part of the HF data communication system. With this features, users are 
able to communicate with existing email services eventhough they are not accessible by 
the conventional communication infrastructure such as the PSTN (Public Switched 
Telephone Network) and the cellular telephone network. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
Below are descriptions or step by step of performing Guess-and-Determine 
attack on Multiplexing and Linear generator. Although the backward process is not 
the same between generators but the idea of performing backward processes for both 
generators can be used as reference for other generators. Next, the verification of 
cipher system is discussed. It shows the concept of verifying the software design. 
 
 
 
 
1.0 GUESS-AND-DETERMINE ATTACKS ON MULTIPLEXING 
GENERATOR. 
 
 
1. First, consider all these following assumptions: 
 
(i) LFSR 0 become a selector and polynomial of LFSR 0 is GF(23):   
(ii) f(x) = 1 + x2 + x3 
(iii) LFSR 1 as input and polynomial of LFSR 1 is GF(24) :   
  f(x) = 1 + x3 + x4 
(iv) Amount of keystream is known. For example: K(n) = 1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1 
(v) Complete knowledge of algorithm. In this case, the algorithm is using 
4 to 1 multiplexer and X3 and X2 states as selectors. 
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2. Then built a truth table of LFSR 0 and LFSR 1. Guesses the initial condition of 
LFSR 0. The number of guessing is equal to 23.  Next, put the keystream bit by 
bit to each state of LFSR 1 depending on selector value which is X3 and X2 states 
of LFSR 0. Table 7.1 show that every row of truth table filled with the 
keystream. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Truth table for both LFSRs 
 
   a). LFSR 0   b). LFSR 1 
    
 
3. The next process is filling the truth table of LFSR 1. As we know that, the state 
values inside the LFSR are delayed from the previous values. Means, values in 
state X4 actually delayed from values of state X3.  From this knowledge, the truth 
table of LFSR is filled as shown in Table 7.2. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Truth table of LFSR 1 is filled and represented by bold binary   
bit. 
X4 X3 X2 X1 
1 1   1 
1   1   
  1     
1     0 
    0 1 
  0 1 0 
0 1 0   
1 0     
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4. Based on polynomial used where the state of X1 is an output of XOR process 
between X3 and X4, continue filling the truth table. Now, the truth table is 
become as Table 7.3. 
 
 
Table 7.3: Another binary bit recovered from the polynomial knowledge. 
X4 X3 X2 X1 
1 1  1 
1  1 0 
1 1   
1 0  0 
  0 1 
 0 1 0 
0 1 0  
1 0  1 
 
 
5. Repeat the step 3 and 4 until all binary bits is filled in truth table as shown in 
Table 7.4. 
 
 
Table 7.4: The secret key is represented by bold binary bit. 
X4 X3 X2 X1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
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6. From Table 7.4, secret key of LFSR 1 which is first line of truth table appear and 
the generator now considered is broken and not secured anymore.  
 
7. As a conclusion, the real strength of this algorithm depends on LFSR 0 and in 
this case, instead of 27 the real strength of Multiplexer Generator is 23. 
 
 
 
 
2.0 GUESS-AND-DETERMINE ATTACKS ON LINEAR GENERATOR. 
 
 
1. Firstly, consider all these following assumptions: 
 
i. Polynomial of LFSR 0 is GF(23): f(x) = 1 + x2 + x3 
ii. Polynomial of LFSR 1 is GF(24) :  f(x) = 1 + x3 + x4 
iii. Polynomial of LFSR 2 is GF(25) :  f(x) = 1 + x2 + x5 
iv. Amount of keystream is known. For example: K(n) = 1,0,1,0,1,1,1 
v. Complete knowledge of algorithm structure: )()()()( 210 nsnsnsnz ⊕⊕=  
where s0(n), s1(n) and s2(n) represent the outputs of LFSR 0 to 2. 
 
 
2. Next, guesses 2 over 3 LFSR and usually we guesses the first 2 smallest LFSRs 
to reduce number of trials. Example of output for each LFSR is shown in Table 
7.5 and the initial condition of each LFSR is represented by bold binary bits. 
 
 
Table 7.5: Example of the initial conditions required before backward the process 
LFSR 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
LFSR 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
LFSR 2          
Keystream K(n) 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
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3. Then, backward the algorithm structure process to determine the output of LFSR 
2. This can be done using Equation 
 
)()()()( 102 nznsnsns ⊕⊕=  
 
 
4. The secret key of LFSR 2 will appear as shown in Table 7.6. The first 5 bit of 
LFSR 2 is secret key of generator. 
 
 
Table 7.6: Secret key of LFSR 2 determined by reverse the linear process 
LFSR 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
LFSR 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
LFSR 2 1 0 0 0 1  1 1 
Keystream K(n) 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
 
 
5. Now, the algorithm is broken and instead of 212, the real strength of linear 
generator in this case is 27. 
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3.0 VERIFICATION OF CIPHER SYSTEM BASED ON LFSR 
 
The verification of the cipher system was done by comparing between the keystream 
that generated manually by calculation and produced from simulation software. Both 
keystream should be the same. Below is an example of verification on Improved 
Geffe generator using small registers. The configurations of the system are: 
  
Register 1: 
        Size of register : 3 
        Coefficient       : 101 
        Initial                :  011  
Register 2: 
        Size of register : 5 
        Coefficient        : 10010 
        Initial                 :  10101 
Register 3: 
        Size of register   : 7 
        Coefficient         : 1000001 
        Initial                  : 0001111 
 
 
 
Table 7.7: Pseudorandom sequences produce by LFSR  
Register Sequences  
 207
1 1100 1011 1001 0111 0010 1110 0101 1100 1011 1001 0111 0010 11 
2 1010 1000 0100 1011 0011 1110 0011 0111 0101 0000 1001 0110 01 
3 1111 0000 0010 0000 1100 0010 1000 1111 0010 0010 1100 1110 10 
 
Table 7.8: Keystream sequences   
Keystream 
Sources 
Sequences  
Calculation 1110 1000 0000 0011 0010 1110 0001 1111 0011 0000 1101 
0110 11 
Simulation 1110 1000 0000 0011 0010 1110 0001 1111 0011 0000 1101 
0110 11 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 Below are descriptions of theoretically BER calculation based on measured SNR 
that obtain from field-testing. Then, follow by the examples of corrupted signals due to 
multipath fading problems. 
 
 
 
 
1.0 THEORETICAL BER CALCULATION BASED ON MEASURED SNR 
 
 
The SNR is obtained from the field-testing result. The uncoded BER is calculated from 
the ratio of error and total received bits. The actual uncoded BER is compared with 
uncoded BER result for comparison purposes. Theoretical BER is calculated based on 
the measured SNR. Measured SNR is 
 
 SNR (dB) 


=
powerNoise
powersignallog10  



=
0
log10
N
Eb        (B.1) 
 
 209
where 
4
2
b
b
TA
E =  is energy per bit, A is signal amplitude, bT is bit duration and 0N  is 
noise power [Sklar, 2001]. Uncoded BER for DPSK is calculated as 
 
 


−=
0
2
4
exp
2
1
N
TA
BER b        (B.2) 
 
where by substituting 
2
2
b
b
TAE =  into the equation produces  
 



−=
02
exp
2
1
N
EBER b         (B.3) 
 
Referring from Equation (B.1), uncoded BER can be calculated by substituting value of 
0/ NEb  into Equation (B.3). Uncoded BER for DQPSK is 
 



−=
02
exp
N
EBER b         (B.4) 
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2.0 EXAMPLES OF CORRUPTED SIGNAL IN ENDAU ROMPIN AND BALING 
 
 
 
Figure B 1: Example of Corrupted Signal in Endau Rompin 
 
 
 
 
Figure B 2: Example of Corrupted Signal in Endau Rompin 
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Figure B 3: Example of Corrupted Signal in Baling 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
1.0 HF TRANSCEIVER TS-570D SPECIFICATION 
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2.0 HF MODEM KAM’98 SPECIFICATION 
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3.0 EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE  
 
 
 
 
 216
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4.0 THE HUFFMAN-COMPRESSED ASCII TABLE 
 
 
Char ASCII Huffman (LSB [sent first] on left) Char ASCII 
Huffman (LSB [sent first] 
on left) 
 space 32  10  M 77  111101010 
 e 101  011  9 57   0001010010 
 n 10  0101  W 87  0001010100 
 i 105  1101  5 53  0001010101 
 r  114  1110  y  121  0001010110 
 t  116  00000  2  50  0001011010 
 s  115  00100  3 51  0001011011 
 d  100  00111  4 52  0001011100 
 a  97  01000  6 54  0001011101 
 u  117  11111  7 55  0001011110 
 l  108  000010  8 56  0001011111 
 h  104  000100  H 72  0010100010 
 g  103  000111  J 74  1100000110 
 m  109  001011  U 85  1100000111 
 <CR> 13  001100  V 86  1100011000 
 <LF> 10  001101  <FS> 28  1100011001 
 o  111  010010  x  120  1100011010 
 c   99  010011  K 75  1100110100 
 b  98  0000110  ? 63  1100110101 
 f   102  0000111  = 61  1111000010 
 w  119  0001100  q     113  1111010110 
 D  68  0001101  Q 81  1111010111 
 k  107  0010101  j  106  00010100110 
 z  122  11000010  G 71  00010100111 
 .  46  1100100  -  45  00010101111 
 , 44  1100101  : 58  00101000111 
 S 83  1111011  ! 33  11110011101 
 A 65  00101001  / 47  11110011110 
 E 69  11000000   * 42  001010001100 
 P 112  11000010  % 37  110001101101 
 v  118  11000011  & 38  111100111001 
 O 48  11000111  + 43  111100111110 
 F 70  11001100  > 62  0001010111000 
 B 66  11001111  @ 64  0001010111001 
 C 67  11110001  $ 36  0001010111010 
 I  73  11110010  < 60  00001010111010 
 T 84  11110100  X 88  0001010111011 
 O 79  000101000  # 35  0010100011011 
 P 80  000101100  Y 89  00101000110101 
 1 49  001010000  ;  59  11110000110100 
 R 82  110000010  \ 92  11110000110101 
 (  40  110011011  [ 91  001010001101000 
 ) 41  110011100  ] 93  001010001101000 
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 L 76  110011101  <DEL> 127  110001101111000 
 N 78  111100000  ~ 126  110001101111001 
 Z 90  111100110  } 125  110001101111010 
 | 124  110001101111011  { 123  110001101111100 
 
 
 
5.0   EXAMPLES OF  TEXT FILES 
 
5.1 4 Kbytes Text File 
 
============================================================
====== 
       MICROSOFT FOUNDATION CLASS LIBRARY : comm 
============================================================
====== 
 
AppWizard has created this comm application for you.  This application 
not only demonstrates the basics of using the Microsoft Foundation classes 
but is also a starting point for writing your application. 
 
This file contains a summary of what you will find in each of the files that 
make up your comm application. 
 
comm.dsp 
 
    This file (the project file) contains information at the project level and 
    is used to build a single project or subproject. Other users can share the 
    project (.dsp) file, but they should export the make files locally. 
 
comm.h 
 
    This is the main header file for the application.  It includes other 
    project specific headers (including Resource.h) and declares the 
    CCommApp application class. 
 
comm.cpp 
 
    This is the main application source file that contains the application 
    class CCommApp. 
 
comm.rc 
 
    This is a listing of all of the Microsoft Windows resources that the 
    program uses.  It includes the icons, bitmaps, and cursors that are stored 
    in the RES subdirectory.  This file can be directly edited in Microsoft 
 
Visual C++. 
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comm.clw 
 
    This file contains information used by ClassWizard to edit existing 
    classes or add new classes.  ClassWizard also uses this file to store 
    information needed to create and edit message maps and dialog data 
    maps and to create prototype member functions. 
 
res\comm.ico 
    This is an icon file, which is used as the application's icon.  This 
    icon is included by the main resource file comm.rc. 
 
res\comm.rc2 
 
    This file contains resources that are not edited by Microsoft  
 
Visual C++.  You should place all resources not editable by 
the resource editor in this file. 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
AppWizard creates one dialog class: 
 
commDlg.h, commDlg.cpp - the dialog 
 
    These files contain your CCommDlg class.  This class defines 
    the behavior of your application's main dialog.  The dialog's 
    template is in comm.rc, which can be edited in Microsoft 
 
Visual C++. 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
Other standard files: 
 
StdAfx.h, StdAfx.cpp 
 
    These files are used to build a precompiled header (PCH) file 
    named comm.pch and a precompiled types file named StdAfx.obj. 
 
Resource.h 
 
    This is the standard header file, which defines new resource IDs. 
    Microsoft Visual C++ reads and updates this file. 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
Other notes: 
 
AppWizard uses "TODO:" to indicate parts of the source code you 
should add to or customize. 
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If your application uses MFC in a shared DLL, and your application is  
in a language other than the operating system's current language, you 
will need to copy the corresponding localized resources MFC42XXX.DLL 
from the Microsoft Visual C++ CD-ROM onto the system or system32 directory, 
and rename it to be MFCLOC.DLL.  ("XXX" stands for the language abbreviation. 
For example, MFC42DEU.DLL contains resources translated to German.)  If you 
don't do this, some of the UI elements of your application will remain in the 
language of the operating system. 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 3 Kbytes text file 
 
 
1.0 Title 
Performance Analysis of Differential Phase Modulation for HF Digital 
Communication 
 
2.0 Introduction  
The existence of essential electrons in ionosphere makes long distance 
communication possible. Some of ionosphere layers act like mirror where the signal 
in the ionosphere experience maximum refraction, that they are bent back toward the 
earth’s surface. This characteristic makes skywave propagation using high frequency 
(HF) available while for short distance transmissions, groundwave propagation will 
be used.  
 
Transmission using HF spectrum (3-30MHz) is required to get a system that 
available to operate over a broad range of adverse channel, due to ionosphere 
variability. These problems makes HF left behind compared to satellite and fiber 
optic communication network. However, HF spectrum is still widely used for tactical 
and strategic military purpose.  
 
Besides that, HF communication system requires minimum infrastructure at low cost, 
on the other hand satellite communication requires a very high cost and frequent 
maintenance. Transmission over HF communication system is operated without the 
need to use the service of third party which much more secure compared to 
transmission using satellite. The sender and the receiver will only require HF 
transceiver and HF modem. Privacy is guaranteed for HF communication because 
the medium is not control by anyone whereas for satellite communication, the 
satellite company will undoubtedly have the access to the information. The problem 
of wear and tear will arise in satellite communication, for HF communication this 
problem does not exist. 
 
The purpose of this project is to develop a digital communication system through 
HF. Design and analyze of multi-phase digital modulation technique that combat 
variability’s of channel effect and perform higher data transmission rate through HF. 
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3.0 Problem Statement 
In HF communication, the variability of ionosphere results multipath fading 
phenomenon. This phenomenon gives several affects in the communication, which 
are time delay spread, Doppler shift and time selective fading. Due to time delay 
spread problem, system can only transmit data to 100 boud per second. A serious 
time delay spread problem will cause for inter symbol interference (ISI).  By limiting 
the data transmission rate to 100 baud per  
 
There are several problems to be focused as listed below: 
1. How to combat the nature of the channel, and 
2. How to improve the reliability in data transmission that enables data 
transmission rate greater than 100 bits per second. 
3. What is the technique can be used in order to improve the reliability in data 
transmission. 
 
As a solution, to increase the data transmission rate without changing or increasing 
the baud rate, differential phase modulation is used. 
 
4.0 Objective 
The main objective of this project is to design, simulate and analysis a HF 
communication system that combats the variability’s of channel effects 
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6.0 EXAMPLES OF JPEG IMAGE 
 
 
6.1 5 Kbytes image 
 
 
 
 
6.2   6 Kbytes image 
 
 
 
 
6.3   10 Kbytes image 
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6.4   12 Kbytes image 
 
 
 
 
6.5   4 Kbytes image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 224
6.6  9 Kbytes image 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
1.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF AES 128 AND AES 256 
 
 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
 
void AES_ENCRYPT128(); 
void AES_DECRYPT128(); 
void AES_ENCRYPT256(); 
void AES_DECRYPT256(); 
 
static word8 shifts[4][2] = { 
   0, 0, 
   1, 3, 
   2, 2, 
   3, 1, 
};  
 
//Global Initialize 
word8 text[16], key[32], out_text[16], t[4][4], k[4][MAX_Nk], 
roundKey[MAX_Nr+1][4][4];    
 
/* multiplication operation of two elements of GF(2^m) needed for MixColumn and 
InvMixColumn */ 
word8 mul(word8 a, word8 b)  
{ 
 if (a && b)  
  return Alogtable[(Logtable[a] + Logtable[b])%255]; 
 else return 0; 
} 
 
void AddRoundKey(word8 a[4][4], word8 rk[4][4])  
{ 
 int i, j; 
 for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
     for(j = 0; j < 4; j++)  
   a[i][j] ^= rk[i][j]; 
} 
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void ShiftRow(word8 a[4][4], word8 d)  
{ 
 word8 tmp[4]; 
 int i, j; 
 for(i = 1; i < 4; i++) 
 { 
  for(j = 0; j < 4; j++)  
   tmp[j] = a[i][(j + shifts[i][d]) % 4]; 
  for(j = 0; j < 4; j++)  
   a[i][j] = tmp[j]; 
 } 
} 
 
void SubByte(word8 a[4][4], word8 box[256])  
{ 
 int i, j; 
 for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
  for(j = 0; j < 4; j++)  
   a[i][j] = box[a[i][j]] ; 
} 
    
void MixColumn(word8 a[4][4])  
{ 
 word8 b[4][4]; 
 int i, j; 
 for(j = 0; j < 4; j++) 
  for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
   b[i][j] = mul(2,a[i][j]) 
     ^ mul(3,a[(i + 1) % 4][j]) 
     ^ a[(i + 2) % 4][j] 
     ^ a[(i + 3) % 4][j]; 
 for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
  for(j = 0; j < 4; j++)  
   a[i][j] = b[i][j]; 
} 
 
/* This is the opposite operation of Mixcolumn */ 
void InvMixColumn(word8 a[4][4]) 
 { 
 word8 b[4][4]; 
 int i, j; 
 for(j = 0; j < 4; j++) 
 for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)              
  b[i][j] = mul(0xe,a[i][j]) 
    ^ mul(0xb,a[(i + 1) % 4][j])                  
    ^ mul(0xd,a[(i + 2) % 4][j]) 
    ^ mul(0x9,a[(i + 3) % 4][j]);                         
 for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
  for(j = 0; j < 4; j++)  
   a[i][j] = b[i][j]; 
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} 
 
 
/* Calculate the necessary round keys 
 * The number of calculations depends on AES type */ 
 
int KeySched (word8 k[4][MAX_Nk], int AES, word8 W[MAX_Nr+1][4][4])  
{ 
 int Nk, Nr; 
 int i, j, t, rconpointer = 0; 
 word8 tk[4][MAX_Nk];    
 
 switch (AES) { 
 case 128: Nk = 4; Nr = 10; break; 
 case 192: Nk = 6; Nr = 12; break; 
 case 256: Nk = 8; Nr = 14; break; 
 default : return 0;  
 } 
 
 for(j = 0; j < Nk; j++) 
  for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
   tk[i][j] = k[i][j]; 
 t = 0; 
  
 /* copy values into initial round key array, W[Nr+1][4][4] */ 
 for(j = 0; (j < Nk) && (t < (Nr+1)*4); j++, t++) 
  for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)  
  { W[t / 4][i][t % 4] = tk[i][j]; } 
 
 /* calculate the remaining round keys for round key array */ 
 while (t < (Nr+1)*4) {  
   
  for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) 
   tk[i][0] ^= S[tk[(i+1)%4][Nk-1]]; 
  tk[0][0] ^= rcon[rconpointer++]; 
 
  if (Nk != 8) 
   for(j = 1; j < Nk; j++) 
    for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)  
     tk[i][j] ^= tk[i][j-1]; 
  else { 
   for(j = 1; j < Nk/2; j++) 
    for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)  
     tk[i][j] ^= tk[i][j-1]; 
   for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)  
    tk[i][Nk/2] ^= S[tk[i][Nk/2 - 1]]; 
   for(j = Nk/2 + 1; j < Nk; j++) 
    for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)  
     tk[i][j] ^= tk[i][j-1]; 
   } 
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 /* copy generated values into round key array */ 
 
 for(j = 0; (j < Nk) && (t < (Nr+1)*4); j++, t++) 
  for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)  
  { W[t / 4][i][t % 4] = tk[i][j]; } 
 } 
 return 0; 
} 
       
int Encrypt (word8 a[4][4], int AES, word8 rk[MAX_Nr+1][4][4]) 
{ 
 /* Encryption of one block */ 
 int r, Nr; 
 switch (AES) { 
 case 128: Nr = 10; break; 
 case 192: Nr = 12; break; 
 case 256: Nr = 14; break; 
 default : return 0;  
 } 
 
 /* begin with a key addition */ 
 AddRoundKey(a,rk[0]);  
 
 /* For Rounds, r = 1 to (Nr-1) */ 
 for(r = 1; r < Nr; r++) { 
  SubByte(a,S); 
  ShiftRow(a,0); 
  MixColumn(a); 
  AddRoundKey(a,rk[r]); 
 } 
  
 /* Last round is without MixColumn */ 
 SubByte(a,S); 
 ShiftRow(a,0); 
 AddRoundKey(a,rk[Nr]); 
  
 return 0; 
}    
 
int Decrypt (word8 a[4][4], int AES, word8 rk[MAX_Nr+1][4][4]) 
{ 
 int r, Nr; 
 switch (AES) { 
 case 128: Nr = 10; break; 
 case 192: Nr = 12; break; 
 case 256: Nr = 14; break; 
 default : return 0; /* this cannot happen */ 
 } 
 AddRoundKey(a,rk[Nr]); 
 SubByte(a,Si); 
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 ShiftRow(a,1);               
  
 for(r = Nr-1; r > 0; r--) { 
  AddRoundKey(a,rk[r]); 
  InvMixColumn(a);       
  SubByte(a,Si); 
  ShiftRow(a,1);                 
 } 
  
 AddRoundKey(a,rk[0]);     
 
 return 0; 
} 
 
/* MAIN PROGRAM*/ 
 
void main () 
{ 
 
 
 /*AES-128 bits Encryption*/ 
 AES_ENCRYPT128(); 
 
 /*AES-128 bits Decryption*/ 
 AES_DECRYPT128(); 
 
 /*AES-256 Encryption */ 
 AES_ENCRYPT 256(); 
 
 /*AES-256 bits Decryption*/ 
 AES_ENCRYPT256(); 
 
} 
void AES_ENCRYPT 128(); 
{ 
 int AES=128,Nk=4,Nr=10; 
 int i, j, m; 
 /* Chunking input text into text[16] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
{t[i][j] = text[4*j+i] & 0xFF; } //text[] is a plaintext 128 bits 
 } 
 
 /* Chunking key into key[32] array */  
 for (j=0; j<Nk; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
  { k[i][j] = key[4*j+i] & 0xFF; }//key is secret key 128 bits 
 }  
 
 /* Round key generation */ 
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 KeySched (k, AES, roundKey); 
 /*Encryption */ 
 Encrypt (t, AES, roundKey); 
  
 /*Arrange the Cipher Text in Array 128 bits */ 
 for (m=0; m<16; m++) 
 { for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
  { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
   { out_text[4*j+i] = t[i][j]; //out_text is a cipher text 128 
bits 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
 
void AES_DECRYPT128(); 
{ 
 int AES=128,Nk=4,Nr=10; 
 int i, j, m; 
 /* Chunking input text into text[16] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
{t[i][j] = text[4*j+i] & 0xFF; } //text[] is a cipher text 128 bits 
 } 
 
 /* Chunking key into key[32] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<Nk; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
  { k[i][j] = key[4*j+i] & 0xFF; }//key is a secret key 128 bits 
 }  
 
 /* Round key generation */ 
 KeySched (k, AES, roundKey); 
 /*Decryption */ 
 Decrypt (t, AES, roundKey); 
 
 /*Arrange the Plain Text in Array 128 bits */ 
 for (m=0; m<16; m++) 
 { for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
  { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
   { out_text[4*j+i] = t[i][j]; //out_text is a plainctext 128 
bits 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
 
 
void AES_ENCRYPT256 (); 
{ 
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 int AES=256,Nk=8,Nr=14; 
 int i, j, m; 
 /* Chunking input text into text[16] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
{t[i][j] = text[4*j+i] & 0xFF; } //text[] is a plaintext 256 bits 
 } 
 
 /* Chunking key into key[32] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<Nk; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
  { k[i][j] = key[4*j+i] & 0xFF; }//key is a secret key 256 bit 
 }  
 
 /* Round key generation */ 
 KeySched (k, AES, roundKey); 
 /*Encryption */ 
 Encrypt (t, AES, roundKey); 
  
 /*Arrange the Cipher Text in Array 128 bits */ 
 for (m=0; m<16; m++) 
 { for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
  { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
   { out_text[4*j+i] = t[i][j]; //out_text is a cipher text 256 
bits 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
 
void AES_DECRYPT256(); 
{ 
 int AES=256,Nk=8,Nr=14; 
 int i, j, m; 
 /* Chunking input text into text[16] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
{t[i][j] = text[4*j+i] & 0xFF; } //text[] is a cipher text 128 bits 
 } 
 
 /* Chunking key into key[32] array */ 
 for (j=0; j<Nk; j++) 
 { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
  { k[i][j] = key[4*j+i] & 0xFF; }//key is a secret key 256 bit 
 }  
 
 /* Round key generation */ 
 KeySched (k, AES, roundKey); 
 /*Decryption */ 
 Decrypt (t, AES, roundKey); 
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 /*Arrange the Plain Text in Array 128 bits */ 
 for (m=0; m<16; m++) 
 { for (j=0; j<4; j++) 
  { for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
   { out_text[4*j+i] = t[i][j]; //out_text is a plainctext 128 
bits 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
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2.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF W7 CIPHER SYSTEM 
 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <conio.h> 
#include <math.h> 
 
#define REGLNG 30000 
#define SEQLNG 30000 
 
void setNLFSR(); 
void LFSR(int ncof,int nbits,int reg[],int cof[],int *seq); 
void W7(int ndat,int *seq,int *seq1,int *seq2); 
 
int temp[30000];   //temp keystream 
 
void main() 
{ 
 int *seq,*msg,*seq1,*seq2; 
 /*polynomial coefficients*/ 
int cof0[19]={1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; 
int cof1[23]={1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; 
int cof2[29]={1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0} 
int reg0[REGLNG], reg1[REGLNG], reg2[REGLNG]; 
 
/*Initialize memory *seq & *msg.*/ 
 
 seq=(int*)malloc(SEQLNG*sizeof(int)); /* to set seq memory loccation*/ 
 if(seq==NULL)    // if connot setting seq memory 
 { printf("\n Memory allocation fail!"); // exit 
  exit(0); 
 } 
 
 seq1=(int*)malloc(SEQLNG*sizeof(int)); /* to set1 seq memory 
loccation*/ 
 if(seq1==NULL)    // if connot setting seq memory 
 { printf("\n Memory allocation fail!"); // exit 
  exit(0); 
 } 
  
 seq2=(int*)malloc(SEQLNG*sizeof(int)); /* to set1 seq memory 
loccation*/ 
 if(seq2==NULL)    // if connot setting seq memory 
 { printf("\n Memory allocation fail!"); // exit 
  exit(0); 
 } 
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 msg=(int*)malloc(SEQLNG*sizeof(int)); /* to set msg memory 
loccation*/ 
 if(msg==NULL) 
 { printf("\nMemory allocation fail."); // if connot setting msg memory  
  exit(0); 
 } 
 
 for(i=0;i<=SEQLNG;i++)  /* to empty the msg and the seq 
loccation*/ 
 { 
  *(msg+i)=0;*(seq+i)=0; 
  *(seq1+i)=0;*(seq2+i)=0; 
 } 
 
 setNLFSR();    //setup the LFSR 
 LFSR(19,10000,reg0,cof0,seq); //Generate LFSR sequence and save to 
m1 LFSR(23,10000,reg1,cof1,seq1); //Generate LFSR sequence and save to 
m2 
 LFSR(29,10000,reg2,cof2,seq2); //Generate LFSR sequence and save to 
m3 
 W7(10000,seq,seq1,seq2);  //Generate W7 keystream 
} 
 
/*Routine for Linear Feedback Shift Register. */ 
void LFSR(int ncof,int nbits,int reg[],int cof[],int *seq) 
{ 
 int i,j,k,sum=0,temp; 
 for(i=0;i<=(nbits-1);i++) 
 { 
  *(seq+i)=reg[0]; 
  for(j=0;j<=(ncof-1);j++) 
  { 
   temp=reg[j] & cof[j]; 
/*Perform modulo 2 addition. */ 
   sum=sum^temp; //  sum = sum exor temp 
  } 
  for(j=0;j<=(ncof-2);j++) 
   reg[j]=reg[j+1]; 
   
  reg[ncof-1]=sum; 
  sum=0; 
 } 
} 
 
 
/* Routine for setup the Nonlinear feedback Shift Register*/ 
void setNLFSR() 
{ 
 int a,i; 
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 for(i=0;i<19;i++) 
 { reg0[i]=session_key[a]; //put the session key as initial condition 
  a++ 
 } 
 for(i=0;i<23;i++) 
 { reg1[i]=session_key[a]; //put the session key as initial condition 
  a++ 
 } 
 
 for(i=0;i<29;i++)   
 { reg0[i]=session_key[a]; //put the session key as initial condition 
  a++ 
 } 
} 
 
void W7(int ndat, int *n,int *p, int *q) 
{ 
 int a0,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,i;  //taps for filters 
 int sum_a1, sum_a2, sum_a3;  //sum of filters 
 int sum1, sum2, sum3;  //sum of each lfsr 
 int c1=0, c2=0, c3=0;   //clock taps 
 int a=0, b=0, c=0;   //a-lfsr0; b-lfsr1; c-lfsr2 
 
 for(i=0;i<ndat;i++) 
 { //LFSR 0 
  a0 = *(n+a);  //state of 19 
  a1 = *(n+a+2); // state of 16 
  a2 = *(n+a+3); // state of 17 
  a3 = *(n+a+6); // state of 13 
  a4 = *(n+a+7); // state of 12 
   
  a5 = *(n+a+9); // state of 10 
  a6 = *(n+a+12); // state of 7 
  a7 = *(n+a+13); // state of 6  
  /*nonlinear combining function*/ 
  sum_a1 = a1&a2; 
  sum_a2 = a3&a4; 
  sum_a3 = a5&a6&a7; 
  sum1 = a0^sum_a1^sum_a2^sum_a3; 
  
  
  //LFSR 1 
  a0 = *(p+b);  // state of 23 
  a1 = *(p+b+4); // state of 19 
  a2 = *(p+b+5); // state of 18 
  a3 = *(p+b+9); // state of 14 
  a4 = *(p+b+11); // state of 12 
  a5 = *(p+b+14); // state of 9 
  a6 = *(p+b+15); // state of 8 
  a7 = *(p+b+18); // state of 5 
 214
  /*nonlinear combining function*/ 
  sum_a1 = a1&a2; 
  sum_a2 = a3&a4; 
  sum_a3 = a5&a6&a7; 
  sum2 = a0^sum_a1^sum_a2^sum_a3; 
   
  //LFSR 2 
  a0 = *(q+c);  // state of 29 
  a1 = *(q+c+6); // state of 23 
  a2 = *(q+c+7); // state of 22 
  a3 = *(q+c+10); // state of 19 
  a4 = *(q+c+11); // state of 18 
  a5 = *(q+c+14); // state of 15 
  a6 = *(q+c+18); // state of 11 
  a7 = *(q+c+19); // state of 10 
  /*nonlinear combining function*/ 
  sum_a1 = a1&a2; 
  sum_a2 = a3&a4; 
  sum_a3 = a5&a6&a7; 
  sum3 = a0^sum_a1^sum_a2^sum_a3; 
  /*results of keystream*/ 
  *(msg+i) = sum1^sum2^sum3; 
  //clock taps 
  c1 = *(n+a+8); 
  c2 = *(p+b+10); 
  c3 = *(q+c+15); 
 
  if(c1==0 && c2 ==0 && c3==0){ 
   a=a+1;b=b+1;c=c+1;}    
  if(c1==0 && c2 ==0 && c3==1){ 
   a=a+1;b=b+1;c=c;} 
  if(c1==0 && c2 ==1 && c3==0){ 
   a=a+1;b=b;c=c+1;} 
  if(c1==0 && c2 ==1 && c3==1){ 
   a=a;b=b+1;c=c+1;} 
  if(c1==1 && c2 ==0 && c3==0){ 
   a=a;b=b+1;c=c+1;} 
  if(c1==1 && c2 ==0 && c3==1){ 
   a=a+1;b=b;c=c+1;} 
  if(c1==1 && c2 ==1 && c3==0){ 
   a=a+1;b=b+1;c=c;} 
  if(c1==1 && c2 ==1 && c3==1){ 
   a=a+1;b=b+1;c=c+1;} 
 } 
} 
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3.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF RADIX 64 
 
 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <stdio.h> 
 
void Radix64_encoder(); 
void Radix64_decoder(); 
/*Global Initialize*/ 
CString input, output;   //input is a cryptogram given by Main Program 
Char data[1250],data1[1250];  //1250 for 10,000 bit of keystream 
int input_len, output_len; 
void  Main() 
{ 
 int i; 
 
 Radix64_encoder();   //encode the cryptogram 
      //the result saves in the output and ready  
      // to transfer to HF modem via serial  
      //communication 
 
 Radix64_decoder();   //decode the receive message before  
      //decrypting 
} 
 
void Radix64_encoder() 
{ int a; 
 char c,c_bar,d,d_bar,e,e_bar; 
 CString temp; 
 
 input_len=input.GetLength();  //check the cryptogram length 
 for(i=0;i<input_len;i++)  //put the cryptogram in array 
 { data[i] = input[i]}; 
 
 for(a=0;a<input_len;a++) 
 { 
  c = data[a];   //take the input 8 bits 
  c_bar = c & 0xfc;  //masking to delete last 2 bits 
  c_bar = c_bar >> 2;  //shift right 2 bits 
  data1[i] = c_bar & 0x3f;   //masking to ensure first 2 bits are 0 
  temp = cryptogram1[i]+40; //adding with the offset 
  output = output + temp; 
 
  i = i + 1; a = a + 1; 
  c_bar = c & 0x03; 
  c_bar = c_bar << 4;  //shift left 4 bits 
  d = data[a]; 
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  d_bar = d & 0xf0; 
  d_bar = d_bar >> 4; 
  d_bar = d_bar & 0x0f; 
  c_bar = c_bar | d_bar; 
  data1[i] = c_bar & 0x3f; 
  temp = data1[i]+40; 
  output = output + temp; 
 
  a = a + 1; 
  d_bar = d & 0x0f; 
  d_bar = d_bar << 2; 
   
  e = data[a]; 
  i = i + 1; 
  e_bar = e & 0xc0; 
  e_bar = e_bar >> 6; 
  e_bar = e_bar & 0x03; 
  e_bar = d_bar | e_bar; 
  data1[i] = e_bar & 0x3f; 
  temp = data1[i]+40; 
  output =output + temp; 
 
  i = i + 1; 
  data1[i] = e & 0x3f; 
  temp = data1[i]+40; 
  output = output + temp; 
  i = i + 1; 
 } 
} 
 
 
void Radix64_decoder() 
{ 
 int a; 
 char k, k_bar, l, l_bar, m, m_bar, n; 
 char temp; 
 
output_len=output.GetLength(); //check the receive message 
//length 
 for(i=0;i<output_len;i++)   //put the message in array 
 { temp = output[i]; 
  temp = temp-40;   //minus the 40 offset 
data[i] = temp;} 
 
  
  
 
 int p=0; 
 for(a=0;a<output_len;a++)  //rearrange the cryptogram 
 {  
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  k = data[a]; 
  k_bar = k << 2; 
  a = a + 1; 
  l = data[a]; 
  l_bar = l & 0x30; 
  l_bar = l_bar >> 4; 
  data1[p] = k_bar | l_bar; 
  p = p + 1; 
  l_bar = l & 0x0f; 
  l_bar = l_bar << 4; 
  a = a + 1; 
  m = data[a]; 
  m_bar = m & 0x3c; 
  m_bar = m_bar >> 2; 
  data1[p] = l_bar | m_bar; 
  a = a + 1; 
  p = p + 1; 
  m_bar = m & 0x03; 
  m_bar = m_bar << 6; 
  n = data[a]; 
  data1[p] = m_bar | n; 
  p = p + 1; 
 } 
} 
 
 
